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Coalition 2000 is a Bulgarian public-private partnership against corruption. 
Launched in 1997, the Coalition has been one of the primary agents 
of change towards improved transparency and integrity in government. 
The experience of Coalition 2000 suggests that a combination of public-
private cooperation in setting an anti-corruption agenda for society and 
a system for monitoring the level of corruption of public administration 
are prerequisites both for designing the long term assistance strategy and 
for evaluating its impact.
This report makes a thorough review of anticorruption reforms in Bulgaria 
since 1997. It offers an analysis of the range, level and dynamics and 
presents the main achievements and challenges of the anti-corruption 
process. It highlights the present-day challenges that Bulgaria should 
meet with its upcoming accession to the EU, such as overcoming its 
structural and institutional failures, the effective operation of the judiciary 
and law-enforcement, and organized crime and gray economy which 
generate corruption practices.
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The long delay in political and economic reforms in Bulgaria in the early 
1990s produced a serious institutional and legal deficit that significantly 
increased the corruption potential in society and ultimately led to the 
crisis of late 1996 and early 1997. Owing to the urgency of the political, 
economic, and social problems in that period, corruption did not attract 
much public attention and was not a subject of research and assessment. 
After 1997, it gradually emerged as an important issue in the public, 
political, and economic life of Bulgaria. With the beginning of political 
stabilization and the acceleration of economic reforms, there was an 
intensification of the process of sweeping redistribution of national 
wealth. Corrupt practices became a key mechanism for gaining specific 
advantages in this process, as well as for the accumulation of capital 
and transfer of resources from the state/public sector to the private 
one. Numerous organized criminal interests acquired powerful positions 
in the economic and political life of the country and strove to preserve 
and expand them by resorting to corrupt practices at all state levels. 
The spread of corruption became visible, permanently destabilizing the 
institutions and deforming the political process.
In this situation, the Bulgarian civil society initiated the public debate 
on corruption and a number of non-governmental organizations placed 
anticorruption at the center of their activity. Since 1997 a leading role 
in this process has been played by Coalition 2000. This initiative brought 
together for the first time non-governmental organizations, government 
institutions and media with the aim of curbing corruption. Unique 
instruments, mechanisms and practices of public-private partnership 
were developed within its framework in the quest for anticorruption 
solutions. In addition to a committed and active civil society, the 
progress of anticorruption reforms also depended on another two essential 
preconditions that were created in 1997. First, there was a reform-
minded government aware of the corruption problems of the country 
and implementing a proactive anticorruption policy. Secondly, strong 
international concern about reducing corruption as an indispensable 
condition for Bulgaria’s accession to NATO and the European Union. 
In this context, a number of international institutions, among which 
most notably the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), encouraged and offered practical support for the anticorruption 
reforms.
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Combating Corruption in Bulgaria through Public-Private 
Partnerships 
Coalition 2000 is one of the most prominent examples of a public-
private partnership in the area of anticorruption in South Eastern 
Europe. Coalition 2000 was established in 1997 by Bulgarian 
nongovernmental organizations to create a cooperative platform 
of public and private institutions. It is an all-inclusive platform 
combining the input and efforts of various stakeholders irrespective 
of their political or institutional affiliations. The partnership has 
developed a Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) to serve as a 
special tool for diagnosing corruption. […] Coalition 2000 also has 
completed a best practices initiative on a local level. […] The 
anticorruption initiative promotes participation by civil society in 
applying mechanisms of civil control over the state, especially with 
respect to carrying out the National Anticorruption Strategy for 
Bulgaria for the period 2001–04.
The experience of Coalition 2000 demonstrates that a determined 
citizenry can demand better government and turn the tables on 
those who are corrupt.
Source: The World Bank, Building Market Institutions in South Eastern Europe, Washington DC, 
2004, p. 76.
Overall, in the period since 1997, considerable progress has been 
made in identifying the corruption-related problems and practices 
in Bulgarian society. A number of specific political, economic, and 
administrative measures have also been adopted and are gradually 
beginning to make a tangible difference on corruption prevalence. The 
most notable trend marking the period since 1997 has been the gradual 
decline of corruption. The data of Transparency International (TI) for 
the period 1998-2004 indicate that, from a country with systemic 
corruption problems (TI index lower than 3), Bulgaria is turning 
into a country with a moderate spread of corruption (TI index 4.1). 
Bulgaria finds itself in a more favorable situation than a number of other 
countries, including some current members of the European Union. For 
instance, in 2004, the TI Corruption Perceptions Index for Slovakia and 
Latvia was 4.0; for Poland, 3.5; and for Romania, 2.9. Better CPI values 
were registered for Bulgaria compared to other countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe with similar GDP per capita.
The drop in the absolute number of corruption transactions actually 
concluded has been significant – around twofold. Whereas in 1998, 
the average monthly number of instances of corrupt interaction with the 
self-reported involvement of adult Bulgarian citizens was in the range 
of 180-200,000, in 2004 it was around 80-90,000. The decline is more 
tangible as regards petty corruption occurring in the interaction between 
citizens and public administration officials. Nevertheless, corruption in 
the economy still poses a serious problem and the anticorruption 
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reforms in the business sector have been proceeding at a slower pace. 
Overall, the spread of corruption in this area exceeds more than twice 
the level registered among the general Bulgarian population. Following 
the drop in the incidence of acts of corruption and corruption pressure 
in the business sector observed in 2000-2002, in the past two years 
the respective values have remained unchanged. It should nevertheless 
be noted that the proportion of Bulgarian companies that have been 
involved in corruption deals has been decreasing.
The late 2004 was marked by stagnation and even an increase in 
the actual spread of corruption compared to the level reached in the 
beginning of the year. This is a serious indication that the anticorruption 
measures taken to date are beginning to exhaust their potential. The 
new challenges faced by the anticorruption efforts of the state and civil 
society are associated primarily with the need to overcome the structural 
and institutional dysfunctions, ensure effective operation of the judiciary 
and law-enforcement, improve the quality of public services, which 
should radically curb the proliferation of corrupt practices.
The anticorruption reforms in the public sphere are characterized by definite 
progress achieved in reducing corruption and by certain implementation 
problems. In this respect, it is worth noting the following:
• Bulgaria already has a relatively well-established anticorruption 
infrastructure as a result of an extensive process that begun in 
the second half of the 1990s at the initiative of civil society and 
with the support of international institutions and organizations. As a 
result of civil initiatives, the first strategic documents for combating 
corruption were developed and approved and on this basis, as 
well as in fulfillment of the country’s international commitments, 
there began the gradual adoption of anticorruption legal instruments 
and institutional mechanisms, including specialized anticorruption 
commissions with each of the three branches of power. Additional 
impetus for this process came from the country’s accession to NATO 
and with the progress of the EU membership negotiations.
• The action taken by the government has largely been aimed at 
limiting petty corruption in the lower ranks of power and has been 
less concerned with counteracting high-level political corruption. 
Political corruption permeates - in a different way and to a differing 
extent - all three branches of power and affects party and political 
elite representatives from the ruling majority and the opposition 
alike. It is harder to expose and prove this kind of corruption which 
necessitates specific measures. As shown by experience in other 
countries, however, even the implementation of these does not 
necessarily guarantee success in limiting political corruption. The fears 
that such a policy may bring about a “chain reaction” of disclosures 
affecting wide circles of top-level politicians largely account for the 
inconsistency and limited efficiency of anticorruption measures in this 
area.
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• Bulgaria has made considerable progress in adopting modern penal 
provisions concerning corruption-related offences. Yet, their 
practical enforcement has largely been hampered by the inconsistent 
and inadequate reform of the penal process. The low effectiveness of 
the bodies of the judiciary in combating corruption can be accounted 
for by a host of factors: the frequent amendments to the penal 
procedural code involving reassignment of functions and prerogatives 
among various authorities; the lack of proper coordination between 
the different units of the judiciary and the other competent authorities 
involved in combating crime and corruption; the lack of working 
mechanisms for exchange of information among them; corruption in 
these institutions and the links of some of their representatives with 
organized crime, etc.
• The number of criminal cases involving corruption-related offenses 
is far too low against the total number of criminal cases finalized 
by the courts and compared to the survey data of the actual 
number of corruption transactions. While in 2003, the average 
monthly number of corruption deals was about 100,000, barely 75 
persons were actually convicted of bribery and misuse of public office 
numbered. For the first half of 2004, the ratio was 80-90,000 to 71. 
The state has been effective in implementing its penal policy largely 
as regards minor cases of corruption while graver offenses, which are 
far more detrimental to public interests, remain unpunished. Thus, 
for instance, in the period from early 2002 to mid-2004, the courts 
imposed sentences involving imprisonment for more than three years 
in no more than seven bribery-related cases, and the sentence only 
exceeded 10 years in a single case.
• The successful counteraction to corruption and organized crime is 
impossible without anticorruption reforms in the judiciary. The role 
of the court system as the last authority in the redistribution of the 
national wealth and power exposes it to strong corruption pressure. 
Reducing and preventing internal corruption in the judiciary 
is crucial for combating corruption in society as a whole. The 
frequent and haphazard reforms cannot ensure efficient operation of 
the judicial system and effective counteraction of internal corruption. 
This is due to the judiciary model and structure laid down in the 
Constitution, as well as to the opposition of quite a few of the 
magistrates to the reforms and their wish to preserve the status-quo.
 
• The Ministry of Interior (MoI) is one of the government institutions 
of key importance in exposing and punishing corruption. For that 
reason, combating corruption within the Ministry itself is essential 
for its effectiveness against corruption in the other bodies of 
public administration. Overall, despite the high degree of secrecy 
in the operation of the Ministry, it has been providing to the public 
more information about its internal anticorruption measures than any 
other government institution. Some obvious outcomes of the steps 
taken are that, in the period 2003-2004, the MoI has announced 
the largest number of internally investigated officials and the largest 
number of cases involving such officials handed to the prosecution.
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• The reforms in the administrative, civil, and commercial laws 
demonstrate definite progress towards creating a legal and institutional 
environment unfavorable to corruption. This has largely been due 
to the country’s international commitments in the context of its 
accession to NATO and EU, as well as to the pressure from civic 
anticorruption initiatives. The pace and quality of the changes and 
their efficient implementation are still among the main problems of 
the legislative reform.
• The adoption of the ombudsman as an out-of-court mechanism 
for human rights protection and an institution with monitoring and 
control functions in counteracting corruption was initiated and has 
been supported by Coalition 2000 since early 1998. A draft legal 
framework was developed for the establishment of this institution 
at the national and local levels and some of its essential provisions 
came to be incorporated in the legislation finally adopted. Although 
the National Assembly failed to elect a national ombudsman, serious 
progress has been made at the municipal level. Thanks to the 
cooperation between Coalition 2000, other civil organizations and the 
local authorities, in 2004 public mediators were appointed and are 
now operating successfully in seven municipalities.
• Ensuring speedier, higher-quality, and more accessible administrative 
service delivery has led to a certain decline in corrupt practices in 
this area. The gradual introduction of new information technologies 
is creating the conditions for radical changes in administrative service 
delivery to the public. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic procedures 
in dealings with businesses and with the public have still not been 
tangibly alleviated.   
State intervention in the economy creates numerous points of 
conflict between private and public interests, which in the absence of 
institutional and administrative capacity and traditions are fostering an 
environment conducive to corruption. Corruption distorts market rules, 
undermines the effectiveness and utility of public services, and provides 
incentives to the hidden economy. Unlawful business incomes in their 
turn constitute a source of corruption pressure and are conducive to the 
emergence of a vicious circle of “corruption-hidden economy-corruption”. 
In this respect, the most notable high-risk zones are the customs and 
taxation, the regulatory regimes, privatization, and public procurement.
• Along with macroeconomic stabilization, increasing international 
integration, liberalization of the economy, and the launch of a 
number of structural reforms in Bulgaria, specific measures have 
been taken to reduce the hidden economy and the corruption 
pressure it generates. The mandatory registration of employment 
contracts introduced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy 
has had the most immediate and tangible impact. The Coalition 
2000 Hidden Economy Index has registered a drop in the share of 
the hidden economy in the country’s GDP from about one-third to 
approximately one-fourth between 1998 and 2004.
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• Progress has been most difficult where the measures aimed against the 
hidden economy affect established mechanisms of political corruption. 
In this respect, preserving duty-free shops at land border crossings 
has been a serious failure of the policy to combat the hidden 
economy and corruption. These outlets constitute one of the major 
channels for illegal import of excise goods in the country. The illegal 
profits they generate serves to maintain the infrastructure of the 
hidden economy and to corruptly secure its political protection.
• The Coalition 2000 Corruption Monitoring System identified the 
Customs Agency as one of the institutions with a significant proportion 
of corrupt officials. The data reported by Coalition 2000 that, as a 
result of corruption and contraband, in the period 1998-1999, the 
national budget suffered lost revenues of more than $1 billion a 
year from the trade with the EU alone, became a major issue of 
the 2001 parliamentary election campaign. By the late 1990s public 
pressure and above all the gradual normalization of the economy 
had brought down corruption in customs. A series of measures 
were adopted within the Customs Agency itself to reduce corruption 
pressure over customs officers and to limit the possibilities for 
customs violations such as the adoption of the Bulgarian Integrated 
Customs Information System (BICIS) and the expert assistance of the 
international consultants from Crown Agents.
• The tax system remains seriously affected by corruption and 
is one area where the institutional reforms have still not been 
brought to completion. According to the tax officials themselves, 
cases of corruption are most common in conducting regular tax 
control, and in terms of value, the largest corruption transactions 
take place in connection with tax audits. In this respect, along with 
the establishment of a Revenue Agency and the gradual reduction 
of direct income taxes, tax procedures should be tangibly simplified, 
codes of ethics introduced, the operation of the internal control units 
improved, etc.
• Considerable potential for curbing the hidden economy and 
corruption lies in reducing the administrative and regulatory 
burden of the state. Government efforts in this respect have 
mainly been focused on alleviating and reducing the number of 
licensing and registration regimes. These measures had but a limited 
anticorruption impact because the basic problem generating corrupt 
payments from business to public administration is the actual manner 
of implementation, rather than the number, of such regimes. In this 
respect, the adoption in June 2003 of the Law on the Reduction of 
Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control of Business Activity has 
been a step in the right direction. It is too early to evaluate the 
anticorruption effect of its implementation.
• The privatization process in Bulgaria in the period 1997-2004 was 
generally conducted in a non-transparent manner, with numerous 
and frequent changes to the rules. It was only with the adoption of 
the March 2002 Law on Privatization and Post-Privatization Control that a 
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number of recommendations by Coalition 2000, meant to reduce the 
corruption pressure in the process of denationalization, were put into 
practice. The negotiations with potential buyers were abolished and 
open tenders and the stock exchange became the priority methods 
of privatization, which significantly brought down the corruption 
pressure on the Privatization Agency and visibly improved its results 
as regards small-scale privatization. Attempts to address ongoing 
problems and political disagreements arising in the course of 
large-scale privatization through legislative or administrative 
mechanisms deepened the legal instability of the process, created 
conditions conducive to corruption, and seriously impeded its 
objective evaluation. The involvement of the Prosecution and the 
Supreme Administrative Court in the privatization of the Bulgarian 
Telecommunications Company and Bulgartabac Holding gave rise to 
justified doubts about the independence of the court system and its 
exposure to serious corruption and political pressure.  
• Public procurement is a major channel for transferring public 
funds to the private sector and one of the areas most susceptible 
to corruption. In the various economic sectors, 30 to 50% of the 
awarded public procurement contracts involve corrupt payments. 
Typically, the corruption “price” is in the range of 3 to 10% of the 
contract value. The violations of legal public procurement procedures 
detected and sanctioned by the National Audit Office and the 
Public Internal Financial Control Agency are constantly increasing in 
number without producing the desired deterring effect. The frequent 
amendments to the legislation in this area are not accompanied 
by adequate measures to establish public standards for good 
practices at the central and local levels and to improve specialized 
and civic control.
It is impossible to foster a business environment free from corruption 
and hidden economy without the active cooperation of the business 
community. In the context of the ever increasing share of the private 
sector in the economy, business and its associations are still not 
active enough in the anticorruption reforms. Corruption in the private 
sector remains at a level comparable to that in the public sector and 
poses a real threat to the stability of the economy in the event of 
adverse external shocks.
Civil society initiated the public debate on corruption and should largely 
be credited for pushing the anticorruption reforms up to a whole new 
level. Whereas in 1997, raising public awareness of corrupt practices 
and problems was perceived as the main task of anticorruption efforts, 
subsequently the goals were redefined and prioritized developing and 
implementing clear-cut and practical anticorruption measures, programs, 
and policies. This allowed anticorruption priorities to be identified in the 
overall framework of democratic reforms. Civil society put forward and 
effectively led a public-private partnership as a fundamental approach 
to anticorruption. In this context, a number of anticorruption measures 
and initiatives were developed in the areas of legislation, the political 
process, and public administration.
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• The Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000 is the 
first of its kind initiative in the post-communist countries to combine 
significant research capacity and powerful anticorruption potential. 
Civic monitoring of corruption and above all, the quarterly Coalition 
2000 Corruption Indexes, have become an important and frequently 
consulted source of information on the actual levels, forms, and scale 
of corruption, as well as a gauge of the progress made in curbing 
it. 
• CMS of Coalition 2000 was further developed to provide a methodology 
for regional monitoring of corruption in the countries of Southeast 
Europe. This regional monitoring was conducted within the Southeast 
European Legal Development Initiative (SELDI) launched in late 1998. 
It brings together non-governmental organizations, representatives 
of government institutions in the region, and experts from various 
countries of Southeast Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia). The 
innovative approaches for the design and implementation of CMS, as 
well as its practical functions make it a unique and viable instrument 
of the comprehensive strategy for combating and reducing corruption 
not only in Bulgaria but also in other post-socialist societies in 
transition. 
• Non-governmental experts are now involved in the discussion 
and adoption of draft laws and comprehensive measures and 
programs aimed at preventing and reducing corruption. Joint forums 
were also created between NGOs and the business community for 
cooperation in the process of development of common mechanisms 
for assessment and counteraction of corruption. A number of civic 
organizations have been exercising civic control of particular areas 
displaying high concentration of corrupt practices and drawing strong 
public interest.
• Civil society organizations outside the capital city Sofia are 
increasingly active. Public councils for preventing crime and 
counteracting corruption have been established at the regional and 
municipal levels. Various forms of public-private partnership to 
promote transparency and accountability of local government have 
been endorsed at the local level. 
• Civil society also promoted the incorporation of anticorruption 
education as an essential element of public education. Coalition 
2000 initiated for the first time anticorruption education in secondary 
schools and universities across the country, as well as in various NGO 
training courses. Instruction and reference books for specialists as well 
as for a general audience were published.
• The monitoring of the absorption of the EU preaccession funds is 
of increasing importance. The programming and evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the management of EU preaccession funds in Bulgaria 
should be one of the priority areas for public-private partnership 
between the state and civil society in the future.
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International experience shows that it is hardly possible to achieve 
sustainable results in a short period of time. Yet, the limitations of the 
political cycle require each government to accomplish visible results 
within its own term of office. Achieving a balance between these 
seemingly opposite tendencies calls for the concerted efforts of public 
institutions and civil society. One specific example in this respect is the 
decline of the hidden economy in Bulgaria in the past 2-3 years. Still, 
in a number of sensitive areas such as the judiciary, law-enforcement 
authorities, and large-scale privatization, there has not been any tangible 
progress despite the anticorruption reforms already under way. In other 
areas, such as healthcare and education, such reforms are yet to be 
launched.
INTRODUCTION 13
14 ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN BULGARIA
The Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) is designed and implemented 
not only as a research instrument for monitoring and measuring the 
spread and dynamics of corruption in the country, but also as a 
significant element of the overall anti-corruption strategy and action 
plan of Coalition 2000. In this sense, CMS is the first initiative of its 
kind in the post-communist countries, combining significant research 
possibilities and a powerful anti-corruption potential. It started at 
a key period for the country – the intensification of the social and 
economic reforms after a period of considerable delay of the social 
transformations in the first half of the 1990s. In the period 1989 to 
1997, a significant corruption potential and resources were accumulated 
in Bulgarian society. Due to the continuous political and economic 
stagnation they did not attract much public attention and were not a 
subject to research and analysis. The start of the political stabilization 
and the accelerated economic reforms after 1997 also caused the 
large-scale redistribution of the national wealth to be stepped up. As a 
result, corrupt practices turned into a key mechanism both for gaining 
competitive advantages in this process, as well as for the accumulation 
of capital and the transfer of resources from the state/public sector to 
the private sector. The spread of corruption started becoming visible and 
entered the political agenda of the country.
Corruption is understood as an abuse of power – economic, 
political and administrative - which leads to personal or group 
benefits at the expense of the rights and legal interests of the 
individual, the specific community or the whole of society.
Source: CLEAN FUTURE. Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Coalition 2000, 1998, 
Sofia, p.11
In this context the development and implementation of CMS faced 
serious challenges and required the use of innovative approaches and 
social technologies. They were related to the solution to a number or 
basic problems, guaranteeing its effective functioning:
First, corruption became widespread, reaching the highest levels of 
government and entering virtually all spheres of public life. This created 
the need for the establishment of a resolute anti-corruption coalition that 
included representatives of the political elite, public administration, civic 
organizations, and the academic community. To accomplish this task, 
1. CORRUPTION MONITORING SYSTEM OF 
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the principles of public-private partnership in the formation of Coalition 
2000 were promoted, developed and implemented. Without the input 
of all interested parties, the anti-corruption efforts would have been 
doomed to failure.
Second, the dominant perception among the public as well as among 
some politicians and academics was that the attempts to counteract 
corruption were largely pointless and unproductive. Strong skeptical 
attitudes also existed concerning the possibility of corruption being 
monitored and measured. In order to overcome the skepticism and 
distrust, it was necessary to develop and demonstrate the validity of the 
theoretical and methodological parameters of CMS. For this purpose 
the existing research in this field was utilized taking into account 
the experience of the World Bank, the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), international non-governmental organization, such 
as Transparency International, etc. The argument that was advanced was 
that the use of a combination of different study methods and techniques 
for the monitoring and measuring of corruption, based on reliable 
theoretical and methodological prerequisites, repeated household surveys 
and the comparison of data from different sources (citizens, experts, 
managers and businessmen, employees in the public sector, etc.) allows 
reliable data of the spread and dynamics of corrupt practices to be 
obtained.
Third, the inherited alienation from the state, supported by the weakness 
and ineffectiveness of the new democratic institutions, led to a crisis 
of confidence in them and to increased tolerance to corruption. The 
confidence in the effectiveness of collective social actions and the 
possibility to influence the functioning of the public institutions through 
civic initiatives and control was also lost. CMS had to win the public’s 
trust and to establish itself as a reliable, independent and competent 
source of objective information about the spread of corruption in the 
country. In order to attain this goal and using the principles of public-
private partnership, an extended Expert Council was set up, including 
representatives of the academic community, of influential research 
organizations, and of the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. 
The Expert Council discussed and established the methodology and the 
tools of all aspects of CMS. This created additional guarantees for their 
reliability and the trustworthiness of the offered information.
The start of the anti-corruption initiative in Bulgaria was in 1997 with 
the establishment of Coalition 2000 – a public-private partnership. The 
first data from CMS were published and the first public event of Coalition 
2000 was held in December 1998. The public and political reactions to 
the presented information on the spread of corruption in the country 
varied. They ranged from strong media interest and the support of part of 
civil society, through the silent attention and moderate skepticism of the 
authorities regarding the possibility of effectively countering corruption, 
to the complete distrust and negation of the practicality of such 
initiatives. Opinions were also expressed that the social and economic 
effectiveness of CMS would be very low. In response to this, several 
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basic functions of the monitoring system were defined, justified and 
implemented:
• The CMS includes regular presentation to the public of information 
about the scale and the trends in corruption, the factors underlining 
it, and the consequences. CMS performs the function of a reliable 
diagnostic and assessment tool about the spread of various types of 
corruption in different spheres of public life. The level of penetration 
of specific corrupt practices in different institutions, socio-professional 
groups, economic sectors, etc., is also identified. For the first time, 
the spread of corruption is measured not through the study of the 
public’s assessment, opinion and ideas, but through the collection 
of data about actual corrupt behavior and exerted corruption 
pressure. With this approach, reliable information is obtained about 
the number and frequency of the corrupt transactions and the 
participation of employees, citizens or business representatives in 
them.
• A significant function of CMS is to reflect the corruption-related 
attitudes, assessments and expectations of the public and different 
economic, political, social and professional groups. Attitudes about 
the spread and perceived practical effectiveness of corruption are 
just as significant a factor for its reproduction as its “objective” 
dimensions.
• CMS helps to establish the problem areas and priorities in the 
implementation of reforms for the improvement of state governance 
and the introduction of anti-corruption policies and programs. 
Corruption monitoring is of great importance to the formulation of 
the strategy and tactics of carrying out such reforms and initiatives. 
It provides information that can be used to assess the effectiveness 
of the reforms and the implemented projects of governmental and 
non-governmental organizations. This provides feedback to the state 
institutions and civil society and helps introducing corrections in the 
content and ways of carrying out the reforms and the anti-corruption 
policies. More importantly, the corruption monitoring is already used 
as a reference point and criterion for the effectiveness of the anti-
corruption efforts and initiatives of the Bulgarian government and civil 
society.
• Corruption monitoring provides data and analyses that stimulate the 
public debate on corruption. They increase the public’s intolerance 
to it, as an element of democratic values, and bring about the 
introduction of mechanisms, ensuring transparency and confidence. 
One of the main achievments of the first stage of anti-corruption 
effort was that a public debate was initiated on the problems of 
corruption in Bulgarian society. It was an important prerequisite 
for the formation of public and political support for an active anti-
corruption policy. The data obtained from CMS are also used as an 
instructive element of educational and informative anti-corruption 
campaigns and programs.
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• The CMS of Coalition 2000 was further developed into a methodology 
for regional monitoring of corruption in the countries of Southeast 
Europe. This regional monitoring is realized within the framework of 
the Southeast European Legal Development Initiative (SELDI), which 
started at the end of 1998. This initiative unites non-governmental 
organizations, representatives of government institutions in the region, 
and experts from different countries in Southeast Europe (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Croatia). CMS was also applied in other countries in 
transition (Georgia, Moldova, etc.). This proved the international 
value of CMS and the possibility of using it as a reliable instrument 
for international comparisons and assessments of the spread and 
dynamics of corruption in the post-communist countries1.  
The innovative approaches and socio-technological solutions for the 
design and implementation of CMS, as well as its track-record in 
fighting corruption, turn it into a unique and reliable instrument of 
the comprehensive strategy for counteracting and curbing corruption 
not only in Bulgaria but also in other societies in transition.
The present report presents some of the main results of the application 
of CMS. The presence of systematic data for the entire 1998-2004 period 
allows for outlining the trends in the level of corruption in the country, 
as well as of the public assessments and attitudes to it. The experience 
from the reserch of corruption and the results attained so far are a 
good basis for the preparation of a future strategy for counteracting and 
curbing corruption.
There are two basic aspects of the analysis of the level of corruption 
in the country – the level of the actual and the level of the potential 
corruption. Important for the reproduction of corrupt practices is not only 
the act of giving and taking (regardless of the subject of the corrupt deal – 
money, services, information, etc.) but also the proposal for a corrupt 
transaction (offer or demand). The accomplishment of corrupt transaction 
is denoted as actual corruption, while the initiation of corrupt transaction – 
a potential corruption. The level of potential corruption essentially 
reflects the level of corruption pressure, exerted by the persons offering 
or willing to make corrupt transactions. In this sense this is an indicator 
of the level of demand and supply of corrupt services.
The level of actual and potential corruption in the CMS of Coalition 2000 
is measured mainly through two interrelated corruption indexes:
• Personal participation in corrupt interactions. This index reflects 
the frequency of the cases, in which citizens admitted that they gave 
money, a gift or service for the purpose of having a problem solved. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The public’s trust and the proven reliability of CMS have turned it into a source of reliable 
information, used both by the Bulgarian media and state institutions, as well as by foreign 
analysts (e.g. The Financial Times of 5.10.2004. in the article “Bulgaria and Romania 
Receive Approval for EU Accession”)
1.1. Level of  
Corruption – 
Sustainable  
Reduction and  
New Challenges
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It reflects the level of actual corruption in the country for a certain 
period of time.
• Corruption pressure. This index reflects the frequency of the cases, 
in which citizens admitted that they have been asked for money, a 
gift or service for the purpose of having a problem solved. It reflects 
the level of potential corruption in the country.
These two corruption indexes reflect not public perceptions of 
corruption, but experiences with certain types of corrupt actions. 
The level of actual corruption is assessed also through three basic 
indicators:
• frequency of corrupt actions (giving or taking);
• number of actual corrupt transactions for a certain period of time;
• size of corrupt payments.
The corruption indexes refer above all to the so-called petty 
corruption, which is seen in the contacts of citizens with low-
level public sector employees. Information about the large scale 
(institutional, political) corruption, as a rule, is not obtained from 
representative studies of the population and only to a limited degree – 
through economic studies.
Grand and petty corruption 
There are two main types of corruption that differ in their scale, 
targets, mechanisms, and consequences:
Grand corruption involves high-ranking state officials, politicians 
and businessmen, who make decisions on the distribution of 
significant resources. Very often grand corruption is identified 
with political corruption in the higher echelons of power. In this 
case state leaders, senior administrators and politicians use their 
positions in order to gain big advantages to serve their personal, 
party or corporate interests.
Petty corruption usually involves low-level employees who are in 
immediate contact with citizens and with representatives of small 
and medium-sized businesses. It entails bribes, favors and gifts on 
a smaller scale. It is more widespread in everyday life than grand 
corruption. 
The main trend of the 1998 – 2004 period, is the gradual reduction 
in both actual and potential corruption (Chart 1).
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The drop in the absolute 
number of actual corrupt 
transactions is also significant – 
around two times. If in 1998-
1999 the average monthly 
number of participations in 
corrupt interactions, admitted 
by adult Bulgarian citizens, is 
between 180,000 and 200,000 
per month, in the period July 
2003 – March 2004 it varied 
around 80,000-90,0002. In 
March 2004, one of the lowest 
values of corruption pressure 
was registered, exerted directly 
or indirectly on citizens by 
employees in the public sector. 
By the year-end, however,
both, in the cases of pressure exerted by a public sector employee, and 
in the actual corrupt deals, a return is seen to higher average values, 
typical of 2003. Despite the registered increase in November 2004 by 
about 20,000 cases, compared to March 2004, the level is nevertheless 
lower than for the same period of the previous year (In comparison, 
then the average monthly number was 114,000 cases, and at the present 
moment – around some 100,000 cases). Whether this negative trend is 
stable or a result of ad hoc factors remains to be seen in 2005.
As a whole, the levels of 
actual and potential corruption 
reported by businesses are 
twice higher than the ones 
reported by the general 
population (Chart 3). This 
fact illustrates the importance 
of the problem for Bulgarian 
business and is an indicator 
of the relatively widespread 
business corruption. After 
the registered decrease of 
corrupt actions and pressure in 
business in the period 2000-
2002, in the last two years 
their levels have been retained.
Nevertheless, the decreasing share of companies which have participated 
in some kind of corrupt deals should be noted.
2 This assessment is based on data from the population census (March 2001), according 
to which the total number of the population aged over 18 is 6.417.869, and 1% of the 
sample corresponds to 64.180 people.
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Both in business and among 
the population, there is 
a clear trend towards the 
increase in the value of 
corrupt transactions. There 
is a noticeable shift towards 
larger bribes given in the form 
of money, services or gifts. 
Among the population, in a 
period of just six months, the 
number of corrupt transactions 
valued between 100 and 500 
leva3 has doubled. 
In business the unofficially 
given sums increased even 
more tangibly. For some of 
the most “expensive” public
services bribes already exceed 5,000 leva. In every six, out of ten public 
procurements the unofficial sum for winning them was over 1,000 
leva. 
According to business repre-
sentatives the areas with the 
highest concentration of cor-
rupt practices in the economy 
are: privatization, public pro-
curement, issuance of busi-
ness licenses and permits, and 
nepotism. Over three-quarters 
of business managers consider 
that corruption in these spheres 
is very widespread. According 
to some two-thirds of the busi-
ness representatives, corrup-
tion is mostly connected to 
the funding of political parties 
and election campaigns, tax 
evasion, favorable settlement 
of court disputes, etc. In the 
last two years, however, a
positive trend is registered towards decreasing levels of the main 
corrupt practices (Table 1).
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3 1 euro = 1.95 Bulgarian leva
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CHART 3.  DYNAMICS OF THE INDEXES OF THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION FOR 
THE BUSINESS SECTOR (OCTOBER 2000 – APRIL 2004)
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
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PROCUREMENTS DEPENDING ON THE SIZE OF THE COMPANY 
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; Study of Bulgarian business (April 2004)
Periodic fluctuations are observed in the level of potential corruption 
among the different socio-professional groups. The greatest fluctuations 
observed in the levels of corruption pressure by university lecturers, 
customs officers and policemen. At the end of 2004, though, the 
levels moved towards the average levels for the 1998 – 2004 period. A 
change, but towards a reduction in corruption pressure during 2004, was 
registered among the judges, investigators and prosecutors. Following 
a lively public discussion and the taking of anti-corruption measures, 
a decrease in the number of cases of exerted corruption pressure is 
noticed in the judicial system. In this sense, the momentary values of 
the exerted corruption pressure by different professional groups should 
be viewed carefully. They are rather a warning signal that a problem 
of corruption exists in a given group. At the end of 2004, for example, 
such a group of public sector employees are doctors who not only 
reverted to the high level of pressure exerted by them of 2002, but also 
came out at the head of the corruption rankings. The situation is similar 
among police officers who rank next with very close values of exerted 
corruption pressure (Table 2). 
Despite the periodic changes, as a whole, customs officers, policemen, 
doctors, employees of the judicial system, and municipal employees are 
among the professional groups exerting the most frequent corruption 
1.2. Corruption Pressure 
and Assessments 
of the Spread of 
Corruption among 
Professional Groups
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TABLE 1. SPREAD OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF CORRUPT BEHAVIOR IN 
BUSINESS (%)
Forms of corrupt behavior
December
2002
November
2003
Аpril
2004
Low
level
High
level
Low
level
High
level
Low
level
High
level
The acceptance of bribes by employees and politicians 
for influencing the outcome of public procurement 
procedures
5.1 82.3 4.3 81.2 5.6 76.1
The acceptance of bribes by employees and politicians 
in holding privatization tenders
4.0 85.1 3.1 83.8 4.8 80.1
The acceptance of bribes by employees and politicians 
for the issuance of licenses or permits for the 
performance of business activities
8.1 81.3 7.8 79.6 14.8 74.3
The acceptance of bribes by employees and politicians 
for the purpose of evading or reducing taxes
18.5 67.7 17.6 65.6 22.2 61.3
Accepting money or gifts in the performance of official 
duties
15.7 73.8 14.7 73.0 17.1 68.8
Accepting money or gifts for a favorable settlement of 
criminal cases 
5.1 82.3 8.6 60.4 9.2 60.4
The use of connections and protection for appointing 
relatives or friends of  management employees
4.0 85.1 5.3 83.3 8.5 81.0
Funding political parties and election campaigns for 
the purpose of serving private interests
8.1 81.3 5.2 75.8 8.3 71.8
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; Corruption studies of Bulgarian business (December 2002, November 2003, April 2004)
pressure on citizens. They can be defined as problematic professional 
groups, which emerge as the main bearers of petty corruption.
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TABLE 2. CORRUPTION PRESSURE BY PROFESSIONAL GROUPS* (%)
Sept.
2000
Jan.
2001
Оct.
2001
Jan.
2002
May
2002
Оct.
2002
Jan.
2003
Мay
2003
July
2003
Оct.
2003
March
2004
November
2004
Doctors 22.1 6.1 22.3 18.0 20.2 20.3 12.9 12.8 15.7 16.6 13.2 22.5
Police 24.0 18.9 18.5 19.9 15.2 22.3 12.0 14.1 17.8 13.9 13.1 22.2
Lawyers - - - - - 26.5 10.5 17.4 13.1 13.8 12.9 16.5
Customs officers 15.8 22.7 18.4 18.5 25.5 19.4 17.3 16.6 16.4 15.3 22.3 13.8
University lecturers - - - - - 11.9 14.7 11.8 21.5 16.6 12.7 12.6
Municipal 
employees
10.3 11.2 11.3 10.0 5.5 10.9 4.4 8.4 6.9 6.4 4.7 10.3
Administrative 
employees in the 
judicial system
11.5 13.3 11.3 9.4 11.0 15.9 8.5 4.9 7.7 9.0 1.8 9.4
University 
employees
- - - - - 5.6 11.9 3.4 10.9 9.0 8.1 9.0
Businessmen 9.7 11.6 13.4 10.8 9.4 9.6 7.0 9.1 13.6 8.3 10.5 8.3
Mayors and 
municipal 
councilors
3.2 2.1 1.4 2.0 2.7 5.3 3.0 4.1 3.4 3.3 3.1 6.6
Ministry employees 7.0 8.9 5.6 4.9 9.3 5.6 13.8 4.3 10.1 8.2 4.9 6.3
Teachers 5.5 3.7 6.1 3.6 3.1 7.4 4.4 3.4 3.4 5.6 3.9 6.2
Judges 9.1 5.8 6.8 7.8 10.7 16.6 2.0 14 6.9 8.5 10.7 5.8
Tax officers 8.3 6.4 9.1 5.3 3.8 4.2 4.1 3.1 3.7 5.9 3.8 5.1
Prosecutors 7.8 7.2 0.8 4.1 8.5 12.3 6.6 9.2 8.2 4.2 1.8 5.1
Politicians and 
leaders of political 
parties
- - - - - 7.1 5.0 7.1 6.3 4.1 4.5 5.0
Investigators 6.0 5.5 6.0 4.3 8.2 8.3 4.3 12.8 2.5 9.6 1.7 5.0
Representatives 
of non-profit 
organizations
- - - - - 5.0 - 4.0 2.6 1.4 - 1.3
Journalists - - - - - 1.8 1.4 - - - -
MPs 6.4 4.2 2.1 2.1 3.5 2.0 11.2 8.9 - - -
Ministers - - - - - 6.3 - 3.3 3.4 4.8 -
Bankers 2.9 4.1 4.1 4.1 5.6 3.9 5.1 9.9 1.2 4.2 8.3
*Relative share of those, who have had contacts in the last year with the respective professional group, and from whom money, gifts or services 
have been asked 
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
The data of the exerted corruption pressure by the different professional 
groups are also supported by the general public perceptions of the spread 
of corruption. CMS data were also obtained about the relative share of 
citizens who consider that most or all representatives of the respective 
group are involved in corruption. Customs officers, representatives of 
the judiciary, policemen, as well as politicians, MPs and government 
ministers, are perceived as professional groups among which 
corruption is most widespread. The public perceptions of the spread 
of corruption among the different professional groups do not show 
significant changes in 2004. Society and businesses still do not register 
serious progress in the curbing of corruption among customs officers, 
politicians and MPs, representatives of the judiciary, policemen and 
other professional groups. The established perception of their corruption, 
in some cases, was even enhanced and the negative assessments of the 
spread of corruption among these groups increased at the end of 2004. 
In this sense, the future challenges before the anti-corruption efforts of 
the state and civil society will be related to the significant reduction 
of the actual spread of corruption in the country. This would lead to 
changing the deeply rooted public perceptions and attitudes of the 
corruption of certain professional groups and institutions.
Corrupt practices exist in a specific social environment and are significantly 
influenced by the state of public awareness: the degree of perception of 
corruption as a problem of Bulgarian society; the dominant social values 
and attitudes to corruption; the public perceptions of the effectiveness 
of corrupt practices and the success of anti-corruption actions. When 
citizens are convinced that they live in an environment, in which 
corruption not only goes unpunished but is also perceived as an effective 
means of solving private problems, their predisposition to the use of 
corrupt practices grows greatly.
Corruption is invariably perceived as one of the most acute problems 
of post-communist Bulgaria. Since 1998 it has ranked consistently 
among the five most important social problems, usually taking 4th-5th 
place together with crime. Unemployment, low incomes and poverty 
were usually ranked higher because they directly affect the living standard 
of a large part of the Bulgarian citizens. In 2004, as a result of the 
active social policy of the government, unemployment and poverty have 
become less of a public concern. The low incomes and crime, though, 
remain at the same level, while corruption has become the third most 
important problem for the society. 
Public attitudes to corruption are dependent on the extent to which the 
predominant social values are accepting or rejecting corrupt practices as 
a way to solve problems. Such values are studied through the specially 
designed CMS index of the general acceptability of corruption. The 
positive trend in the last 3-4 years of an ever increasing view of 
corrupt actions as unacceptable, both by society and by business 
circles, continues in 2004 as well. Nevertheless, the warning signal of 
the latest study from 2004 should be taken into consideration, which 
shows a slight increase of the acceptability of corrupt practices. Such
1.3. Public Attitudes to 
Corruption
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results coincide with the above-
quoted data on the increase of 
actual and potential corruption 
at the end of 2004. 
Albeit at lower rates, the 
tendency of the Bulgarian 
citizens to use corrupt practices 
is also slowly decreasing, which 
is registered by the index of 
susceptibility to corruption. 
With the gradual narrowing 
of the spectrum of reasons, 
which are cited to justify 
corrupt actions, citizens begin 
to increasingly feel blackmailed 
and unjustly treated by the 
public administration. The 
number of people, willing to 
pay a bribe on any occasion, 
is getting ever smaller. Among 
some social strata people either 
refuse to pay bribes or search 
for alternative ways of solving 
problems with public servants. 
Individuals with higher education 
and higher incomes are more 
inclined to seek other ways of 
solving a problem, while those 
with lower education would 
simply refuse to pay the bribe 
demanded of them. In both 
cases this is indicative of the 
increasing awareness of civil 
rights and the ever greater 
intolerance of citizens to the 
practice of paying additionally 
for public services to which 
they are rightfully entitled.
Despite the slowly decreasing 
corruption pressure that public 
administration employees exert 
on businesses, and despite the 
increasing public disapproval of 
corrupt actions, the susceptibility 
of the Bulgarian businessmen
to participation in corrupt practices remains relatively stable. This is 
largely explained with the widespread attitude that informal payments 
are an effective means of solving private problems. 
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The dynamics observed in most corruption indicators also relate to the 
public perceptions about the society’s potential to cope with corruption. 
After nearly a year-long favorable and optimistic assessments, at the 
end of 2004 an increase is registered in the public’s doubts and 
skeptic attitudes that coincides with the increase of actual and potential 
corruption in Bulgarian society.
The data obtained from CMS about the level of the spread of 
corruption in the country outline several stable trends that may be 
summarized in the following conclusions:
• For the period 1998 – 2004 a significant reduction has been 
achieved both of the corruption pressure exerted by civil servants, 
as well as of the actual corrupt transactions. This decrease is felt 
more tangibly with regards to petty corruption, manifested in the 
interaction of citizens with public sector employees. At the same 
time, business-related corruption continues to be a serious problem, 
and the positive changes in the business sector take at a slower 
pace.
• The level of corruption in the different social spheres, measured 
through the number of corruption transactions, is decreasing. Despite 
this, the positive changes do not correspond to public expectations. 
A number of indicators show that corruption is changing its forms of 
manifestation but it is still too early to draw conclusions whether it 
is significantly reduced. Indicative in this respect is the increase in 
the number of transactions for some public services although absolute 
numbers are still low. This shows a concentration of corrupt practices 
in specific areas. Correspondingly, the size of bribes is also increasing, 
depending on the importance of the corrupt transaction. This also 
determines the higher levels of corrupt payments by businesses.
• An interesting development of recent years is the gap between the 
changes in public perceptions of the spread of corruption and the 
corruption pressure that is actually exerted by public employees. 
Perceptions about corruption among the different professional groups 
change only after a very tangible change in the actual corruption 
pressure, exerted by the respective group. On the other hand, it 
is possible that for a given period of time the public perceptions 
about the level of corruption among certain professional group could 
increase significantly, while no change in actual corruption pressure 
from this group is registered. This may be due to a number of factors 
such as the more frequent discussion of the subject in the media 
or the lack of a visible decrease in the behavior, which shape the 
expectations of corruption pressure from the respective group. Among 
some groups, for example doctors, mayors and municipal councilors, 
the increase in corruption pressure is gradually reflected also in the 
perceptions of businessmen about the spread of corruption in the 
respective group.
• Despite the slower rates at which people’s attitudes have changed 
in comparison with the actual level of corruption, the positive 
26 ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN BULGARIA
developments are noticed by the public. They reflect on its assessment 
of the potential of society to cope with corruption. Practical measures 
and the attainment of tangible results gradually restore people’s 
confidence that corruption can be limited to a more acceptable 
level. The fluctuations in the intensity of anti-corruption actions and 
the increase in the level of corruption registered at the end of 
2004, however, are a reason for doubts and distrust among the 
population. Business representatives are more reluctant to make 
positive assessments, and express a more skeptical attitude to the 
potential of the government and of society to curb corruption. The 
assessments of business and citizens of anti-corruption policies and 
their impact, as a whole, are moderately optimistic.
As a whole, after 1997 significant progress has been made with regard 
to identifying the problems and practices related to corruption in 
Bulgaria. As a result of the accumulated knowledge and experience, 
a number of administrative measures have been implemented with 
gradually increasing impact both on the size of actual corruption, 
as well as on the corruption pressure exerted by civil servants. The 
minor increase in the actual spread of corruption in 2004, however, is 
a serious signal that previous anti-corruption policies have exhausted 
their potential. Overcoming the structural and institutional deficits 
which permit the sustained reproduction of corrupt practices is the 
new challenge for the government and civil society.
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The national anti-corruption infrastructure in Bulgaria has emerged from 
the efforts of the civil society. A number of Bulgarian non-governmental 
organizations initiated the public debate on corruption and placed the 
fight against corruption in the focus of their activities. Coalition 2000 
has played a major part in this process ever since 1997. The initiative 
brought together for the first time NGOs, representatives of public 
agencies and the media in a joint effort to counter corruption. Despite 
the involvement of representatives of various public authorities in the 
Coalition 2000 process and the stated commitment by some government 
agencies, the phenomenon of corruption has remained inadequately 
addressed at governmental level for a long time and not all the necessary 
measures to curb it have been undertaken.
The Anti-Corruption Action Plan, a key document of Coalition 2000 
approved at a widely representative Policy Forum in 1998, contained 
the first comprehensive program to combat corruption in Bulgaria 
structured under six major headings: developing a legal and institutional 
framework against corruption; reform of the judicial system; curbing 
corruption in the economy; enhancing civic control in the fight against 
corruption; changing the public perception of corruption and international 
cooperation. The annual Corruption Assessment Reports of Coalition 
2000 measure the dynamics of corruption in Bulgarian society (based 
on quarterly corruption indices), analyze the anti-corruption policy and 
propose specific measures in the key areas of the Action Plan. All of 
them have contributed to lowering the public tolerance to corruption, 
transferring the debate on corruption from the realm of civil society to 
the level of government policy and fostering a public-private partnership 
in the search for and identification of responses to corruption.
The comprehensive anti-corruption approach adopted by Coalition 2000 
on the basis of public-private partnership is applied in international 
development programs in countries where corruption has become a 
systemic problem. It reflects the understanding that systemic corruption 
is a complex political, social and economic problem that cannot be 
eliminated through sporadic private efforts or one-off emblematic anti-
corruption projects that entail short-term results for political or reporting 
purposes. Systemic corruption generates staunch opposition to the 
reforms which can only be resisted through the collective effort of 
the civil society and international development organizations. Through 
its Corruption Monitoring System, Coalition 2000 has set up a reliable 
tool to identify the spheres and sectors most affected by corruption 
and to exert perpetual social and political pressure in order to identify 
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internal vehicles of reform and trigger a dialogue and practical steps, 
e.g. in the customs administration, education, law enforcement, the local 
authorities, etc.
The first comprehensive government anti-corruption document – the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy – was only adopted in the fall of 
2001. The strategy was drawn up with the active involvement of Coalition 
2000 and outlined the fundamental objectives of and line of action 
for anti-corruption reform within the public institutions, the judicial 
system and criminal law, the economic sphere, in particular the areas 
representing the most solid cross-section of public and private interests, 
as well as the anti-corruption cooperation between government, civil 
society and the media. It incorporated a number of basic principles and 
proposals from the Action Plan and the annual Corruption Assessment 
Reports of Coalition 2000.
The Program for the Implementation of the government strategy 
contained specific measures and pinpointed the institutions to translate 
them into practice. The ambitious task to have those measures in 
place by 2002-2003 was not fulfilled. In parallel with the optimistic 
assessments, the government reports on the execution of the program 
also highlighted some of the reasons for the lingering problems.
 „... The organization to fulfill the Program tasks and initiatives has 
revealed some fundamental problems, i.e. the relatively insufficient 
administrative capacity of the specialized anti-corruption units, the 
fact that the anti-corruption system is not fully completed yet, the 
insufficient internal control of the program implementation, and 
above all the lack of enough earmarked financial resources ...”
Source: Report on the Program of Implementation for the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, 
as of 30 August 2003  
The updated version of the program adopted at the end of 2003 
reworded and supplemented some of the measures while extending the 
deadlines for their implementation up until 2005. The measures relate 
primarily to areas that are particularly prone to corruption risks, e.g. 
customs, privatization and post-privatization control, public procurement, 
the judicial system, public order and security agencies, public health and 
education. These largely coincide with the areas that the population and 
businesses alike identify as worst affected by corruption.
2.1. National Anti-
Corruption Strategy 
and Implementation 
Program
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TABLE 3. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG INSTITUTIONS (POPULATION)
October
2002
January
2003
May
2003
July
2003
Оctober
2003
Маrch
2004
Spread of corruption in general
In Customs. Among customs 
officers.
30.4 53.3 50.0 54.1 49.5 46.3
In court. In the judicial system. 
In the system of justice. 
Among lawyers. 
28.5 48.2 42.9 45.3 42.0 39.8
In the Ministry of Interior 
(including Traffic Police)
19.9 28.6 30.6 30.9 33.9 26.9
In the healthcare system. In 
medical care. In the National 
Health Service.
20.6 27.3 27.6 30.9 27.8 26.7
In the higher ranks of power 
(Parliament, the Presidency, and 
the Government). Among the 
political elite.
30.3
24.7*
23.1**
1.3***
27.6*
27.5**
2.5***
28.5*
28.2**
1.7***
26.1*
26.3**
1.9***
22.8*
24.0**
1.6***
Ministries and government agencies
Customs Agency 10.9 31.2 31.2 31.5 32.4 28.4
Ministry of Justice 18.1 33.5 31.0 32.1 30.3 26.4
In all ministries and government 
agencies
- 19.6 21.8 24.6 25.4 23.7
Privatization Agency 22.5 27.2 24.7 21.8 21.7 19.2
Ministry of Healthcare 16.6 16.7 17.0 17.7 14.4 18.8
Ministry of Interior 15.3 18.4 19.0 18.5 21.2 16.9
Judicial system
Throughout the judicial 
system
5.4 33.5 34.4 33.3 37.6 39.8
The courts, the administration 
of justice
32.1 27.5 29.1 32.5 30.5 24.9
Prosecution 32.0 26.2 25.3 30.0 22.9 19.1
Lawyers, notaries public 16.2
24.9****
7.4*****
21.8****
8.0*****
22.5****
7.4*****
19.7****
8.5*****
17.1****
5.9*****
Investigation service 15.7 18.4 17.6 21.5 15.3 12.0
(Respondents could give up to five answers under “Spread of corruption in general” and up to three answers under “Ministries and state agencies” 
and “Judicial system”, which is why the percentages do not sum up to 100)
* Spread of corruption in the government / among ministers / among deputy ministers; 
** Spread of corruption in the National Assembly / among MPs;  
*** Spread of corruption in the presidency/ among officials at the presidency; 
****Spread of corruption among lawyers;
*****Spread of corruption among notaries public.
Source: Corruption monitoring system (CMS) of Coalition 2000 
Although the strategic anti-
corruption objectives of 
the program remain largely 
unattained, the action 
undertaken, especially on the 
initiative of or with the support 
of the NGO sector, made it 
possible to bring down the 
level of corruption, while rising 
to a certain extent the public 
confidence in the anti-corruption 
efforts of the government over 
the past two years.
The implementation of a number 
of tailored measures, such as 
the adoption of Codes of Ethics 
and rules for service delivery 
to citizens, the detection and 
punishment of corrupted officials 
gradually change the views that 
corruption is a tolerable and 
unpunished way to “facilitate” 
speedier public services of 
higher quality. That change of 
perception is hard to achieve 
and necessitates constant efforts 
on the part of those in power 
in order to improve the public 
service sphere.
The senior levels of public 
administration are still believed 
to be most susceptible to 
corruption, though even there, 
similarly to the business sector 
and the lower level of the 
administration, the perception 
that “the government is doing 
nothing” to restrict corrupt 
acts is now far weaker than 
before.
The evaluation by business 
people of the anti-corruption 
efforts of those in power is 
more favorable, especially 
when it comes to evaluating 
public sector officials. In the 
view of the business sector, the 
most noticeable change can be 
identified among lower-ranking
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January, 2002
July, 2003
Мay, 2002
Оctober, 2003
Оctober, 2002
Маrch, 2004
January, 2003
November, 2004
Маy, 2003
Businesspersons High-ranking officials Low-ranking officials
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0
57.8
51.5
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48.9
43.5
49.3
54.9
49.9
43.5
48.7
47.2
48.7
50.9
44.5
48.6
47.9 46.4
40.3
41.2
38.7
41.6
44.1
38.8
40.5
CHART 7. ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO 
CURB CORRUPTION (%) (POPULATION)
Source: Corruption monitoring system (CMS) of Coalition 2000 
TABLE 4. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG INSTITUTIONS * (BUSINESS)
Маrch
2003
June
2003
November
2003
February
2004
Аpril
2004
In customs, among customs 
officers
62.4 59.5 55.6 59.2 64.4
In the judicial system 36.7 36.4 32.1 34.8 38.3
Ministry of Interior and its 
agencies
20.4 24.9 27.8 23.1 25.1
In healthcare 18.3 17.9 16.6 18.9 22.0
In the agencies issuing various 
permits and certificates (Institute 
of Hygiene and Epidemiology, 
etc.)
22.1 20.6 16.2 18.0 18.8
In the National Assembly / 
among MPs
24.2 19.5 20.7 21.2 17.2
Government, ministers 20.1 19.2 18.5 18.9 16.5
In the tax system on 12.1 17.0 10.7 13.6 16.1
In municipal administrations 17.4 17.0 12.4 15.3 15.9
In central public administration 12.8 13.3 13.3 10.2 9.4
In big business 13.0 8.4 9.3 7.0 6.1
In the education system 2.5 1.4 3.3 3.2 2.5
In the presidency 0.9 0.7 0.2 - 0.4
Everywhere 6.3 8.6 14.3 14.2 10.3
Other 0.4 0.2 1.9 - 0.6
* The percentages add up to more than 100 because respondents could give up to three 
answers.
Source: Corruption monitoring system (CMS) of Coalition 2000
officials who usually form the administrative structure most frequently 
contacted by companies.
The experience of developed 
countries in combating cor-
ruption has clearly shown that 
it is not possible to arrive at 
sustainable results within short 
periods of time. On the other 
hand, the limited duration of 
the political cycle forces every 
government to achieve visible 
results within the frame of its 
4 years term of office. Striking 
the right balance between those 
contradictory trends is difficult, 
though not impossible. The 
concerted efforts to reduce the 
level of the hidden economy in 
the past two to three years are 
one example in that respect. 
Limited as it may be, that 
success should be highlighted,
while not forgetting the lack of any tangible progress in other very sensitive 
anti-corruption areas, such as the judicial system, the privatization of 
large-scale enterprises, and conflict of interests. The strong and inevitable 
politicization of most anti-corruption efforts implies that the government 
would not withdraw from the anti-corruption debate but instead would 
plan carefully and identify more feasible objectives. 
2.2.1. The Legislature
The anti-corruption agenda in Bulgaria still includes an acute problem, 
namely the need for a serious commitment of the National Assembly 
to the fight against corruption through the exercise of key powers 
vested in the Assembly (law-making, parliamentary scrutiny of the 
government, and election of some state institutions) and setting up 
specific mechanisms. The 38th National Assembly (1997-2001) only 
made some steps along these lines at the end of its term. These affected 
primarily criminal legislation, the reform of public administration and 
the financial disclosures by individuals in senior positions within the 
government. The Standing Parliamentary Committee for Counteracting 
Crime and Corruption has not managed to become a focal point and 
initiator of effective and lasting anti-corruption efforts. 
• The 39th National Assembly set up a Standing Anti-Corruption 
Committee (decision dated 11 September 2002) with the key task 
to discuss bills and issue reports, opinions and proposals thereon if 
it determines that the draft rules are conducive to the manifestation 
and spread of corruption. In addition, the Committee is empowered 
to collect information on the effectiveness of the existing legislation 
2.2. Government 
Institutions in 
the Fight against 
Corruption
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CHART 8. ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO 
CURB CORRUPTION * (%) (BUSINESS)
* Relative share of those who answered, “The government is not doing anything”
Source: Corruption monitoring system (CMS) of Coalition 2000
and, depending on its findings, prepare reasoned opinions with 
suggestions to amend or supplement the rules in force or improve 
the statutes from the point of view of legal technique. 
The Committee made efforts to establish cooperation with NGOs and 
various anti-corruption initiatives but fell short of realizing its stated 
intention to analyze corrupt practices and the legal or factual grounds 
from which they emerge, and initiate the legislative measures required 
in response. Despite the large number of complaints sent by individual 
citizens, members of parliament, government agencies and civic 
organizations (totaling 504 as of the setting up of the Committee up 
until mid-2004), the most frequent instances of corruption and their 
underlying reasons have not been summarized. During that period, the 
Committee discussed and provided opinion on only nine bills.
The inconsistent implementation of the principles of publicity and 
transparency in the operation of the National Assembly affects adversely 
the quality of the legislation passed and the membership of the institutions 
elected by the Assembly, thus undermining the authority of parliament 
and the public confidence in what the MPs are doing. The refusal 
of the National Assembly to endorse the measures proposed by the 
Ministry of Finance, namely to close down the duty-free shops along the 
land borders, leaves the impression that this has served the interests of 
particular business groups associated in the public mind with smuggling 
and corruption. 
• The law-making process is not sufficiently transparent although 
occasional public hearings of bills have been organized. It is still 
common practice to introduce alternative bills the texts of which are 
then combined in a purely perfunctory manner. The result is that 
laws are enacted which are devoid of any straightforward philosophy. 
Private and corporate interests still pervade the legislative process 
primarily through the bills presented by individual MPs (or groups of 
MPs). Bills presented by MPs, unlike the government bills, do not 
need to be coordinated with any ministry or agency. The frequent 
exercise of the right to legislative initiative by MPs from the ruling 
majority deprives the political governance of a serious and well-
thought commitment to the bills presented by MPs and to their 
enforcement upon enactment. 
By the end of November 2004, a total of 1,020 bills were presented 
to parliament since the beginning of its term, of which 558 were 
presented by the government. Individual MPs or groups of MPs 
presented 462 bills, and MPs from the parliamentary group of 
the ruling National Movement Simeon II featured among the 
presenters of 234 out of them. 
Source: National Assembly
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• When electing members of the institutions formed by parliament 
(e.g. the parliamentary quotas of the Constitutional Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Council, the Commission for Protection against 
Discrimination, the National Audit Office, the Commission for Personal 
Data Protection, the Ombudsman, etc.) the vote of the MPs is more 
often than not dominated by backstage bargaining fuelled by political 
and economic interests. This frequently delays or even prevents the 
formation of those institutions and generates possibilities to improperly 
and informally influence their operation at a later stage.
• No ethical rules have been adopted to set forth the general principles 
for the conduct of MPs (priority of the public interest, transparent 
activities, respect for the citizenry, impartiality, etc.) or rules on 
disclosing information and avoiding conflicts of interests. There is 
no Standing Parliamentary Ethics Committee that should register any 
declared conflict of interests and inquire into complaints by citizens 
and civic organizations for violations and offences by MPs or suggest 
the imposition of sanctions. 
• The parliamentary scrutiny designed to identify the existence of 
corruption in the executive branch and the necessary anti-corruption 
measures are more or less sporadic and barely efficient. 
– The existing data on questions asked by the MPs and the current 
inquiries into allegations of corruption show that during the term 
of the current National Assembly (by the end of 2004) a total of 10 
corruption-related questions were asked, as follows: one question 
about the corruption scandal that occurred in the management 
of the Customs Agency and with the customs officers sacked at 
the Regional Customs Directorate in Rousse (November 2001); 
two questions on the Anti-Corruption Coordination Commission 
(October 2002); two questions on the existence of prima facie 
evidence of corruption in the public healthcare system (April 
and May 2002); three questions on the work carried on by the 
Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Committee as regards the executive 
and public administration (April and May 2003); two questions 
on corruption in the Bulgarian education system (October and 
November 2004). Throughout that period, only six MPs asked 
questions on public procurement. 
– The interim fact-finding committees set up during the term of 
the 39th National Assembly to explore the existing suspicions of 
corruption and abuse by government officials were used primarily 
for political attacks and failed to hit their target (a good example 
is the committee set up to check how the Ministry of Regional 
Development and Public Works absorbs the funding granted 
under the PHARE and ISPA instruments of the European Union). 
Even when such committees find out violations or irregularities, 
there is no information about any follow up on the files sent 
to the prosecution office (for example, the report on the 2002 
inquiry into the operation of the state-owned enterprise Air 
Traffic Control based on allegations for stripping the company 
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assets). The parliament fails to respond to apparent conflicts of 
interest displayed in the day-to-day work of the executive and the 
legislature thus enhancing the public perception that corruption 
thrives even at the highest level of government.
2.2.2. The Executive Branch
The enforcement of the legislative framework of public administration 
reform that started at the end of the term of the previous government 
was taken over by the current government which initiated legislative 
changes, and organizational and institutional measures to fight against 
corruption. In the course of public administration reform, a number of 
steps were made to ensure accountability and good governance. In 
practice, however, every administration in the country tends to apply 
the legislation differently which produces diverging results as regards 
transparency and openness. 
The Reports on the State of the Administration prepared annually 
since 2001, the setting up by most administrations of their own web-
sites, and the creation and maintenance of an electronic Register of 
Administrative Structures and the Acts of Administrative Bodies are all 
steps serving to promote the principles of openness, transparency and 
accountability in the operation of the administration.
• The public Register of Administrative Structures and the Acts 
of Administrative Bodies contains information on the number of 
administrations in Bulgaria, their structure, the functions they perform 
and the number of their officials and employees. The content of 
the data available in the Register, however, shows that not all of 
them are introduced and regularly updated. For example, in terms 
of regulatory regimes, the blank forms and the sample documents 
required to issue licenses, permits and other regulatory acts are not 
available on the Register. 
• Since 1998 each administration has to report on its annual activities 
to the government but this is done rather formalistically and not by 
all administrative structures, especially at the central level. Those 
reports are not yet able to serve transparency or the civic control of 
governance, as they do not determine in actual terms the efficiency 
of Bulgarian administration. The reporting process is subject to 
quantitative, rather than qualitative criteria and what is reported on 
are activities instead of results. The administrations do not declare in 
advance the goals they would pursue, the methods they would use 
to achieve them, the deadlines and the resources, so that Bulgarian 
taxpayers could have a realistic idea about the importance of the 
objectives planned or the resources needed for their pursuit. 
• There are already inspectorates at all ministries and state agencies. 
The legislative framework, however, does not provide in detail for 
their powers, and they are understaffed. The inspectorates need 
to be supplied with broader authority to control the work of the 
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administration by, inter alia, examining complaints and information 
submitted by citizens and intervening whenever a conflict of interests 
or corruption occurs; they should also have disciplinary authority. 
Complaints of corruption
„Of all complaints of corruption received by the administrative 
structures (503), each of the following units has received more 
than 5 complaints: local healthcare centers – 146; Customs 
Agency – 134; Ministry of Interior – 49; General Tax Directorate – 
30; Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works – 
22; General Directorate of Execution of Penalties – 21; Sofia 
Municipality – 14; Ministry of Agriculture and Forests – 10; district 
administrations: Vidin - 7; Lovech – 6; and Gabrovo – 5, the 
municipal administration in Kazanlak – 5, Ministry of Defense – 5. 
Compared to 2002 (when 630 such complaints were received), 
the overall number of complaints of corruption has decreased by 
20.2 per cent.”
Source: Report on the State of the Administration, 2003
• A specialized central government structure was also put in place – 
the Anti-Corruption Coordination Commission (Decision No. 77 of 
the Council of Ministers of 11 February 2002) chaired by the Minister 
of Justice. The Commission undertook a series of steps to coordinate 
the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and entered 
into agreements with other relevant government agencies. However, 
it failed to fulfill its major tasks – to collect, analyze and summarize 
information on anti-corruption measures and supervise the efforts to 
combat corruption. Its reports abound in findings rather than future-
oriented analysis of existing problems. The Commission works mostly 
on general awareness-raising initiatives primarily designed for the 
public at large. Irrespective of the significant number of complaints 
(171 for the first 9 months of 2004 only) the Commission has not 
made public any common findings derived from those complaints or 
any suggestions as to how to combat corruption, especially at the 
high levels of government. The Commission has intensified its efforts 
in the area of anti-corruption education, jointly with anti-corruption 
NGOs and initiatives. Among these, Coalition 2000 is a key partner, 
as acknowledged by the Commission. 
The steps undertaken by the government should essentially curb 
administrative corruption and do not feature any specific measures to 
tackle political corruption which also affects the executive branch.
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“... the approach taken by the Bulgarian authorities in the fight 
against corruption has left aside the need to take specific measures 
in the fight against high level corruption, in the political, local and 
business circles.“
Source: 2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession, European Commission
As political corruption has penetrated all the three branches of power, 
uncovering and proving such corruption is even more difficult and 
requires the employment of special means. But, as suggested by the 
experience of other countries, even the implementation of specific 
measures is not always crowned with success. A variety of factors 
could explain the lack of political will for adequate measures - the 
difficulty in designing and delivering effective policies, concern that anti-
corruption measures could damage the country’s international image, 
and, of course, personal corruption of politicians. 
2.2.3. The Role of the Judiciary
The implementation of the state criminal policy, including as regards 
corruption, depends to an utmost extent on the efficiency of the courts, 
the public prosecution and the investigation, on the bodies outside 
the judiciary that are directly relevant to its operations, and on the 
successful intertwining among all these institutions.
Criminal statistics on corruption offences for the period 1999-2004 
suggest that the number of cases for bribery and other corruption-
related offences is very low. Compared to the findings of the surveys 
of the actual level of corruption transactions, this merely proves the 
unsatisfactory performance of the bodies of the judiciary and their 
inadequate interaction with the executive branch in the investigation 
and prosecution of corrupt offences. 
The number of criminal cases 
for corruption offences is 
also low when compared to 
the total number of criminal 
cases finalized by the courts. 
The data of the National 
Statistical Institute for 2003 
suggest that the cases of abuse 
of official capacity that entailed 
conviction were only 1.18% of 
the total number, while bribery 
cases amounted to even less 
– 0.13% of the total number 
of finalized criminal cases. The 
individuals sentenced for abuse 
of official capacity during that 
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TABLE 5. CASES WHICH ENDED IN CONVICTION AND OFFENDERS WITH SENTENCES THAT 
HAVE COME INTO EFFECT FOR BRIBERY AND ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY  
(1999 – 2003)
Year
Abuse of official capicity Bribery
Cases ended 
in conviction
Offenders with 
sentences that 
have come 
into effect
Cases ended 
in conviction
Offenders with 
sentences that 
have come 
into effect
1999 30 31 - -
2000 51 50 45 38
2001 57 46 29 26
2002 38 37 20 20
2003 44 44 31 31
Source: National Statistical Institute
period were only 0.15% of all 
sentenced persons, and those 
sentenced for bribery were 
no more than 0.11% of all 
sentenced persons.
The total number of corrup-
tion-related cases ended with 
conviction appears even less 
significant when compared with 
the spread of corruption mea-
sured through the Corruption 
Monitoring System of Coalition 
2000. According to the latter, 
the average monthly number of
corruption transactions in 2003 was 100,000, while the number of 
defendants sentenced for bribery and abuse of official capacity for the 
same year was only 75. For the first half of 2004 this proportion is about 
80-90,000 to 71.
The insignificant number of 
cases which ended in convic-
tion, however, contrasts with 
the number of instituted pre-
liminary proceedings for such 
crimes. Overall, the number of 
pre-trial proceedings instituted 
over the past years to investi-
gate alleged corruption-related 
offences, other than the cases 
of bribery, has been relatively 
high. 
At the same time, many of those preliminary proceedings never reach 
the court and end already at the pre-trial stage. Thus, in the first half 
of 2004 only 15.8% of finalized preliminary proceedings for abuse of 
official capacity ended with an opinion by the investigator to bring 
the case to trial. The proportion only differs in respect of bribery but, 
interestingly, the overall number of preliminary proceedings for bribery 
is very limited in absolute terms. 
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TАBLE 6. OFFENDERS WITH SENTENCES THAT HAVE COME INTO EFFECT FOR BRIBERY AND 
ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY (1999 – 2003)
Year
Abuse of official capacity Bribery
Offenders with sentences that 
have come into effect
Offenders with sentences that 
have come into effect
1999 10 20
2000 32 25
2001 36 22
2002 37 20
2003 45 31
Source: Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation
TАBLE 7. INSTITUTED PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BRIBERY AND 
GENERAL ECONOMIC CRIME (2002 – 2004)
Year
Year Instituted preliminary proceedings
Abuse of official 
capacity
Bribery
General economic 
crime
2002 724 50 281
2003 614 62 433
First half 
of 2004
205 61 252
Source: National Investigation Service
While the penalties for corruption offences under the Criminal Code 
are substantial (including imprisonment of up to 30 years, fines of up to 
30,000 levs and confiscation of offender’s assets), in the few instances 
where such offences nonetheless entailed conviction the sentences 
defined by the courts were very lenient. This comes to show that, in 
practical terms, the state implements its criminal policy effectively only 
as regards petty corruption offences, while serious crimes that affect 
the public interest far more heavily merely go unpunished. Thus, 
from the beginning of 2002 to mid-2004, the courts imposed prison 
sentences for more than three years in only 7 cases, and in only one 
of those cases the sentence was longer than 10 years. These data and 
Coalition 2000 surveys suggest that the deterrence impact the judiciary 
has on potential participants in corruption relates only to bribes of 5 
levs or less, i.e. if the benefit from corruption exceeds that threshold, 
corruption crimes “pay”.
A major reason for the low 
detection rate and poor 
prosecution of corruption 
offences is the specific nature 
of this category of criminal 
conduct which benefits to all 
those involved in a corruption 
transaction. Thus there is little 
incentive for whistle-blowers as 
coming forward might entail 
their own criminal liability.
The poor efficiency of judicial 
bodies in investigating and
penalizing corruption is rooted in other reasons as well, such as the 
frequent amendments to procedural legislation whereby powers and roles 
are shifted between authorities, the insufficient coordination between 
the separate branches of the judiciary and the other pre-trial authorities, 
internal corruption, links with organized crime, etc. On occasion, these 
institutions resort to mutual accusations and blame each other for 
failures of justice. 
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TАBLE 8. CLOSED PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BRIBERY AND 
GENERAL ECONOMIC CRIME (2002 – 2004)
Year
Closed preliminary proceedings
Abuse of official capacity Bribery General economic crime
Total
For 
bringing 
to court
For 
discontinuing 
proceedings
For 
suspending 
proceedings
Total
For 
bringing 
to court
For 
discontinuing 
proceedings
For 
suspending 
proceedings
Total
For 
bringing 
to court
For 
discontinuing 
proceedings
For 
suspending 
proceedings
2002 1088 233 693 162 69 41 18 10 547 131 326 90
2003 988 221 607 160 69 38 20 11 471 148 256 67
First half of 
2004
501 79 344 78 68 36 22 10 304 122 138 44
Source: National Investigation Service
TАBLE 9. DURATION OF IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED FOR BRIBERY (2002 – 2004)
Year
Imprisonment imposed for bribery
Up to 3 years
From 3 up to 10 
years
More than 10 years
2002 42 2 1
2003 29 4 -
First half 
of 2004
43 - -
Source: Ministry of Justice
That the various pre-trial institutions do not cooperate effectively is 
evidenced by the lack of consistent statistical data for the opening and 
progress of criminal cases, including cases of corruption. The different 
authorities maintain different sets of statistical data grouped under 
different headings, thus preventing the comparative analysis of any data 
obtained. To rectify that problem – since it also prevents effective civic 
control – experts of Coalition 2000 developed a system of indicators for 
the collection of statistical data for the work of judicial bodies and of 
the Ministry of Interior in detecting and prosecuting corruption. The 
final form of the suggested indicators, aligned with the recommendations 
of the institutions concerned, was provided to the Anti-Corruption 
Coordination Commission but was not put into operation. 
Proposal for Indicators for the collection of statistical data on the 
work of judicial bodies and of the Ministry of Interior in detecting 
and prosecuting corruption offences
(Articles 282 – 283а, 224, 225b, 225c и 301 – 307а of the Criminal 
Code)
І. Ministry of Interior
Total number of initiated preliminary inquiries, including:
• Number of preliminary inquiries in which preliminary proceedings 
were instituted;
• Number of preliminary inquiries in which no preliminary 
proceedings were instituted
ІІ. Investigation
Total number of preliminary proceedings handled by investigators, 
including:
• Number of preliminary proceedings where detention on remand 
was ordered;
• Number of preliminary proceedings where a detention request 
was refused;
• Number of preliminary proceedings where investigator issued 
warrant to bring charges against defendant; 
• Number of preliminary proceedings closed with warrant of 
indictment;
• Number of preliminary proceedings closed with opinion to 
suspend criminal procedure;
• Number of preliminary proceedings closed with opinion to 
discontinue criminal procedure.
ІІІ. Public Prosecution
Total number of preliminary proceedings instituted by public 
prosecutors
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Total number of closed preliminary proceedings submitted to 
public prosecutors, including:
• Number of indictments presented to court and number of 
defendants;
• Number of cases remitted by prosecutor for further 
investigation;
• Number of criminal proceedings discontinued by prosecutor;
• Number of criminal proceedings suspended by prosecutor;
• Number of criminal proceedings closed by plea bargaining 
approved by court (where applicable);
• Number of pending (instituted but not finalized) criminal 
proceedings.
ІV. Court
Total number of indictments presented by prosecutor;
Total number of trials with pronouncement by judge-rapporteur, 
including:
• Number of trials discontinued by judge-rapporteur;
• Number of trials discontinued by judge-rapporteur while 
remitting case to prosecutor for further investigation;
• Number of criminal proceedings discontinued by judge-
rapporteur;
• Number of criminal proceedings suspended by judge-
rapporteur.
1. Total number of trials at first instance, including:
• Number of trials discontinued while forwarding case to relevant 
prosecutor;
• Number of criminal proceedings discontinued by court of first 
instance; 
• Number of criminal proceedings suspended by court of first 
instance;
• Number of convictions;
• Number of acquittals;
• Number of cases ended by plea bargaining (where 
applicable).
2. Total number of convictions or acquittals appealed against by 
defendant or prosecutor before interim appellate court (optionally – 
who appealed against the conviction/acquittal) including: 
• Number of appeals by defendants and prosecutorial appeals 
returned by court of first instance/interim appellate court;
• Number of appeals by defendants or prosecutors withdrawn;
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed while remitting case 
to prosecutor for re-examination;
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed while remitting case 
to court of first instance for retrial;
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• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed while passing new 
sentence;
• Number of first-instance convictions/acquittals modified;
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed while discontinuing 
criminal proceeding;
• Number of criminal proceedings suspended;
• Number of first-instance convictions/acquittals upheld.
3. Total number of convictions/acquittals appealed against by 
defendants or prosecutors before instance of cassation, including:
• Number of appeals by defendants or prosecutor sent back by 
interim appellate court/court of cassation;
• Number of appeals by defendants and prosecutorial appeals 
withdrawn;
• Number of convictions/acquittals upheld;
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed while discontinuing 
criminal proceeding;
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed while suspending 
criminal proceeding;
• Number of convictions/acquittals modified;
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed in whole or in part 
while remitting case for retrial.
4. Number of reopened criminal cases
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed upon reopening 
while remitting case for retrial;
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed upon reopening 
while discontinuing criminal proceeding;
• Number of convictions/acquittals reversed upon reopening 
while suspending criminal proceeding.
V. Execution of Sentences
• Number of sentences effectively served and number of 
individuals having served or serving sentence
Coalition 2000
January 2003  
The lack of uniform statistics forms part of a broader problem, namely 
the lack of working mechanisms for the exchange of information 
between the different branches of the judiciary and between them and 
other authorities involved in the fight against crime and corruption. The 
Unified Information System against Crime envisioned in the Law on the 
Judiciary has not been set up yet. The practical implementation of the 
system is being postponed, and this is an additional impediment to the 
fight against corruption. 
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Improving the existing and introducing new mechanisms for independent 
control are essential components of a national anti-corruption 
infrastructure. 
 
• The National Audit Office is in charge of controlling the management 
and use of public funds and implementing financial disclosure – a 
significant, albeit only moral, deterrent to corruption at the higher 
levels of power. The 2004 amendments to the Law on Property Disclosure 
by Persons Occupying Senior Positions in the State made it possible to 
impose fines on those individuals, covered by the law, who fail 
to file their statements of disclosure on time. On the other hand, 
the law does not provide sufficient guarantees against conflicts of 
interests and corrupt practices by persons occupying senior positions 
in the three branches of power. The efficiency of the National 
Audit Office is undermined by its lack of powers to cross-check 
the information contained in the statements; to control banks and 
commercial companies which could be used to drain public funds; 
and to use properly the results of auditing (the findings of the audit 
reports and the audit materials could not be used as evidence before 
the competent authorities).
• The introduction of the national Ombudsman and the local public 
mediators had been proposed in the Coalition 2000 Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan as these are additional and easily accessible mechanisms 
to monitor the operation of the administration. The efforts made 
by Coalition 2000 in this area helped formulate and enact the legal 
framework of these institutions. While the practical implementation 
of that mechanism at the local level advanced considerably in 2004 
(mainly due to the efforts of civil organizations and local authorities) 
and public mediators were elected in seven municipalities, the 
National Assembly failed twice in electing a national Ombudsman. 
In a number of countries, the institution of the ombudsman has proven 
its potential and role as an out-of-court tool to combat corruption and 
prevent the breach of fundamental rights, while substantially alleviating 
the workload of the courts (particularly as regards administrative cases). 
In order for such an institution to perform better, especially in terms of 
its powers and independent status, it should be an institution provided 
for in the Constitution.4 Thus, the Ombudsman would be elected by 
a qualified majority, endowed with a legislative initiative in the area 
of human rights and entitled to refer cases to the Constitutional Court, 
which would not be possible if it is provided for in a regular law.
The problems with the investigation and prosecution of political 
corruption have also motivated other proposals to introduce new 
oversight mechanisms. The following deserve a mention here:
– The idea (launched in January 2003) of Mr. Georgi Parvanov, 
President of Bulgaria, to set up a specialized independent anti- 
 
 
 
2.3. Specialized  
Oversight  
Mechanisms
4 The Constitutional Court has expressly specified that such a body may be set up even if 
the Constitution is amended by the regular, rather than a Grand National Assembly.
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corruption agency with functions similar to those currently exercised 
by the National Service for Combating Organized Crime in respect 
of corruption offences committed by certain responsible public 
officials and magistrates. In the course of the discussions, however, 
that idea did not meet with sufficient support and was therefore 
not developed into a bill despite the positive opinions expressed 
for it. 
– The proposal of Coalition 2000 to introduce the position of a public 
official empowered by law to perform prosecutorial functions, or 
a team of such public officials, outside the hierarchical system of 
public prosecution in its current form. That proposal was submitted 
to the Interim Commission for Amendments to the Constitution but 
was not taken on board when the Constitutional amendments were 
discussed. Later, it was reasoned in greater detail and submitted 
to the government Anti-Corruption Coordination Commission. The 
idea is for those officials to be elected by the National Assembly 
for particular functions (e.g. instituting preliminary proceedings, 
investigating, bringing and maintaining charges of crimes committed 
by high-level politicians and magistrates, in cases of internal 
corruption in the judiciary, etc.) or for specific cases; those officials 
should enjoy the same immunity as magistrates. 
The legislative changes proposed in the Coalition 2000 Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan derive from the general understanding that comprehensive 
measures are required to ensure an environment which prevents corruption. 
These are based on a systemic approach that mandates reforms in the 
areas of criminal, civil and administrative law and procedure alike. 
The contribution of the civil society is not only to outline the overall 
parameters of reform and suggest specific legislative solutions, but also 
consistently pursue their enforcement. The legislation that forms a legal 
environment to resist and prevent corruption has been improved, 
largely due to the international commitments undertaken by Bulgaria 
in the context of its accession to NATO and the European Union and 
to the pressure exerted by civic anti-corruption initiatives. Regardless 
of the progress made, however, the pace and the quality of reforms (in 
particular the lack of an overall philosophy and systemic approach) and 
their implementation are still problematic. The 39th National Assembly 
did not abandon the practice of enacting important pieces of legislation 
only towards the end of the parliament’s term. 
2.4.1. Criminal Law Instruments
In the period reviewed by this report the country made significant 
progress in developing a modern criminal law frame for corruption-
related offences. At the same time, the enforcement of the rules is 
greatly inhibited by the inconsistent and inadequate reforms of criminal 
procedure and, occasionally, by the poor interaction between different 
authorities and the existence of corruption there.
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2.4. Legislative Measures 
to Combat 
Corruption
In terms of substantive criminal law, the major international and 
European instruments for the criminal prosecution of corruption were 
adopted. By a series of amendments to the Criminal Code the legal 
rules on the main corruption offences were improved substantially, and 
most of the changes conformed to the proposals made by Coalition 2000 
in its Anti-Corruption Action Plan and annual Corruption Assessment 
Reports. Thus, more bribery offences were incriminated (such as the 
offering or promising of bribe and the acceptance of such an offer or 
promise), as were the trade in influence and private sector bribery. 
Heavier penalties were introduced for active or passive bribery involving 
judges, prosecutors, investigators and jurors. For the first time now it is a 
criminal offence if an attorney gives or accepts a bribe in order to induce 
a case to be decided in favor of an opposing party or to the detriment 
of the attorney’s client. Bribery is no longer limited to material benefits, 
thus criminalizing the widest possible range of corruption transactions.
The reforms of substantive criminal law, however, are not sufficient in 
themselves to effectively combat crime in general and corruption in 
particular, as their implementation stumbles on the inefficient system 
of criminal justice. The serious problems in the criminal procedure 
were identified already in the Anti-Corruption Action Plan of Coalition 
2000 which contained the key recommendation to develop and enact 
an entirely new Code of Criminal Procedure. The latter is expected 
to ensure the openness and transparency of criminal justice and to 
transform the trial into a central stage of the criminal process. Instead 
of enacting an entirely new Code early on, however, the legislature and 
the government chose the opposite approach of piecemeal amendments 
often devoid of a consistent philosophy. As a result, only between 
the beginning of 1999 and the end of 2004 the Code of Criminal 
Procedure was amended and supplemented nine times and most of 
those amendments entailed serious controversies and debates. Some of 
the changes were even challenged before the Constitutional Court on 
account of their alleged inconsistency with the Constitution. The most 
recent amendments to the Code were enacted in October 2004 but 
they were primarily aimed at transferring a larger number of cases from 
the investigators to police inspectors within the Ministry of Interior. In 
the wake of EU’s opinion that the effectiveness of the institutions of the 
pre-trial phase in Bulgaria needs to be increased, attempts were made 
to make judicial investigation part of the executive (Ministry of Interior). 
These were thwarted by the Constitutional Court which ruled that only 
a Grand National Assembly could make changes to the Constitution to 
that effect. As a result, the government resorted to extending the powers 
of police inspectors at the expense of the powers of judicial investigators 
mostly through changes in procedural legislation.
Irrespective of the well-founded criticism of criminal procedure reform, 
in the last five years some positive anti-corruption measures were 
adopted, such as the enhanced judicial review over measures to prevent 
absconding, the introduction of police proceedings, the abolition of 
preliminary inquiries, the setting forth of fines for parties, witnesses 
and expert witnesses whose failure to appear at a hearing without 
good reason results in adjourning the case, the introduction of plea 
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bargaining, etc. A special Law on the Protection of Individuals at Risk in the 
Context to Criminal Proceedings was passed (to take effect in May 2005) 
prescribing measures to ensure the safety of individuals whose testimony, 
explanations or information are essential to the prosecution of serious 
intentional offences or organized crime. 
It was only in 2004 that, after huge delays and a series of contradictory 
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the government approved 
the National Criminal Justice Reform Concept drawn up by the Ministry 
of Justice. The concept provides that an entirely new Code of Criminal 
Procedure, long-overdue, would be enacted and includes many other 
recommendations made by Coalition 2000 in its Anti-Corruption Action 
Plan and reiterated in its annual Corruption Assessment Reports. The 
government has publicly committed itself to the ambitious task to 
present to parliament a new Draft Code of Criminal Procedure before the 
end of its term of office (summer 2005), with a view to having it passed 
by the next National Assembly by end-2005. The seriousness of this 
commitment is reconfirmed by the fact that it was entered, together 
with the time schedule for its implementation, in the additional position 
papers presented by Bulgaria under Chapter 24, Justice and Home Affairs, 
in its accession negotiations with the European Union. 
Although compelling for the purpose of judicial reform and the combat 
of corruption, the adoption of a new Code of Criminal Procedure may well 
prove to be an end in itself. On the one hand, the new procedural 
code is not prepared in parallel to an entirely new Criminal Code 
while that would be the only way to create a coherent and consistent 
set of substantive and procedural norms. On the other hand, the 
new Code of Criminal Procedure should be passed after the issue of 
the organization and structure of the judiciary has been resolved, in 
particular as regards the location and functions of the public prosecution 
and the investigation. If the Constitutional provisions on the structure 
and organization of the judiciary are to be amended after the adoption 
of new procedural legislation, another series of legislative amendments 
would become necessary. 
2.4.2. Other Legislative Measures to Curb and Prevent   
 Corruption
The obsolete, often inconsistent and incomplete legal framework on 
other areas of law might not be directly relevant to corruption but still 
creates, to one extent or another, conditions that are conducive to 
its flourishing and spread. The Anti-Corruption Action Plan of Coalition 
2000 advanced specific proposals to amend some rules of civil, 
commercial, administrative, labor and family law and of the relevant 
procedural laws, in order to: 
– simplify the procedures for the acquisition of ownership, commercial 
transactions, privatization, concessions, and any other areas where 
private interests intertwine with power and state authority;
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– reduce to a minimum the possibility of the administration to 
interfere in business;
– simplify the incorporation of commercial companies and adopt a 
central administrative registration procedure;
– accelerate the insolvency procedures;
– amend the process of enforcement to ensure speed and 
efficiency.
The annual Corruption Assessment Reports have analyzed and evaluated 
the measures put into effect and the results of their implementation, 
and also recommended further improvements. To sum up, it is clear 
that regardless of the progress made in some areas legislative reform has 
not been consistently rooted in a sound conceptual basis that would 
allow tackling the existing problems comprehensively. The mechanisms 
of enforcing the novel legislation are still underdeveloped. 
The efforts to provide a legal framework in a few spheres critical to the 
fight against corruption are particularly noteworthy.
• The passage of the Law on Limiting Administrative Regulation and the 
Administrative Control on Economic Operations at the end of 2003 and 
the introduction of the principle of tacit consent create prerequisites 
for a swifter and more effective administrative service delivery. The 
rules on tacit consent, however, are not accurate enough, as the 
principle is meant to apply unless otherwise provided in a law. In 
other words, a possibility for tacit refusal is still there and at the same 
time it is not specified which body should ascertain the existence 
of tacit consent. While the law has narrowed down the room of 
the administration to abuse its discretionary powers and the chances 
for corruption in administrative service delivery, the insufficient 
administrative capacity of the central and local administrations to 
enforce it and the continued presence of rules inviting ambiguous 
interpretation open the door to the use of corrupt practices.
• The amendments to the Family Code (enacted in 2003) focused 
particularly on adoption, mostly intercountry adoptions that have 
frequently given rise to significant suspicions of corruption in the 
past few years. The new rules are in line with the Convention on 
Protection of Children and Cooperation in respect of Intercountry Adoption, 
better protect the interests of the child and set forth more transparent 
procedures. 
• In order to combat corruption, it is especially important to effectively 
reform the enforcement of judgments. This area has been repeatedly 
identified as a notorious example of delays, inefficiency and a fertile 
ground for corrupt practices in all Corruption Assessment Reports, 
despite the numerous legislative amendments undertaken between 
1998 and 2004. A serious attempt to introduce radical reforms in 
this area was the Draft Law on Private Enforcement under which the 
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enforcement of private claims would be entrusted for the first time 
to private, rather than public enforcement entities. Although the full 
substitution of private enforcement for public enforcement remains 
debatable and the possibilities to combine both approaches seem to 
have been ignored, introducing private bailiffs would certainly limit the 
illegal collection of claims and narrow the ground for corruption. The 
implementation of that reform should go hand in hand with relevant 
amendments to the – or the adoption of an entirely new – Code 
of Civil Procedure, so as to streamline and improve the enforcement 
proceedings and protect to the maximum extent the interests of both 
parties to such procedures.
• A legislative mechanism intended to combat crime in general and 
corruption in particular that has generated a lot of debate was 
the Draft Law on the Forfeiture to the State of Property Acquired through 
Criminal Activity developed by the Ministry of Interior. The provisions 
on prompt freezing and forfeiture of criminal assets in the draft 
could step up the fight against crime. In order to achieve that, 
however, sufficient guarantees against any possible abuse should be 
built into the law. Following the initial public presentation of the 
draft and before it was submitted to parliament and voted on at 
first reading in the fall of 2004, it was substantially refined based on 
a series of discussions initiated and organized by Coalition 2000 and 
involving Bulgarian and international experts. Nonetheless, some of 
the proposals and recommendations made have not been reflected in 
the text. The draft still has some shortcomings that should be rectified 
before its intended effect could be attained.
• A legislative area of key significance is the improvement of the 
legal rules on political parties. The reform of the political party 
system proposed in the Anti-Corruption Action Plan of Coalition 2000 
focused on the required transparency of political party activities, the 
introduction of a clear system of public funding for political parties 
and the setting up of efficient tools to audit the financial resources of 
political parties. The Law on Political Parties passed in 2001 addressed 
only some of those problems and the strongest criticism is generated 
by the retained possibility for political parties to receive anonymous 
donations which prevents the transparency of political party funding 
and the efficient control of some portions of that funding. This has 
led to a renewed effort to reform the legislation, so at the end of 
2004 the parliament enacted a new Law on Political Parties setting out a 
number of anti-corruption measures to guarantee the transparency and 
accountability of political party funding, including inter alia a complete 
ban on anonymous donations, better mechanisms of monitoring the 
activities of political parties, etc. The expected positive effect of that 
law, however, has been compromised already at the outset as the 
requirement for re-registration did not apply to political parties that 
participated independently or in coalitions in the general elections in 
2001 or that have at least one seat in Parliament. 
• The Draft Code of Administrative Procedure aims at a fundamental and 
comprehensive reform of administrative justice. It also embeds solutions 
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for enhancing the quality of the work of public administration and 
limiting the possibilities for corruption practices, for refining the 
control over the administration and the establishment of an efficient 
and modern system of administrative justice. Particularly relevant 
to the fight against corporate corruption is the newly introduced 
provision of administrative liability of legal persons. The need for 
such liability has been reiterated more than once in the Corruption 
Assessment Reports (2002, 2003) and in a number of reports by the 
European Commission on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession. 
• During the preparation of an entirely new Code of Civil Procedure (work 
launched at end-2004), Coalition 2000 presented a detailed opinion 
and proposals to improve civil procedure legislation by, inter alia, 
restricting the possibilities for corrupt practices explained in detail 
in the Judicial Anti-Corruption Program and the annual Corruption 
Assessment Reports. The following proposals can be outlined as most 
relevant to speeding up civil procedure and limiting the opportunities 
for corruption: replacing the existing three-instance proceedings with 
two-instance procedures coupled with the possibility for extraordinary 
review by the Supreme Court of Cassation; regulating the activities 
and liability of attorneys in the civil process; introducing a set of 
procedural measures to enhance the discipline of parties and to 
discourage the intentional procrastination of proceedings; new rules 
on summoning and serving notices, including more obligations on 
parties and liability for summoners, etc.
The implementation of efficient institutional and legislative measures 
to modernize the administration and its service delivery and to limit 
corruption in its work was a major area of action identified in the Anti-
Corruption Action Plan of Coalition 2000. Many of the reforms proposed 
in that Plan and developed in detail in the Corruption Assessment Reports 
were actually implemented in the process of the current administrative 
reform.
In the period after 1997 a number of government documents were 
developed, e.g. the Strategy for Modernization of the State Administration, 
the Program for Modernization of the State Administration and the Plan for 
Implementing the Strategy for Modernization of the State Administration. The 
statutes adopted (Law on the Administration, Law on Administrative Services for 
Natural and Legal Persons, Law on Civil Servants) put in place the legislative 
framework of administrative activities as well as conditions to introduce 
a career civil service and improve administrative service delivery. 
Irrespective of the positive attainments, though, a fully effective service 
delivery to businesses and individuals based on common standards of 
efficiency and quality is still not in place. 
2.5. Better Access to 
and Quality of 
Public Services as 
a Prerequisite for 
Reducing Corruption
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2.5.1. Introducing New Information Technologies in Administrative 
 Service Delivery
Implementing new information and management technologies in the 
public administration is a must for the enhancement of its performance 
and for an improved administrative service delivery, as well as for 
reducing the causes of and possibilities for corruption. The promptness 
and quality of public services are fundamental factor that shapes the 
attitude of the citizenry to the local and central administrations. 
The implementation of modern IT makes the contacts between citizens 
and the administration shorter, easier and more transparent, thus curbing 
the playfield of corruption. Some processes amenable to automation 
in fact could eliminate discretion and thus eradicate the prerequisites 
for corruption. In other instances the automation of a process makes 
it easier to uncover the corruption trail. IT implementation paves the 
way to a radical change in administrative regulation and this inevitably 
dismantles the existing channels of corruption. Having said that, IT 
cannot substantially transform the style of administrative service delivery 
unless it is accompanied by relevant administrative reforms. 
• Implementing Some Elements of E-Government
The E-Government Strategy (adopted by the Council of Ministers at the end 
of 2002) was developed by representatives of the public administration 
with the involvement of NGOs. It identified the lines of implementing 
modern and efficient governance in response to the general need for 
high-quality and readily accessible administrative services provided inter 
alia by online links between individual citizens and public administration 
institutions. 
E-Government was launched in 2003 with the provision of four 
administrative services online (changing the address registration of an 
individual, obtaining information on the court registration of a commercial 
company from the Delphi system, and obtaining information for social 
security contributions made by natural or legal persons at the National 
Social Security Institute) when the users are in possession of a universal 
e-signature certificate. In the second half of 2004, the system of e-
procurement was launched as well which covers the small procurement 
contracts awarded by the Ministry of Finance. Its application, however, 
is seriously hampered by the fact that many suppliers of goods and 
services do not possess universal e-signatures.
Of all electronic services operational as of the end of 2004, the last one 
on the list has the strongest potential to curb corruption. By 2005, a 
total of 20 services (twelve for individuals and eight for businesses) are 
planned to be deliverable in this way. 
The introduction of e-government has been accompanied by numerous 
allegations, if not of straightforward corruption, at least of lobbying for 
a few private companies. For example, the so-called e-government 
portal was inconsistent with the Strategy, while the Concept Paper for 
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an E-Government Portal developed by the Coordination Center for 
Information, Communication and Management Technologies with the 
Council of Ministers openly favored a particular e-signature provider, 
etc. 
E-Signature Legal Framework
The legislation on e-documents and e-signature enacted in 2001/
2002 provides ampler opportunities for the introduction and use 
of IT in the public administration and to promote e-government. 
The Law on Electronic Document and Electronic Signature drafted 
by experts with the Center for the Study of Democracy within the 
framework of the Coalition 2000 process represents the indispensable 
statutory basis to modernize government administration and 
administrative service delivery. 
Detailed comments on the provisions of the law and other related 
materials are available in the book Electronic Document and 
Electronic Signature. Legal Framework (Sofia, 2004, 700 pages), a 
publication authored by the task force at the Center for the Study 
of Democracy that prepared the draft law and assisted with the 
development of its implementing secondary legislation. 
For e-signature to have its anti-corruption effect, the Council of Ministers, 
the ministers, the National Statistical Institute and the National Social 
Security Institute should meet their obligation (in force as of January 1, 
2005) to accept and issue e-documents signed by universal e-signature. 
The issuance of electronic licenses, approvals and other administrative 
acts should also become possible in the nearest future. 
While a comprehensive online administrative process needs more time, 
the gradual implementation of e-administration would result in more 
transparency, accountability, flexibility and speed, lower costs and 
reduced bureaucracy and less corruption in administrative procedures.
• “One-Stop Shop” Service Delivery
The introduction of administrative service delivery based on the one-
stop shop principle started incrementally in 1999, first in some municipal 
administrations, and as of the spring of 2000 in some administrative 
bodies at the central level. Later, two government papers – Concept 
Paper for Improving Administrative Services Based on the One-Stop Shop 
Principle, and Basic Model of One-Stop Shop Service Delivery, launched the 
wider implementation of that mechanism. The provision of swifter and 
accessible administrative services of better quality leads to the gradual 
decrease in the level of administrative corruption.
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“The one-stop shop principle has been implemented in 52% of 
the municipalities across the country, 73% of the structures of 
central administration, and 78% of district administrations. By the 
end of 2005 the one stop shop principle should be introduced in 
all administrations in the country.”
Source: Report on the State of the Administration, 2003
Most administrations provide access to services at one place, and only 
about one fifth of the administrations have not undertaken measures 
to apply the one-stop shop model. No solution has been found yet to 
ease the administrative procedures involving joint or sequential work by 
several different institutions. There is no uniform model of the one-stop 
shop service provision and integrated administrative service delivery that 
could replace the provision of services in the various administrations.
• Information Centers at Municipalities
The building up of municipal information centers with the purpose to 
ensure the speedier and more transparent provision of administrative 
services at municipal level started on the initiative of civil society in 
some municipal administrations. The number of municipalities having 
set up such centers that are fully one-stop shops has gradually increased 
(Blagoevgrad, Vratsa, Gabrovo, Dobrich, Montana, Rousse, Silistra, Sliven, 
Stara Zagora, etc.).
The programs are mainly implemented within the local administration 
and entail the development of administrative service delivery manuals, 
information catalogues, leaflets and similar materials depicting the 
procedures applied by each respective administration. Given the lack 
of a uniform catalogue of administrative services and the fact that 
different administrations frequently offer different names or designations 
for a service that is essentially the same, those materials are not 
always a reliable and accurate source of information for the respective 
administrative procedures.
The effect of having service and information centers is therefore often 
confined to providing the citizens or legal entities concerned with 
information, and to streamlining, though only partially, the procedures 
applicable to the provision of services by the specific administration.
2.5.2. Codes of Ethics in the Public Administration 
The introduction of ethical rules as an additional tool to combat corruption 
in the public sector and strengthen the public confidence in government 
institutions started with the Code of Conduct for the Civil Servant approved 
at the end of 2000. The Code outlined the fundamental principles 
of and rules on the ethical behavior of civil servants. During the 
drafting stage, the existing international instruments in that respect were 
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neglected, including Recommendation No. R (2000)10 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe to the Member States on Codes of 
Conduct for Public Officials adopted at the 106th session of the Committee 
of Ministers on 11 May 2000 and the Model Code of Conduct for Public 
Officials enclosed to the Recommendation. The insufficient clarity of 
the provisions of the Code and the fact that it was not promulgated in 
the State Gazette prevented it from becoming an efficient and working 
regulatory instrument. Irrespective of the recommendations of Coalition 
2000 made in its Corruption Assessment Reports 2001 and 2002, the 
Code was not amended and failed to achieve its purpose. 
It was only in 2004 that a new Code of Conduct for Public Administration 
Officials was approved, already on the basis of the Code of Good 
Administrative Behavior adopted in 2001 by the European Parliament. The 
new Code is free from some of the shortcomings of the previous text. It 
has extended the scope of application of ethical rules so as to cover not 
only the persons enjoying the status of civil servants but also the other 
employees in the public administration. Another improvement is the link 
between the breach of ethical standards and disciplinary liability. This 
differs substantially from the approach adopted in the previous Code 
whose ethical rules were mere recommendations with awareness-raising 
and educational effect. The conditions are therefore in place now for 
the efficient application of the rules and a genuine alignment of officials’ 
behavior to the standards embedded in the Code.
Along with those advantages, the new Code still needs improvement as 
it fails to provide sufficiently clear and detailed rules on the personal 
behavior of officials or any efficient mechanisms for its enforcement – 
there are no effective mechanisms to detect or to rectify violations of 
the Code.
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Judicial reform in Bulgaria started in the beginning of the nineties, as 
part of the ongoing process of transition to democracy. Unlike the 
political and economic reforms, reforms in the judiciary are slower 
which is attributable to some extent to the conservatism inherent in 
and needed by the judicial branch of power. In addition, the delay 
and inconsistency of judicial reforms in Bulgaria derive from a set of 
factors brought about by the nature and the peculiarities of transition 
in the country, and from the fact that the judiciary appears to be the 
point where too many political and economic interests intersect. 
On the one hand, the official proclamation of the independence of 
the judicial branch in the new Bulgarian Constitution (1991) and the 
gradual enactment of the specific laws governing it (the Law on the 
Judiciary and the Law on the Supreme Administrative Court) prompted the 
political parties to seek indirect means to influence the judicial system. 
For that purpose, a large number of magistrates were superseded at 
all levels of the system. That approach is still manifested in the fight 
for votes within the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) – the governance 
body of the judiciary – and most visible in the election of SJC members 
from the parliamentary quota. The SJC plays an increasingly important 
role as regards the professional development of magistrates and even in 
issues of management: it accords and removes guaranteed tenure, lifts 
the immunity of magistrates and disciplines them, appoints magistrates, 
including those at managerial positions, and removes them from office. 
On the other hand, powerful economic lobbies need more than political 
leverage in parliament and in the government. In a country where 
the rule of law – with its fundamental principles of judicial review 
of administrative acts, resolution of legal disputes in court, and equal 
access of everyone to justice – is still in the process of development, 
these interests need also to “capture” the bodies of the judiciary, which 
is what opens a channel for the spread of corruption within the judicial 
branch. 
Thirdly, because of its traditionally conservative mentality the judiciary as 
a whole responds with skepticism to any endeavor to radically change 
the status quo. The existing constitutional model under which the 
judiciary is composed of institutions with different purposes, functions 
and roles in the process (courts, public prosecution and investigation) 
makes it difficult to form a shared view on the reforms, hence the 
frequent occurrence of opposing opinions and ideas. 
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These factors are mostly to blame for the belated pace of changes and 
their inconsistency. The conduct of politicians and businessmen, and 
even by some magistrates, has distorted the very idea of an independent 
judicial branch. The judiciary defends its independence and claims it is 
free from political interference but in practice some of its members still 
serve different political and economic interests. 
The role of the judiciary as an instance of last resort in controlling 
executive decisions which redistribute wealth and power opens the door 
to a tremendous corruption pressure on that branch. The limiting and 
prevention of corruption in the judiciary is a key component of the 
fight against corruption in the whole society. In other words, the anti-
corruption effort in the judicial system must be a priority in the overall 
reform designed to make the administration of justice in Bulgaria more 
effective.
Judicial reform has significant international dimensions as well. Foreign 
partners and international organizations are particularly concerned 
about the progress of reforms in the judiciary, which has indisputable 
positive impact on the domestic reform agenda and has turned into 
a precondition for its success. The recognition of judicial reform as a 
matter of paramount importance and the reaching of consensus on the 
priorities of reforms, especially against the backdrop of strong political 
confrontation, would have been much more difficult without such an 
interest from abroad. External influence over anticorruption reforms may, 
on the other hand, bring certain risks. These are related to the feasibility 
of expectations for immediate results, which in turn may encourage 
Bulgarian institutions to pay lip-service and undertake rather formal and 
insignificant reforms. External pressure could result in piecemeal changes 
that are necessary in themselves but only in the context of comprehensive 
reforms. In addition, the conditions posed by international organizations 
binding judicial reform to, for instance, making particular progress in 
integration (European Union) or receiving a loan (World Bank) engage 
primarily the executive and have little consequences for the judiciary. If 
international organizations come to realize those risks the effect of their 
efforts for supporting the reforms would increase.
As of the end of the nineties, the need for judicial reform with an ever 
stronger emphasis on its anti-corruption dimensions has been persistently 
placed on the agenda by the NGO sector – Coalition 2000 through 
its annual Corruption Assessment Reports, the Judicial Reform Initiative 
with its Program for Judicial Reform (2000), the Center for the Study 
of Democracy through its Judicial Anti-Corruption Program (2003), 
etc. These efforts allowed the first steps to be taken towards a public-
private partnership with the bodies of the judicial and the executive 
branches which has been quite beneficial in terms of drafting strategic 
and programmatic documents but not so fruitful in terms of day-to-day 
implementation.
3.1. Civic Initiatives and 
Government  
Programs
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Judicial Reform Initiative
The Judicial Reform Initiative was set up in 1999 in response to the 
explicit need for change and in sharp contrast to government 
claims that judicial reform had been completed. The Initiative, 
whose secretariat is the Center for the Study of Democracy, 
brought together well-established Bulgarian professional associations 
and NGOs involved in judicial reform, including the Union of 
Bulgarian Jurists, the Association of Judges in Bulgaria, the Chamber 
of Investigators in Bulgaria, the Legal Initiative for Training and 
Development, etc., as well as representatives of state institutions, 
including magistrates, and individual experts. As a result of its 
activities, in 1999-2000 a Program for Judicial Reform was prepared 
which identified the priorities of judicial reform: promoting the 
independence of the judicial branch, enhancing the professional 
capacity and the accountability of magistrates, modernizing the 
operation of judicial bodies and their administration, opening the 
judiciary towards the public, developing the legislative basis of 
reforms.
In addition to public pressure, important incentives for change over 
the past years have been the evaluations provided by a number of 
international organizations and institutions, including the European 
Commission through its Regular Reports on Bulgaria, the Venice 
Commission, the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative of the 
American Bar Association through its Judicial Reform Index (2002, 2004), 
etc. All these provided analyses, critical remarks and proposals for the 
further development of judicial reform. Particularly important among 
those are the requirements formulated during the negotiations for 
Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union. 
After a long period of turning a deaf ear to the need for reform 
and making piece-meal changes in the judicial system, since 2001 the 
government, and recently the judiciary itself have undertaken steps to 
respond to both the internal and the compelling external challenges 
facing the system. 
• The first official attempt to place judicial reform on a sound conceptual 
basis was the Strategy on the Reform of the Bulgarian Judicial System 
adopted by the government on 1 October 2001 and the subsequent 
Program of Implementation of March 2002. The priorities of these 
documents largely coincided with the goals and measures identified 
in the 1998 Action Plan of Coalition 2000 and the Program for Judicial 
Reform developed under the Judicial Reform Initiative. 
The first two years following the adoption of the Strategy saw no 
particular progress in terms of implementing the measures embedded in 
it. The judicial system was still viewed negatively by the public and by 
the European and other international institutions. These attitudes, and 
Judgment No. 13 of the Constitutional Court of 2002 which declared 
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anti-constitutional a number of amendments to the Law on the Judiciary, 
forced the government to update the Strategy and the Program of its 
implementation in the spring of 2003. It should be mentioned that at 
that time the political parties in parliament arrived at a consensus on the 
priorities of judicial reform and these were included in the Declaration 
on the Guidelines to Reform the Bulgarian Judicial System signed by the 
parties on 2 April 2003. Although the solutions envisaged there are not 
comprehensive enough, the Declaration is a good beginning that paves 
the way to a wider consensus on judicial reform. Its potential remains 
underused but is certainly a must for the forthcoming Constitutional and 
legislative amendments in this area.
„The processes of eliminating corruption in the judiciary, ensuring 
the speedy and effective functioning of the judicial system, 
modernizing the operation of courts, prosecution offices and 
investigation services, are relatively slow.”
Source: Report on the Program of Implementation for the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, as 
of 30 August 2003 
• In February 2004, the Supreme Judicial Council approved a Strategy 
for the Fight against Corruption in the Judiciary (February 2004) with 
the following objectives: achieving a stable administration of justice; 
enhancing public trust in the judiciary; enabling larger transparency 
and efficiency in the work of judicial authorities; introducing 
efficient mechanisms to detect and sanction corrupt practices among 
magistrates; creating preconditions for zero-tolerance of citizens to 
corruption in the judiciary; ensuring active civic involvement in the 
prevention and detection of corrupt practices in the judicial system.
The measures identified in the Strategy and developed in detail in the 
Program of its Implementation 2004-2005 are designed primarily to 
reform the work of magistrates by inter alia reinforcing the managerial 
capacity of the Supreme Judicial Council, promoting the status of 
magistrates, putting in place anti-corruption monitoring mechanisms 
within the judiciary, ensuring the transparency of judicial proceedings, 
automated case assignment, etc. The Strategy also prescribes measures 
to reform the operation of court administration such as enhanced 
control of document processing, easier access to administrative services 
provided by the judiciary and refined mechanisms for the appointment, 
career development and disciplining of clerks. A separate part of the 
document provides for measures to advertise the anti-corruption efforts 
of the judiciary, inter alia through the mass media. 
The dynamics of the measures adopted, however, do not follow the 
inherent logic of the strategic objectives but seem to be influenced by 
international factors and domestic politics. 
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Proposals of the Center for the Study of Democracy for 
counteracting corruption in the judiciary
The Judicial Anti-Corruption Program and the Corruption Assessment 
Report 2003 outline the parameters for comprehensive solutions to 
the problems in the judiciary. These documents elaborate on the 
proposals made in the Program for Judicial Reform while building on 
a number of suggestions in the government Strategy on the Reform 
of the Bulgarian Judicial System and on the measures proposed by 
different civic anti-corruption initiatives in Bulgaria and in some 
international instruments to monitor and evaluate judicial reform in 
Bulgaria. Although many of the proposals made could be subject 
to debate further refinement, they build on the understanding that 
a comprehensive approach comprising constitutional, legislative, 
organizational and institutional reforms is necessary. 
The success of anti-corruption efforts in the context of judicial reform 
depends on the necessary amendments to the Constitution and to 
the overall legislative framework of the country. The amended and 
supplemented rules of Chapter Six of the Constitution enacted on 24 
September 2003 formed the first step to breaking a clearly malfunctioning 
model. The amendments also helped overcome the difficulties for 
legislative changes in respect of the judiciary created by the judgments 
of the Constitutional Court. Although they were passed unanimously, 
the changes to the Constitution should not be overemphasized. The 
parliamentary debate on the Constitution was confined solely to the 
requirements posed during the EU accession process and failed to 
promote large-scale changes with long-term effects. The Parliament 
failed to bring about some broader changes which do not necessitate 
the convocation of a Grand National Assembly (Judgment No. 3 of the 
Constitutional Court of 10 April 2003). 
Even with their new wording, the modified principles of limited (functional) 
immunity of magistrates and terms of office for the administrative 
managers of judicial bodies, as well as the adjustments to guaranteed 
tenure actually reproduce the current structural problems of the judiciary. 
This is equally valid for all the three branches of the judiciary – the 
courts, the prosecution system and the investigation services – as the 
changes failed to take account of the different factual status of judges, 
prosecutors and investigators stemming from their different powers and 
roles in the process and from the different level of transparency, the 
different recruitment, appointment and promotion policies applicable to 
them.
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3.2. Constitutional and 
Legislative Measures
The Politics of Appointment in the Judiciary
The terms of office were introduced by the Supreme Judicial 
Council elected in December 2003 and composed under the 
previous system, i.e. the quota principle. That procedure, especially 
given the election of the parliamentary quota by a simple majority, 
largely enables the ruling majority/coalition to influence indirectly 
the appointments of the heads of courts, prosecution offices and 
investigation services and the adoption of other decisions essential 
to the judiciary. In addition, the members of the different branches 
of the judiciary elected to the judicial quota often uphold their 
narrow institutional views that may be even conflicting. All this 
makes it difficult for the members of the Council to form uniform 
and objective opinions. The appointments of administrative heads 
are frequently the result of unprincipled compromises and take place 
without mandatory criteria and alternative nominations, especially 
in the prosecution offices and the investigation services.  
Likewise, the adoption of these partial changes before other reforms 
necessary for the judiciary and the other branches of power prevents 
the striking of the right balance between those powers and the efficient 
interaction among them. 
In addition, the Law on the Judiciary, which provides for its governance, did 
not attain its purpose to build an independent, efficient and corruption-
free judicial power. It has been amended and supplemented on 
numerous occasions since its enactment in 1994. The ambitious attempt 
to improve the operation of the system and eradicate the prerequisites 
for corruption in the judiciary by the 2002 amendments to the law met 
with disagreements and criticism on the part of some units and bodies 
of the judiciary, and of some professional groups, and ultimately failed 
as most of those amendments were declared unconstitutional.
The latest and most significant amendments to the Law on the Judiciary 
were enacted in the period 2003 – 2004, largely under the pressure 
of the European Union, and some of them elaborated on the earlier 
amendments to Chapter Six of the Constitution (Judiciary). They offered 
solutions for a number of problems identified as priorities of judicial 
reform already in the Anti-Corruption Action Plan of Coalition 2000 and 
reiterated in the Corruption Assessment Reports, e.g. the introduction 
of competitions, professional evaluation, the adoption of statutory rules 
on the training of magistrates and on the measures to enhance their 
professional qualification, the setting up of a National Institute of Justice, 
etc.
Despite the substantial anti-corruption potential of the recent amendments, 
some of them have not been in place long enough to assess their effect, 
while others are not implemented consistently. An indicative example 
in this context is the introduction of the principle of openness in the 
operation of the SJC. The decision of the SJC not to allow journalists to 
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attend the Council’s sittings invited significant protests from the media 
and even a court appeal against the decision. 
The need to improve the work and to resist corruption within the 
administrations of judicial bodies has been unduly neglected for a 
long period. The deficient operation of court administration and the 
corruption practices involving court clerks affect the quality of operation 
of the judicial bodies and bear negatively on the perceptions the public 
entertains of the judiciary. It is quite impressive that the public at large 
and the magistrates have quite different opinions on the spread of 
corruption among the administrative personnel of judicial bodies.
It was only in 2004, with the 
Rules on Court Administration at 
Regional, District, Military and Ap-
pellate Courts that some initial 
prerequisites have been put in 
place to modernize the admin-
istrative operation of the courts 
and to implement anti-corrup-
tion reforms there. Most of the 
newly-introduced solutions (e.g. 
random selection of judge-rap-
porteurs for the cases, broader 
access to court files, introduc-
ing the positions of “court ad-
ministrator” and “administrative 
secretary”) mirror proposals 
made in previous years by ex-
perts and NGOs. 
The frequent and largely haphazard amendments to the Law on the 
Judiciary driven by external factors cannot bring forth the required 
efficiency of the judiciary or represent genuine deterrence to inside 
corruption. This is due to the model and structure of the judiciary 
originally built into the Constitution and these cannot be changed by 
ordinary legislation passed by parliament (even worse, in the view of 
the Constitutional Court a regular National Assembly is prevented from 
amending the Constitution for that purpose). Another reason for the 
current situation is the resistance of quite a few magistrates to reforms 
and their strong desirer to see the status quo preserved. 
To attain the fundamental objectives of anti-corruption judicial reform – 
accountability, speed, efficiency and deterrence of crime, further 
constitutional and legislative amendments are required which should 
result in:
• Introducing clear-cut checks and balances between the branches 
of power by having the National Assembly elect the Presidents 
of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative 
Court and the Prosecutor-General by a qualified majority and 
for terms exceeding four years; the National Assembly should have 
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the power to remove those officials before their term expires and 
decide on lifting their immunity only under conditions and following 
a procedure strictly defined in the Constitution; a logical follow-up to 
this principle would be the possibility to make these magistrates (in 
view of their administrative responsibilities) answer parliamentary 
questions in cases specifically provided for and under a procedure 
established in advance. 
• Decentralization, transparency and accountability of the public 
prosecution system by changing the hierarchical model to which 
it is confined at present; putting in place better guarantees for the 
independence of prosecutors when they decide on individual files 
or cases, which is in fact independence of any superior prosecutor 
or the administrative manager: e.g., requiring that any instructions 
given to a prosecutor should be in writing, giving the prosecutors the 
right to object against the instructions given by a senior prosecutor 
or withdraw from the case in the event of disagreement; introducing 
stringent sanctions to put an end to the unlawful practice of giving 
oral instructions to prosecutors down the line, etc.; regular and ad 
hoc reporting by the Prosecutor-General to the SJC, or alternatively 
to the National Assembly if the proposal to have the Prosecutor-
General elected by parliament is accepted. 
• Introducing the institution of a public official empowered by the 
law to exercise prosecutorial functions, or alternatively a team of 
such officials, outside the hierarchical structure of the prosecution as 
it stands currently. Those officials should be elected by the National 
Assembly to perform long term functions (e.g. instituting preliminary 
proceedings, investigating, bringing and maintaining charges of 
suspected crimes committed by MPs, high ranking government 
officials and magistrates, or of suspected corruption within the 
judiciary, etc.) or elected for a specific case; those officials should 
avail of the immunity of magistrates. 
• Reviewing comprehensively the concept of immunities granted to a 
large group of officials (MPs, members of the Constitutional Court, 
individuals in senior government positions). 
• Strengthening the magistrates’ right of independent decisions by 
limiting the control exercised by superior magistrates as regards 
magistrates at lower levels and excluding any direct intervention in 
the resolution of cases or improper pressure by senior magistrates on 
those at lower levels.
• Changing the status of the SJC and the procedure for forming its 
membership (including the number of its members, their election 
and term of office, and the eligibility requirements) – the members 
should only be elected by the bodies of the judiciary and the 
chairperson should be elected by the National Assembly and report 
to the Assembly both regularly and on invitation; if the parliamentary 
quota in shaping the SJC is retained, the election by Parliament 
should be by a qualified majority.
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• In case the Constitutional model is changed, the investigation and 
the prosecution should be taken out of the judicial branch, while 
adopting a model based on a wide consensus. Until the existing 
Constitutional model is changed, the organizational, personnel and 
financial management of the investigation and the prosecution 
should be separated from those of the courts within the SJC.
Structural changes in themselves cannot provide solutions to all the 
problems facing the judiciary but their implementation – or failure to 
do so – would largely predetermine the content of any future decision 
relative to the governance, the roles and organizational principles of the 
judiciary, and the content of the entire procedural legislation. 
In the past few years, the public and the businesses have persistently 
defined the judiciary as one of the areas where corruption thrives. 
Moreover, an increase is noticeable in the levels of corruption pressure 
and of the perceptions of corruption in this area. The increase in the 
average bribe amount concerns all the members of the judicial system, 
which in turn reveals the existence of a serious problem. On the 
other hand, the data of a survey (the first of its kind) conducted in 
the framework of Coalition 2000 Corruption Monitoring System in 2003, 
Corruption and Anti-Corruption: The Viewpoint of Magistrates, suggest that half 
of the magistrates think that allegations of corruption in the judiciary are 
unfounded. Also, every branch of the judiciary tends to see the other 
branches of the system as guilty of corruption. 
The assessment of magistrates 
that corruption in the judiciary 
is a matter of distorted public 
opinion rather than a genuine 
problem is at serious odds with 
the perceptions of the public 
and the businesses. The reasons 
for this discrepancy could be 
sought both in the inaccurate 
self-evaluation or attempts by 
magistrates to conceal the 
problems in judicial system, 
and the insufficient publicity of 
the anti-corruption measures. 
Regardless improved public relations of the courts, and the initial 
attempts of the prosecution to become more open to society, the work 
of the judiciary is not sufficiently transparent yet. It is only over the past 
two years that measures have been taken within the system to prevent 
inside corruption.
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3.3. Mechanisms to 
Combat Judicial 
Corruption and 
Ensure the Financial 
Independence of  
the Judiciary
TАBLE 10. ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION WITHIN THE THREE GROUPS 
OF MAGISTRATES (%)
Corruption proliferated among: (Relative share of 
responses “Most or all magistrates are involved”)
Magistrates Judges Prosecutors Investigators
1. Judge 2.8 17.4 19.0
2. Prosecutor 11.9 7.9 10.3
3. Investigator 20.8 28.2 4.7
Source: Corruption monitoring system of Coalition 2000
• Specialized mechanisms to 
combat corruption within the 
judiciary
Since the beginning of 2004 
there has been an Anti-
Corruption Commission at 
the Supreme Judicial Council. 
The Commission has powers 
to inquire into specific 
complaints and allegations and 
to request the disciplining of 
the respective magistrates; 
to analyze information about 
corrupt practices in the judicial 
system and develop and 
submit for approval to the SJC 
specific measures to prevent 
and combat corruption in the 
judiciary. From the beginning 
of its term until mid-2004 the 
Commission handled a total of 
84 complaints and allegations 
by citizens; of these, 31 were 
transmitted for verification to 
the relevant superior judicial 
body; in 21 cases there are 
pending inquiries, while 10 files 
were closed with opinions by 
the superior judicial bodies that 
no corruption-related offences 
had taken place.
At the Supreme Prosecution 
Office of Cassation, a special 
department was set up, Abuse 
of Official Capacity and Anti-
Corruption. As of April 2002, 
all corruption offences (i.e. 
bribes, abuse of official capac-
ity, embezzlement by public 
officials, smuggling) are subject
to special monitoring and supervision for legality by the Supreme 
Prosecution Office of Cassation. In 2004, the operation of that department 
became more visible to the public but the number of corruption-related 
indictments presented to court is still modest, and no single investigation 
proceeding has been opened against a magistrate. 
The mechanisms to combat corruption within the judiciary are 
underdeveloped and lack efficiency. There are no external mechanisms 
either to monitor or inquire into instances of internal corruption (such as 
an independent prosecutor). No separate statistical data are collected for 
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corruption offences committed by magistrates and court clerks despite 
the numerous recommendations along these lines made by NGOs. 
The introduction of functional immunity by the 2003 Constitutional 
amendments has not improved the detection rate, nor has it facilitated 
the prosecution of corruption acts committed by magistrates.
• Codes of Ethics within the judiciary 
The adoption of ethical rules within the judiciary started on the initiative 
of the professional organizations of magistrates and court clerks already 
in 1998-1999 but the provisions of that period were not binding and 
merely intended to demonstrate good will. The 2004 amendments 
to the Law on the Judiciary empowered the SJC to approve rules of 
professional ethics for magistrates and envisaged disciplinary sanctions 
for their violation. It thus became possible for ethical norms to turn into 
an additional factor to promote the status of magistrates, curb corruption 
and strengthen confidence in the judiciary.
The rules of professional ethics of prosecutors were drafted jointly by 
the Association of Prosecutors in Bulgaria and the National Association 
of Bulgarian Prosecutors, while the Ethical Code of Investigators was 
endorsed by the Chamber of Investigators. These two sets of rules were 
approved by the Supreme Judicial Council in the beginning of 2003, and 
the Rules of Professional Ethics for Judges prepared by the Association of 
Judges in Bulgaria were approved by the SJC in the beginning of 2004.
Nonetheless, the mechanisms to implement this kind of responsibility 
are still underdeveloped as the powers and the capacity of the Supreme 
Judicial Council with respect to disciplinary proceedings should be 
extended and refined. This has been stated in the Corruption Assessment 
Reports 2002 and 2003 and was confirmed by the survey Corruption and 
Anti-corruption: the Viewpoint of Magistrates according to which 37.4% of 
the magistrates were of that opinion.
The National Association of Court Clerks approved Standards for Service 
Delivery to Citizens and a Code of Ethics for Officials in the Court 
Administration which is binding on all court clerks and also provides for 
disciplining those of them who violate its provisions.
• The budget of the judiciary
The inadequate budget and poor facilities of the judiciary are identified 
by magistrates as a major impediment to an efficient judicial reform. 
Despite the wider powers of the Supreme Judicial Council to draw up 
and present the budget of the judicial branch as a percentage share of 
GDP, the overall amount available to the judiciary remains far below 
European standards. In EU member states, judicial budgets are normally 
2-4% of GDP, while in Bulgaria the budget was only 0.54% of GDP in 
2004.5 In its attempt to resolve this long standing problem, the SJC has 
gradually engaged in a dialogue with the legislature, in particular with 
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all the parliamentary factions, instead of openly confronting the other 
branches of power as in the past. 
The SJC, however, does not yet have sufficient capacity to effectively 
manage the resources and their earmarking, allocation and spending is 
governed by decisions made without any transparency, often based on 
subjective factors rather than on the genuine needs of different judicial 
structures. 
• Introduction of New Technologies in the Judiciary: Anti-Corruption 
Expectations
In the past few years different measures have been taken, primarily 
by the non-government sector with international support, to introduce 
new technologies in the operation of the judiciary: automated file 
registration systems, automated case management system (the software 
was developed by a USAID-supported project and provided to the SJC), 
other measures implemented in individual courts, etc. All these efforts 
aim at improving the work of courts and make it more transparent, 
while limiting corruption factors. Their implementation, however, has 
benefited mostly a few pilot courts involved in specific projects or courts 
whose heads are personally committed and very pro-active. Although 
in 2003 the SJC approved a nation-wide case management system, the 
number of courts having implemented it was more than moderate (about 
30 of the total of 153 courts throughout the country as of end-2004). 
However, even where the registries of the courts work in an electronic 
format, the security of information is not guaranteed and the documents 
processed and stored in an electronic form are exposed to the same 
risks as the prevailing paper documents. The SJC and the government 
(Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance) should engage in a dialogue 
in order to avoid overlapping projects. The Research Support and IT 
commission set up with the SJC should be pro-active in this process, as 
the beneficiary under any such project is the judiciary as a whole, not 
individual government officials. 
The adoption of specific legal rules is expected enabling the parties 
to proceedings and the courts to undertake procedural steps in an 
electronic format as well. At the end of 2004, the Council of Ministers 
approved some proposed rules (draft laws to amend and supplement the 
Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Criminal Code, 
and the Law on Electronic Document and Electronic Signature) to enable the 
filing and issuance of e-documents in the judicial system affixed with 
a universal e-signature. The proposal was prepared by an interagency 
expert task force involving inter alia representatives of the Center for 
the Study of Democracy.  
The new legislation should be adopted shortly and should be backed 
up with appropriate facilities for its implementation. This is expected 
to speed up judicial work, enhance transparency and restrict corruption 
among magistrates and the court administration. 
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• The Inception of Registration Reform
The idea to adopt a simpler set of rules on the registration of commercial 
companies and make their registration an administrative, rather than a 
judicial procedure, and ease the rules on real estate transactions was 
originally formulated in the Anti-Corruption Action Plan of Coalition 2000. 
Further to a study of the drawbacks of the registration system in Bulgaria 
which appears to be flawed by corruption, the annual Corruption 
Assessment Reports after 2002 have consistently upheld the conceptual 
view that a thorough registration reform is needed. These ideas have 
been presented many times to the ministers of justice, finance, and 
economy, to businesses, etc., and were finally endorsed by all. 
The business community, foreign investors, NGOs and citizens all see the 
current system of registration as an inefficient, unreliable and insufficiently 
transparent area often marked by improper influence and corruption. In 
Bulgaria, it takes an average of 30 days to incorporate a company, 21 
of them being necessary for registration in court. This is much longer 
than the period of 18 days fixed by the European Commission already 
in 2002 and nearly ten times longer compared to the countries with 
the most advanced registration systems in Europe. On the other hand, 
court registration increases unnecessarily the workload of the courts as it 
is not a judicial activity per se. In 2003, the entries of various details in 
the commercial registers amounted to nearly 50% of the total number 
of proceedings instituted at the district courts, while in Sofia City Court 
alone registration proceedings were 62% of all cases.
A Strategy for Establishing a Central Electronic Register of Legal Persons and an 
Electronic Registries Center of the Republic of Bulgaria has been submitted 
to the Council of Ministers for approval. The Strategy was drafted by 
an interagency expert task force chaired by the Minister of Justice and 
involving representatives of the Minister for Public Administration, the 
Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Judicial Council, the Ministry of Economy, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Regional Development and Public 
Works, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications, the Administration of the Council of Ministers and 
the Center for the Study of Democracy. The steps undertaken by the 
Ministry of Justice and the government to implement the registration 
reform are based on the preparatory work of the expert group at the 
Center for the Study of Democracy in 2001 – 2003 summarized in a 
report published in 2003 (Opportunities for Establishment of Central Register 
of Legal Persons and Electronic Registries Center in Bulgaria).
Under the Strategy, the existing court registration procedures should be 
replaced with uniform and standardized administrative procedures, the 
registers should be centralized and converted into electronic ones, and 
each entity would be assigned a unique ID number.
The development of a modern registration system in Bulgaria should 
produce a better environment for business. In particular, it is expected 
to enhance speed, security, reliability, and equal opportunities, while 
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helping get rid of the errors and of all possible forms of corruption 
abundant in this segment of judicial work. 
The Ministry of the Interior (MoI) is a government institution of crucial 
importance for detecting and punishing corruption. Combating corruption 
within the Ministry itself, therefore, is decisive for its anti-corruption 
efficiency with regard to the other structures of the public administration. 
In the beginning of his term of office, the current Minister of the Interior 
declared in public that he had not suspected “that such corruption 
existed in the MoI”. That was the first case after 1990 when the problem 
of corruption in the internal security system was put forward at the 
political level. Previous criticisms of the MoI system had focused either 
on officers who had served the communist regime or on reshuffles to 
benefit one or another political party. Much less common had been 
discussions on links between MoI officers and notorious criminals. In 
fact, the comments of the Minister just came to confirm facts that were 
no secret to the general public: corrupt behavior existed in most of the 
MoI structures and at almost all levels, starting with tens of thousands 
of bribes paid to traffic police every year and reaching the top levels of 
special services and the Ministry itself. 
In conformity with the goals set out in the National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy, the MoI developed its own anti-corruption program in the 
autumn of 2001. The implementation of the programs included the 
following specific measures:
  
• Establishment of an Internal Anti-Corruption Coordination Council. The 
Council was headed by the Deputy Minister in charge of combating 
organized crime and corruption. The main objective of that new 
structure was to show that combating corruption in the security 
system was given topmost political priority and that corrupt officers 
could not rely on protection by their political contacts; 
 
• The strategy envisaged the establishment of a department to combat 
corruption within the MoI Inspectorate and the enhancement of the 
status of anti-corruption units at the Ministry. Although corruption 
had been high on the agenda of the Inspectorate, there had been no 
follow up on many reports and even proven cases due to pressure 
exercised from within by higher levels; 
 
• At the lower levels of national services and regional subdivisions 
specific officers were designated – parallel to the discharge of their 
routine duties - to check corruption reports. The intention was 
to establish a tool at the local level in order to increase the risk 
associated with corruption practices and to counteract incentives 
which deter the reporting corruption at lower levels; 
 
• Steps were taken to promote the involvement of civil society and 
to improve the interaction with the media in combating corruption 
within the MoI. Prior to 2001, the problem of corruption within the 
MoI was shunned by policy-makers and the media. The effect of 
3.4. Anti-Corruption 
Reform in the 
Ministry of Interior
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the political decision to ensure greater transparency was that the 
Inspectorate launched regular publication of data on its investigations 
which had been used only for internal purposes before. The 
subsequent public debate and media coverage came to show that 
the MoI was perceived as the institution which worked much more 
actively than the other government institutions, although its efforts 
were still insufficient. 
 
In 2003 and 2004, anti-corruption became part of the cooperation with 
EU partner institutions. 2003 saw the beginning of a twinning project 
for combating corruption, where the partners were the MoI, the UK 
Home Office and the ‘Anti-Corruption Command’ of New Scotland 
Yard. The objective of the project was to strengthen the Inspectorate 
and the Coordination, Information and Analyses Directorate (CIAD). The 
communication strategy proposed by the British partners to the MoI 
was oriented to the head office, the six national services of the MoI, as 
well as to the general public. With regard to the latter target group, the 
Ministry invited non-governmental organizations to join a Transparency 
Group which was expected to advise the Ministry on the efficiency of its 
communication with the general public. Experience, however, showed 
that few NGOs had the capacity to become effective partners of the 
MoI. By and large, in spite of the deeply rooted culture of excessive 
secrecy in the activities of the Ministry, it had become the government 
institution which provides the public with the most detailed information 
on the implementation of its internal anti-corruption measures, compared 
to other government institutions.
 
As a result also of the partnership with the British services, much better 
balance was achieved between preventive and enforcement measures. 
With regard to the latter, many investigation techniques applied by the 
New Scotland Yard were adapted and successfully introduced in the 
work of the Inspectorate. In June 2004, for instance, an integrity test 
was held under controlled conditions. It ended up with the detention of 
eight policemen alleged to have misappropriated lost money found and 
brought to the police by individual citizens. Such techniques should be 
developed and applied in other areas of operation of the MoI, where 
the risk of corruption is high. The introduction of all the new tools 
proposed in the cooperation with the UK is likely to need legislative 
changes related mainly to the punishment for provocation to bribery. 
This would be a guarantee that internal anti-corruption measures will 
continue after the end of the twinning project.
 
Some results of these steps are that in 2003 and 2004 the MoI was 
the government institution with the greatest number of internal 
investigations and of cases brought for public prosecution.   
 
Nevertheless, the review of anti-corruption measures within the MoI 
conducted in the middle of 2004 highlighted the following problems, 
the resolution of which would be indispensable for a breakthrough 
in the efforts to combat corruption: 
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• Surveys point to frequent incidence of corruption at the low levels 
of the MoI. Graft opportunities range from various violations of traffic 
rules to the use of soft drugs. Such massive corruption practices would 
require staff of hundreds of officers and large local structures tackling 
corruption, at least in the beginning of the anti-corruption reform. At 
present, this is not feasible due to the limited availability of human 
and financial resources. At the same time, the pilot anti-corruption 
measures in the traffic and border police proved that organizational 
solutions and technical aids (these have become affordable thanks 
to the rapidly falling prices, e.g. closed circuit cameras installed at 
border check-points) could resolve a number of problems regardless 
of the scarce resources; 
• Given the current organization, the disciplined offenders were mainly 
at the lower ranks: non-commissioned officers, junior officers and 
other servicemen of medium and low rank;
• Corruption activities are detected mainly on the basis of anecdotal 
evidence. In spite of some progress, there is still no comprehensive 
approach underlying the anti-corruption policy. Although, as mentioned, 
the policy balance has improved, still its main thrust is the detection 
of corruption already committed, while preventive measures or the 
establishment of an early warning system are of less importance. 
There is no integrated system to collect information in advance;
• The most important and serious cases of corruption carried out in 
an organized manner at key loci with and by senior officials are not 
detected due to the administrative and personal dependence among 
the officers in the various services. 
These conclusions warranted a number of new policies, which were 
introduced in October 2004 and included:
• The specific actions which constitute corruption in the MoI were 
explicitly stated in an internal regulation. These include abuse of 
authority for personal or third party gain; involvement of officers 
in organized crime; unauthorized contacts with, protection of and 
provision of information to criminals; extortion of citizens, including 
suspects or offenders, etc.;
• Preliminary information about corruption is collected using open 
telephone lines to both the public and MoI staff, internet and various 
surveillance techniques; 
• Reports of corruption go through a process of registration, reporting 
to superiors, vetting and follow up;
• Officers investigating corruption are organizationally independent and 
are freed from other duties.
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An objective and accurate review is needed to differentiate the 
corruption risk by groups of servicemen. At present, the MoI employs 
55 to 60 thousand people but it is not more than 10 to 15% that are 
exposed to strong corruption pressure. A possible solution is to develop 
a system for classification of risk levels by the following groups of 
servicemen:
• Senior officers who make decisions to undertake search operations, 
penal proceedings and administrative measures against criminals;
• Persons in direct contact with criminals (field officers at the criminal 
and economic police, the staff of the National Service for Combating 
Organized Crime, police investigators, etc.);
• Persons who are in charge of establishing administrative violations 
and making decisions on the spot (traffic policemen, fire safety 
officers, etc.);
• Border police;
• Those involved in procurement and the staff of logistics units.
Narrowing down the list of vulnerable groups would make it possible 
to implement an effective set of preventive measures with regard to the 
highest-risk groups and to detect corrupt behavior at an early stage.
It is important to discuss and adopt the following technical measures 
proposed by MoI experts: 
• Introduction of a term of office for senior positions;
• Rotation of field officers, e.g. transfer to other areas and lines of 
operation and service, replacement of teams, etc.;
• Establishment of mechanism to collect and analyze information about 
the property and financial status of persons exposed to corruption 
pressure. The system should incorporate data from the annual 
declarations on the property and financial status of the staff, similar 
data on family members, private trips abroad, holiday-making at 
tourist facilities whose prices are well above actual income levels, 
etc.
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The intervention of the government in the economy generates numerous 
points of conflict between private and public interests, which create 
favorable environment for corruption against the background of lacking 
institutional and administrative capacity and traditions. Corruption and 
the hidden economy, in their turn, are linked into a vicious circle for 
re-distribution of the country’s economic resources outside the formal 
institutions of the market and the democratic government. The hidden 
economy expands not just because of the level of tax and social security 
rates but rather as a result of the inefficient and arbitrary application of 
tax and regulatory regimes and the existence of corruption.
Corruption strongly distorts the business environment like an arbitrary 
and non-transparent tax; it leads to lower efficiency and benefits from 
public services, creating incentives for companies to enter the hidden 
economy. When corruption turns into a systemic problem, i.e. when 
everybody perceives it as an integral part of business rules, it turns into 
an effective tool for resolving private problems but the negative public 
effects remain: larger hidden economy, deteriorating public services, and 
loss of economic resources. In this case, the public cost of corruption 
by far outweighs the economically measurable private benefits from 
corrupt deals: there is a waste of social capital and the public loses its 
trust in the rule of law and its equitable enforcement. Thus corruption 
creates conditions and incentives for the emergence of a considerable 
hidden economy. Participants in the hidden economy try to preserve 
the existing status quo to their benefit through corruption pressure and 
corrupt deals and thus they close the vicious circle. Corruption strongly 
erodes the opportunities for economic growth and, at the same time, 
makes it irrational and inefficient for individual institutions, organizations 
or citizens to counteract on their own.
The Anti-corruption Action Plan (1998) of Coalition 2000 envisages 
consistent and continuous efforts of the public and private sector with 
a view to realizing simultaneous impact on all the elements of this 
vicious circle as an indispensable condition for achieving lasting anti-
corruption effect: (1) reduction of the hidden economy; (2) creation of 
conditions for the development of a competitive private sector through 
privatization, liberalization and deregulation; and (3) improvement of 
the major fiscal mechanisms of interaction between the government 
and the business community – the taxation system, the customs and 
public procurement. These general objectives underpin a number of 
government documents issued over the period from 1998 to 2004 with 
a time horizon primarily to 2007: the National Anti-corruption Strategy, the 
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National Economic Development Plan, the Strategy for Modernization of the 
Public Administration, the National Employment Strategy, etc. 
This section dwells on the progress towards the attainment of these 
objectives. Thanks to the joint efforts of business and non-governmental 
organizations, international institutions and government authorities, 
substantial progress has been achieved in the establishment of a 
better business environment and the reduction of the share of the 
hidden economy and corruption in the economic sphere for the past 
seven years. At the same time, many of the measures undertaken are of 
long-term nature; they call for further efforts and it is too early to draw 
final conclusions on the sustainability of their results. There continue 
to exist considerable challenges in such spheres as the counter-
action to the criminal economy and the related political corruption, 
the large-scale privatization, concessions and public procurement. 
Further efforts are needed to improve the quality of some basic public 
services like the administration of justice, healthcare and education, and 
to further reduce the share of the hidden economy and the related 
corruption. Against the background of the increasing importance of 
the private sector in the economy, businesses and their associations 
are not sufficiently active in anti-corruption reforms yet.  Corruption 
in the private sector is still at levels comparable to those in the public 
sector, posing a real threat to the stability of the economy in the event 
of adverse external shocks.
Bulgaria Joined the Group of Nations with Mostly Free Economy 
„Now that Bulgaria is a member of NATO, the focus of public 
policy debate has shifted to the country’s economic future.” [...] 
„Bulgaria’s economic policy continues to reflect commitments to 
International Monetary Fund guidelines and European Union entry 
requirements. Fiscal policy has generally remained conservative. 
The government’s record on privatization remains mixed. Bulgaria’s 
ineffective judicial system continues to allow organized crime and 
corruption to hamper investment.” 
Index of Economic Freedom for Bulgaria (1995 – 2005)
Note: The closer the value of the index to 1 the freer the economy.
Source: Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, January 4, 
2005  
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The deep financial crisis in the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997, 
the hasty and non-transparent privatization accompanied by a number of 
corruption scandals and the numerous institutional deficits, put Bulgaria 
among the EU candidate countries with the largest share of hidden 
economy in GDP. According to a number of international estimates, the 
hidden economy in Bulgaria accounted for 36 % of GDP in 19996. For 
the last seven years, parallel to the macroeconomic stabilization, the 
growing international integration and liberalization of the economy and 
the beginning of a series of structural reforms, Bulgaria has undertaken 
specific measures to limit the hidden economy and corruption on the 
basis of public-private partnership. The sustainable economic growth 
and the enhanced financial and banking intermediation have also created 
conditions for reducing the hidden economy.
Gray and Black Hidden Economy
The hidden economy encompasses business activities and their results, 
which are not covered by official statistics and by the competent 
government institutions and/or illegal business activities.
The gray economy is made up of activities which though not 
prohibited by the laws of the country are not declared before the 
government in conformity with the official rules and/or institutional 
requirements (declaration, registration, licensing, etc.).
The black (shadow or criminal) economy includes activities which are 
explicitly banned and prosecuted under the laws of the country 
and they are not registered by government statistics.
Source: Gray and Black Economy, Discussion Points, Centre for the Study of Democracy 
(2003)  
Over the period from 1998 to 2005, a number of surveys, studies and 
fora on the nature and various manifestations of the hidden economy 
were conducted in Bulgaria, which were the first to attract a critical 
mass of public and political attention and to trigger the development of 
an adequate policy in that sphere. One of the major contributions of 
Coalition 2000 in that respect was the leading role and the tangible 
policy impact of its research on cross-border crime, smuggling and 
the related corruption. The data presented in those studies revealed that 
as a result of smuggling the state budget lost over USD 1 billion annually 
in the trade with the EU for the period 1998 – 1999 alone. The issue 
emerged as a focal point of political debate in the 2001 parliamentary 
elections. The newly elected parliamentary majority came to power with 
a mandate to reduce corruption and smuggling. The public efforts of 
Coalition 2000 to focus anti-corruption reforms on the reduction of the 
hidden economy and the growing number of international benchmarking 
studies, including the Regular Reports on Bulgaria’s Progress towards EU 
Membership, which showed a number of adverse consequences of 
 
 
4.1. Corruption, the 
Regulatory and  
Tax Burden, and  
the Hidden Economy
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6 The Informal Economy in EU Accession Countries: Size, Scope, Trends and Challenges in 
the Process of EU Enlargement, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2003.
its existence for the country such as low employment rates, loss of 
competitiveness and income, poor efficiency of public services, etc., put 
the topic high on the political agenda. Following the beginning of reforms 
in the customs administration, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy announced a 
series of initiatives aimed at curbing the size and manifestations of 
the hidden economy in the country in 2002 and 2003.
The New Employment Policy of the EU and the Index of 
Hidden Economy of Coalition 2000
In 2003, experts of Coalition 2000 and the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Policy took part in the consultations of the European 
Commission and the Italian Presidency on the drafting of a 
separate guideline for combating undeclared work and the hidden 
economy in the 2004 European Employment Strategy. At the final 
conference on those preparations held in Sicily, Italy in December 
2003, Coalition 2000 presented for the first time the results of the 
new Hidden Economy Monitoring System (HEMS) and the Index 
of Hidden Economy. The index is used as a major monitoring 
tool for tracking the dynamics of the hidden economy and its 
components and for assessment and adjustment of relevant public 
policy.
The Index of Hidden Economy is measured on a scale of 0 to 10. 
The closer its values to ten, the more negative the assessments 
of the size and manifestations of the hidden economy in the 
country. Index values closer to zero point to a low level of hidden 
economic activity. The Index of Hidden Economy comprises the 
following subcomponents:
І. General assessment of the size of the hidden economy
ІІ. Specific manifestations of the hidden economy
1. Labor relations (hidden employment)
2. Turnover (hidden revenues)
3. Redistribution (tax evasion)
The measures which the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy 
undertook to reduce hidden employment produced the most rapid 
and tangible effect on the hidden economy in this country. They were 
further enhanced by similar measures at the European level through the 
European Employment Strategy and Guidelines. The most effective measures 
related to the mandatory registration of all employment contracts with 
the National Social Security Institute and the subsequent increase of the 
supervision checks by the General Labor Inspectorate in the beginning 
of 2003. They brought about a considerable reduction in the number 
of people hired without any contract – from 25 % at the end of 2002 
to 16.7 % in March 2003. The new employment contracts registered as 
a result of the measures reached some 162,5007. Notwithstanding the 
 
7 Iliev, P. Et al., The Informal Economy in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy (2004)
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positive effect of those mea-
sures counteracting the informal 
economy, it should be noted 
that, due to their administra-
tive nature, they were cost-
ly and short-term in nature. 
Their effect could quickly fade 
away or turn into a brake on 
the competitiveness of the 
economy. They should be sup-
plemented by adequate steps 
to reduce the regulatory and 
tax burden and to improve the 
efficiency of some basic public 
services like social security and 
health care. There already is 
a tendency for a shift of hid-
den employment payments in 
enterprises to contracts with 
“confidential” clauses so that 
employees receive more than 
the amount officially stated in 
their contracts. The Index of 
Hidden Economy of Coalition 
2000 reveals that the effect of 
the measures undertaken by 
the Ministry of Labor and So-
cial Policy is relatively weaker 
with regard to employment 
contracts with “confidential” 
clauses than it is with regard to 
hiring people without any con-
tract. The lack of confidence 
in the viability of the national 
social security and health care 
system due to widely spread 
corruption continues to gen-
erate long-term threats to re-
ducing the size of the hidden 
economy and corroborates the 
importance of the systematic 
approach to anti-corruption re-
forms.
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Transforming Hidden into Registered Employment
The policy to combat undeclared (hidden) employment in the 
Republic of Bulgaria covers a set of incentive, restrictive and 
sanctioning measures:
• Incentives – aimed at fostering the economic and social attractiveness 
of legal employment: 
– Improving the conditions for development of private 
business, entrepreneurship and the investment climate in 
the country;
– Reducing the tax burden and easing the administering of tax 
payments;
– Encouraging investments in high unemployment areas;
– Reducing the number of licensing, permit and official 
authorizations of business activities and streamlining the 
administrative process – 2003 saw the adoption of the 
Law on Limiting Administrative Regulation and the Administrative 
Control on Economic Operations, which entered into force in 
December 2003;
• Restriction – to make hidden employment unattractive to both 
employees and employers and to encourage people to declare their 
activities:
– Continuing the obligatory registration of the signing, 
modification and termination of employment contracts;
– Continuing the application of the statutory requirements for 
employers to become eligible beneficiaries under the Law on 
Employment Promotion;
• Sanctions – control of the activities of enterprises and individuals.
Institutions involved: Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, Ministry 
of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Employment Agency, General 
Labor Inspectorate, regional and municipal administrations, national 
representative organizations of employers and employees, non-
governmental organizations.
Source: Employment Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria 2004
4.1.1. Tax Burden
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) also announced a package of measures 
to reduce the hidden economy. Most of them related to existing long-
term initiatives to reform the fiscal system, which the Ministry was 
already implementing in one form or another, such as the establishment 
of a National Revenue Agency, program budgeting, and the customs 
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reform. These measures have a systemic anti-corruption potential but 
it will not be until 2006 that their effect will be felt and will be 
adequately measurable. The MoF proposals on the reduction of the 
hidden economy, which were anti-corruption landmarks, were the 
establishment of a Fiscal Investigation Service and the closing down 
of duty-free shops at the land borders of Bulgaria. Both measures 
failed to gain sufficient support in Parliament and did not become 
operational. While the establishment of a Fiscal Investigation Service 
duplicated the functions of already existing government institutions and 
it was rejected on those grounds, the preservation of duty-free shops 
could be viewed as a serious failure of the policy to reduce the 
hidden economy and corruption. The explicit or covert opposition of 
Members of Parliament and whole parliamentary groups against the 
government initiative to close down duty-free shops at the land borders 
of the country was an alarming sign of the dependence of Parliament 
on strong vested corporate interests.
Measures of the Ministry of Finance to Limit the Hidden Economy 
Current measures:
• Improving customs and tax oversight and discipline;
• Reducing the possibilities for VAT fraud schemes;
• Cracking down on the distribution of illegal software.
Future measures:
• Establishment of a Fiscal Investigation Service;
• Countering the sale of excise tax goods with false excise label 
or no excise label at all:
– Introducing new specimen of excise labels for tobacco 
products and alcoholic beverages;
– Improving the operation of warehouses for excise tax 
goods;
– Closing down duty-free shops;
• Setting up a National Revenue Agency; 
• Introducing of program budgeting;
• Establishing a Reporting and Information Centre; 
• Launching e-commerce and e-procurement.
Source: Ministry of Finance (September 2003)
For the last 14 years, duty-free shops have turned into a sphere, of 
the highest political level intervention to distribute illegally-generated 
income8. They are a major source of smuggled excise goods in the 
country. Even the official turnover of duty-free shops in the amount 
of BGN 300 to 400 million annually alone is sufficient to indicate the 
size of the losses the national budget and legal business sustain. The 
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illegal profits from smuggling are used to support the infrastructure of the 
hidden economy and to guarantee its political protection. In this respect, 
the major long-term challenges to anti-corruption reforms are to curb 
political corruption and the revenues from the criminal economy. 
This calls for political will and active interaction of all responsible 
government institutions, the civil society and legal businesses. It is 
worth considering, for instance, the proposal of big petrol distributors 
to finance the establishment of a network for real time sales reporting 
at all petrol stations in the country. The smuggling of fuels and the 
related political corruption are another important financial channel for 
the shadow economy. The government support to such proposals would 
be a clear sign of existing will to counteract large-scale corruption.
The tax system remains 
strongly affected by corrup-
tion and generates hidden 
economy. Half of the business-
men and 43 % of the popula-
tion believe that “almost all or 
most” tax officials are involved 
in corrupt activities. In a survey 
conducted by Vitosha Research 
Agency among tax officials, 
they disclosed that corruption
was most widely spread in operational tax control units, while the 
largest corruption deals were related to tax audits. Tax officials 
consider VAT collection as most prone to fraud attempts and VAT 
registered companies as most likely to try to evade taxation and social 
security payments.
There are many prerequisites for corruption in the tax system, which 
can be summarized in the following system of elements:
• The formal rules and regulations are formulated in a way that 
prevents their full implementation. They contain a lot of loopholes, 
which allow for discretionary interpretations and lead to considerable 
non-compliance;
• The lack of effective channels for protection against discretionary 
administrative actions through the judiciary and the widespread 
existence of open and effective possibilities to use corruption and 
political influence to avoid sanctions;
• The existence of selective control and taxpayer inspection. Corrupt 
practices most often relate to selective control and inspections which 
are usually purposeful and frequently politically of economically 
motivated;
• The emerging informal agreements between taxpayers and controlling 
authorities ensuring individualized application of legal requirements, 
i.e. collusion. 
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TАBLE 11. REVENUES AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX PAID BY 
DUTY-FREE SHOPS
Year Revenues (BGN) Corporate Income Tax Paid (BGN)
2000 251 085 204 6 926 406
2001 338 010 246 9 346 759
2002 344 527 053 9 361 902
Source: Ministry of Finance
In parallel to the ongoing long-term reform for improving the performance of 
the tax administration, more measures are needed to reduce its corruption 
potential and to enhance civil society control over its activities:
• Reduction of the opportunities for corruption pressure by tax officials 
in the exercise of their controlling functions. Emphasis should be put 
on closing loopholes in the legal framework which create conditions 
for arbitrary interpretation and application of the law by tax officials 
and on the opportunities for improvement of the appeals mechanism. 
An overall review of the legislation in this field would be particularly 
useful to both tax officials and taxpayers;
• Shrinking the opportunities for corruption pressure on the tax 
administration by businesses and the conditions for corrupt collusion. 
It is necessary to introduce measures for improving risk management 
and audit control systems; a specialized unit to combat tax fraud 
(to inspect properties of suspicious origin, including those of tax 
officials); control and accountability of tax auditors; opportunities 
for rotation of tax inspectors; hotlines; internal control units; time 
limits for tax audits and for the enforcement of tax statements, etc. 
It would be useful to introduce tax audit effectiveness indicators. The 
demonstrated fiscal effectiveness of BGN 2.52 per tax audit in recent 
actions by MoF to reduce the hidden economy is not reassuring to 
the overall efficiency of the administration, but creates reasonable 
doubts that fines have been partially “privatized”;
• Expansion and improvement of the feedback system of MoF in 
connection with violations committed by the tax administration. Six out 
of the nine corruption reports to the Reporting and Information Centre 
of the MoF in 2004 referred to activities of the tax administration.
The reform of the tax and social security administration, the improvement 
of the services they provide and the reduction of their burden on 
business should remain high on the agenda of the government for 
reducing the hidden economy.
Effectiveness of Tax Inspections
Over the period from 1 January 2001 to 30 April 2003, the tax 
authorities conducted a total of some 294,000 inspections of stores 
and warehouses for alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. 
Seizures of illegally sold goods in the course of those inspections 
included approximately 656,000 bottles of alcoholic beverages (in 
2001 – 210,000 bottles with false excise labels, in 2002 – 350,000, 
and in 2003 – 100,000) and 135,000 packs of cigarettes without 
or with false excise labels. The penalties levied amounted to 
BGN 740,000. All big offenders were reported to the prosecution 
but there is no information available as to the beginning of any 
investigation.
Source: Measures against the Hidden Economy, Ministry of Finance
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In spite of government mea-
sures for reduction of the hid-
den economy and corruption, 
there remain some powerful 
financial and fiscal factors 
which produce adverse ef-
fects: 
• The preservation of the 
overall high redistribution 
weight of the government, 
given the current level of 
development of the country. 
The government redistrib-
utes through its consolidated 
budget some 40 % of GDP. 
Particularly alarming in this 
respect is the discretionary 
allocation of the substantial 
budget surpluses for the re-
cent years; 
• The decentralization of pub-
lic finances has not reached 
a level at which local gov-
ernments can be indepen-
dent from political corrup-
tion in their relations with 
the central government. The 
rather big share of central 
government allocation to 
municipal budgets and the 
allocation of budget surplus-
es are still strongly partisan 
and politicized.  
4.1.2 Regulatory Burden
The third big sphere of reforms with considerable potential to reduce 
hidden economy and corruption over the period from 1998 to 2005 has 
been the reduction of the administrative and regulatory burden of the 
government. Regulatory regimes have been analyzed in the annual 
Corruption Assessment Reports since 1999 and they have invariably 
featured among the three most frequently mentioned reasons for 
the existence of corruption in relations between the businesses and 
the government. Anti-corruption measures in this field are long-term 
and difficult to gauge and therefore they are politically unattractive to 
governments.
Until 2004, the main anti-corruption measures in this respect were 
linked to making licensing, permit and registration regimes fewer in 
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CHART 14. INVOLVEMENT OF TAX OFFICIALS IN CORRUPTION (“HAVE YOU 
EVER ACCEPTED MONEY OR GIFTS”) (%)
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
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number and easier to apply. There were two “waves” of reducing the 
regulatory burden:
• In 1999 – 2000, on the basis of a decision of the Council of Ministers, 
the government reported that 44 out of 400 regimes were removed 
or facilitated;
• In 2003 – 2004, on the basis of another decision of the Council of 
Ministers, the government sought to remove 75 regimes and ease the 
application of 117 out of 360 regimes.
Necessary as it was, that process per se failed to bring about tangible 
reduction of the corruption pressure in the regulation of business activities 
because it did not address the main problem, which was the procedure, 
methods and mechanisms of applying the regimes. The positive anti-
corruption effect of those measures could be seen rather in raising 
the awareness of the civil society and the business community of the 
issue, which enabled them to increase their pressure for its further 
effective resolving. A positive change in that respect was also the 
concentration of responsibilities for the implementation of the regulatory 
reform into the Ministry of the Economy by including the Agency for 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in its structure. That led to a more 
pronounced political commitment to the completion of the ongoing 
reforms. Bulgaria’s commitment to EU accession calls for continuous 
introduction of new administrative regimes in the coming years and the 
main role of the national government in that connection is to ensure 
their most efficient and corruption-free implementation.
As early as 2001, in its Corruption Assessment Report Coalition 2000 
proposed that new licensing and permit regimes be introduced only by 
law that would provide clear regulations on their implementation. The 
adoption of the Law on Limiting Administrative Regulation and the Administrative 
Control on Economic Operations and the publishing of Instructions on its 
implementation adopted by the public-private Council for Economic 
Growth are undoubtedly a step forward in this respect. In order to fully 
achieve the anti-corruption potential of the law, further measures are 
needed over an extensive period of time:
• Better matching of these measures with the public administration 
reforms, the introduction of one-stop-shops and the electronic 
provision of public services;
• Effective involvement of local authorities whose role in the interaction 
with businesses will continuously grow in the context of the country’s 
upcoming accession to the EU; 
• Enhancement of the coordinating role of a single institution in this 
process and pooling together of the reform information and resources. 
This should not be perceived as exclusion of other government 
institutions at the central and local level from the process;
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• Dissemination of information and clarifications on the Instructions 
on the implementation of the Limiting Administrative Regulation and 
the Administrative Control on Economic Operations among businesses, 
ministries, local governments and the judiciary. Thus a common 
understanding will develop on the need for reduction of the regulatory 
burden which stakeholders could seek to uphold through the judiciary 
in future.
No tangible positive effect from the measures undertaken in 2004 can 
be expected before 2006 or 2007 but the success of the implementation 
of the Limiting Administrative Regulation and the Administrative Control 
on Economic Operations and other measures to improve the business 
environment will warrant sustainable reduction of the hidden economy 
and corruption.
The Business’ Opinion on the Application of Regulatory Regimes in 
Bulgaria
• Six regimes create most difficulties for businesses: the sanitary 
permit to set facilities into operation issued by the sanitary 
authorities; the registration of commercial facilities; the permit 
to build; the permit to use constructed facilities; the permit to 
set facilities into operation issued by the National Veterinary 
Control Service; and the permit to transport passengers and 
freight by road;
• Companies are much more likely to use the assistance of 
external consulting companies which deal with the issuing 
and obtaining of administrative documents when the issuance 
procedure is cumbersome and takes a long time. Such are, for 
instance, the registration of commercial facilities, the permit to 
build and the permit to use constructed facilities;
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TABLE 12. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTER’S DECISION (CMD) 392/2002 FOR 
ELIMINATION AND/OR EASING OF REGULATORY REGIMES, JANUARY 2005
Regimes, 
Included in CMD 
392/07.06.2002
Total Licensing Regimes Permit Regimes Registration Regimes
360 53 260 47
Recommendation
To be 
Preserved
For 
Elimination 
or Easing
For 
Elimination
For Easing
For 
Elimination
For Easing
For 
Elimination
For Easing
168 192 6 29 55 79 14 9
Implemented 159 4 24 46 69 10 6
Not Implemented 33 2 5 9 10 4 3
Implementation Rate 83 % 67 % 83 % 84 % 87 % 71 % 67 %
Source: Ministry of Economy
• Respondents point to three major problems when they apply 
for obtaining administrative permits: the duration of the 
procedure; the large number of documents to be presented 
and requirements to be met, and the requirement to present 
documents which have already been submitted to public 
registries.
Source: Ministry of the Economy, Vitosha Research
Generally, the public-private actions undertaken for the last six years to 
reduce the hidden economy and the corruption pressure it generates 
have been quite successful, bringing its share from about one-third 
of GDP to approximately one-quarter. Still, its size is substantial for a 
developed market economy. A risk factor for the sustainability of the 
results achieved is the continued open and strong corruption impact 
of the criminal economy – the use of illegally generated profits to 
ensure competitive advantages in the official business life. As a result of 
the long existence of considerable percentage of hidden and unregulated 
business activities, a kind of a nucleus of the hidden economy has 
developed, in which businesses continuously violate the official laws. 
Some 10 to 15 % of businesses pay bribes to avoid fines for a violation 
they have already committed. One of the most widely used instruments 
to end the corruption pressure exercised by such nuclei of the hidden 
economy is the amnesty:
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Paying Customs Duties
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Registration of the Company
Connection to a Water Main
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CHART 16. SHARE OF COMPANIES, WHICH MADE INFORMAL PAYMENTS FOR 
THE FOLLOWING (%)
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
• A number of partial amnesties were applied in Bulgaria prior to 
2005. They were conducted without any clear rules and yielded to 
the corruption pressure of amnestees without levying any penalties 
for past violations nor achieving guarantees for sustainable change in 
their attitude in the future. For instance, before the local elections in 
the autumn of 2003, municipal councils applied amnesties to illegal 
construction works without imposing any penalties or guarantess for 
the reduction of illegal construction works in future;
• Such public demonstrations of pardoning violations without any 
penalty, tax or at least attempted reform create further incentives 
to violate the existing rules in the future and erodes the public 
confidence in the democratic institutions. 
As the experience of many developed nations shows, the amnesty can 
be effective only when it is accompanied by serious action and political 
commitment to substantially improve compliance after its application. 
Otherwise the amnesty would only nourish the sense of impunity and 
institutionalize corruption. 
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CHART 17. RELATIVE BURDEN OF CORRUPTION PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES BY 
COMPANY SIZE**
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
Note: *The last row of the chart shows companies’ distribution by size in the sample – the rows with higher 
concentration of companies of the respective size show, which are the most burdensome corruption problems for 
them; 
**Companies are: micro (up to 10 employees), small (11-50 employees), medium (51 – 250 employees) and large 
(over 250 employees)
Already in the earliest corruption surveys of Coalition 2000 in 1997, 
the customs administration and customs officers were identified as the 
least transparent institution and the most corrupt officials respectively. 
There is hardly any other national institution that is subjected to such 
a high corruption pressure. The main prerequisite is the open nature 
of the Bulgarian economy. Some 60 to 70 percent of the national 
income cross the national borders either as exports or imports. From 
the very beginning of the Bulgarian transition to market economy, 
its borders were turned into a major mechanism for redistribution of 
national wealth, comparable in magnitude only to the privatization and 
restitution processes. Bulgarian customs had to reform from a Soviet 
type administration controlling centrally planned imports and exports 
into an institution operating under market conditions and uncertainty. Its 
restructuring and modernization have been carried out in the context of 
permanent political and economic crises, endemic expansion of criminal 
activities within the country and years-long corruption pressure on its 
borders due to the war and the U.N. embargo on former Yugoslavia.
As a result, corruption in its numerous and diverse forms had turned 
into an essential part of the sub-culture of the customs administration, 
affecting all its levels. The forms of corrupt behavior ranged from small 
bribes from the hundreds of shuttle traders to smuggling of oil tankers 
protected at the highest political level. During most of the 1990s, at 
least 50 % of the turnover of almost any market for highly liquid goods 
(e.g. cigarettes, alcohol, coffee, oil, sugar, fruit, vegetables, electronic 
household equipment, automobile spare parts, etc.) was supplied though 
customs violations (e.g. smuggling, tax and customs duties evasion, etc.)
In the late 1990’s, public pressure and the gradual normalization of the 
economy led to a decrease of corruption in the customs administration. 
The main prerequisites for the decline can be attributed to:
• The political stabilization of 1997 and 1998 enabled the government 
to crack down on the largest semi-criminal structures in the economy 
(mostly bogus insurance companies). Some large smuggling channels 
for goods, which were related to those structures, ceased to exist;
• The normalization of the country’s political system led to the 
elimination of some of the opportunities for politicians at the local 
and central level to protect customs fraud schemes; 
• The lifting of the oil embargo and related sanctions against former 
Yugoslavia and, later on, the stabilization of the West Balkan countries 
broke off the huge flows of embargoed goods supplied by Bulgarian 
criminal organizations and reduced the influence of international 
criminal structures on Bulgarian border institutions;  
• With the end of the financial crisis in the Bulgarian economy, 
new stable medium-sized and big Bulgarian companies emerged 
which regularly paid customs duties and taxes. Thus the customs 
administration could focus its attention on higher-risk companies 
which accounted for the greatest number of customs violations;
4.2. Corruption,  
Smuggling, and 
Customs Reform
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• As the privatisation process advanced, the practice of state-owned 
enterprises not to pay their import duties because of alleged difficulties 
in their financial positions was gradually phased out. That substantially 
increased the revenues of the customs administration;
• The entry of multinationals on the Bulgarian market and the increase 
of their market share squeezed out hidden economy and greatly 
reduced the sales of goods in violation of the Bulgarian customs and 
tax regulations. Typical examples were the imports of mass consumer 
goods like alcohol, coffee, detergents, etc.;
• The penetration of the multinationals further into transport, forwarding 
and especially in trade created additional obstacles to the functioning 
of established channels for “grey” imports. According to Coalition 
2000 estimates, the entry of internationally established retail chains 
like Metro and Billa at the end of the 1990’s reduced “grey” imports 
by as much as 50 % in the cities where those chains opened their 
stores.
Simultaneously to the improving political and economic environment, 
the customs administration undertook a number of steps to lower 
the corruption pressure on customs officers and to reduce the 
opportunities for customs violations. The most important ones are as 
follows:
• After years of procrastination and delays, 2000 saw the launch of 
the Bulgarian Integrated Customs Information System (BICIS). Thus 
the whole process of import, export and transit of goods became 
transparent in real time. The introduction of BICIS enabled the 
management of the customs administration for the first time to 
exercise centralized control on customs operations; to introduce risk 
assessment of goods and companies; to evaluate the performance of 
each individual customs officer; and to use many other analytical tools, 
which greatly reduced the preconditions for customs violations;
• In 2001, the Ministry of Finance signed a contract with the British 
company Crown Agents to provide expert assistance in the reform 
of the Bulgarian customs administration. Regardless of the critical 
remarks on the activities of the British company, Crown Agents 
proved as a whole to be a genuine catalyst for improved operation 
of the Bulgarian customs;
• When mobile customs groups were established in 2002, the customs 
administration got a tool to exercise quick on-site operational control. 
Coupled with BICIS, those measures eliminated the opportunities for 
regional customs authorities to hide unregulated activities and customs 
violations. Due to the mixed composition of the mobile groups 
(a representative of the National Squad for Combating Organized 
Crime, a representative of Crown Agents and two representatives of 
the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service), they turned into 
an effective independent control tool. As a result, only an year after 
their introduction, customs groups achieved tangible reduction in the 
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use of under-priced declarations and false tariff items by imports, 
while the shuttle trade was practically eliminated;
• After the opening of the EU accession negotiations, the customs 
administration started regular exchange of information with their 
counterparts in Western Europe. Thus the value of exported 
(respectively imported) goods from the European Union could be 
compared to the value declared by the importer to (respectively the 
exporter from) Bulgaria. The number of enterprises importing at lower 
than actual prices (or exporting at overpriced levels) has been strongly 
reduced for the last two or three years. 
Notwithstanding the considerable improvement in the work of the 
customs administration, the level of corrupt practices remains high. 
Moreover, the institution’s human, technological, organizational and 
financial resources are underutilized. The most serious critical remarks 
in this respect are as follows:
• The customs administration used higher than expected revenues 
reported in 2003 and 2004 as an argument for offsetting the public 
pressure for anti-corruption reforms within the organization. However, 
the way customs revenues are calculated and presented does not 
allow separating the effects of improved efficiency of the customs 
administration from increases in the country’s imports. The main 
revenue item of Bulgarian customs is the valued added tax (VAT). 
The increased growth rates of imports in 2003 and 2004 automatically 
resulted in a proportionate increase in VAT revenues. Imports grew so 
significantly due to the rapid expansion of bank lending which rose 
by 50 % in 2004 alone. According to market surveys, consumption 
growth rates are higher than the growth of imports registered by the 
customs. This gives grounds to assume that the import at lower than 
actual prices continues for some groups of goods, which results in 
budget losses due to lower VAT revenues. Thus revenue growth has 
proven to be a convenient environment for disguising “grey” imports 
in some groups of goods;
• The accelerated growth of consumer goods imports has created new 
opportunities for corrupt practices in the customs. Unlike the late 
1990’s when customs fraud was based on gross law violations, the 
period from 2003 to 2005 has been characterized by “soft” forms of 
corruption, in which a customs officer acts as a “consultant” and/or 
intermediary of businesses circumventing the law. These operations 
rarely constitute law offences but nevertheless customs officials provide 
assistance to businesses to evade paying the full amount customs 
duties; 
• Alongside “soft” corruption forms, the system of graft to speed up 
customs procedures continues to exist. Surveys among transporting, 
forwarding and trading companies reveal that the spread of graft has 
retained its level of the 1990’s;
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• The critics of the current management of the customs administration 
believe that participation in “soft” corruption forms and small graft 
have grown into a peculiar system of rewarding loyalty to the 
system;
• Another serious problem is the low level of activity of the Inspectorate 
as the internal body within the Customs Agency entitled to investigate 
corruption. Independent internal investigation is strongly restricted by 
the lack of autonomy of the Inspectorate and its strong dependence 
on the management of the customs;
• In 2004, the MoI has undertaken a series of raids to detect VAT 
siphoning schemes through fictitious exports. Although hundreds 
of participants related to those schemes have been identified, the 
response of the customs administration has been sluggish and there is 
no information available as to investigation or punishment of customs 
officers. And the losses due to fictitious exports are substantial and 
increasing. Studies of Coalition 2000 using the “mirror statistics” 
method prove that the country loses several hundred million USD 
annually from such schemes. Assessments of the Ministry of Finance 
have revealed similar results for the last five years. Though a host 
of organizations have repeatedly recommended enhancing the 
interaction between the customs and the tax administration and both 
institutions are situated within the Ministry of Finance the exchange 
of information and joint action between them is inadequate. In this 
respect there are numerous cases in which the referral to tax or 
customs secrecy regulations has prevented the investigation of fictitious 
exports schemes for VAT siphoning in considerable amounts.
Right from its outset, the privatization process turned into one of 
the most problematic corruption spheres due to the concentration 
of a multitude of private and public interests in it. The historically 
unprecedented scope and size of the divested assets, the lack of 
administrative and political experience, the absence of adequate legal 
framework and judicial control and the long delays in the process 
created unlimited opportunities for corruption and abuse in the 
privatization process. Not surprisingly privatization featured on top of 
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4.3. Privatization and  
Anti-Corruption
TАBLE 13. MIRROR STATISTICS OF COMMERCIAL FLOWS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND GREECE  
(2000 – 2003) (THOUSANDS OF USD)
Year Export from BG Import into GR Difference Import into BG Export from GR Difference
2000 376 977 396 892 -19 915 317 897 451 169 -133 272
2001 448 588 422 213 26 375 411 588 572 139 -160 551
2002 521 162 308 889 212 273 475 708 553 894 -78 186
2003 772 925 415 852 357 073 714 899 825 002 -110 104
Note: (1) Exports are FOB, (2) imports are CIF  
Source: National Statistical Institute
the Anti-corruption Action Plan (1998) of Coalition 2000 in the economic 
sphere.
As a whole, the privatization process in Bulgaria over the period 
from 1998 to 2005 has been characterized by lack of transparency 
and all too frequent and numerous changes of rules. It was not until 
very late in the process in 2004 and 2005 that a tendency emerged to 
improve the accountability of privatization and to reduce the potential 
for abuse and corruption. The successive changes of the privatisation 
model built on the proposals of Coalition 2000 set out in its regular 
Corruption Assessment Reports since 1999, i.e. more active use of open 
privatisation procedures, transposition of the successful model of the 
privatisation process in the banking sector, etc. Still, the privatisation 
process continued to involve businesses that had gained economic 
strength through previous corrupt practices. Thus privatisation turned 
into a symbol of large-scale political corruption and created lasting 
mistrust among the general public in the democratic institutions and the 
rule of law. 
Many corruption practices in the privatization process persisted in spite 
of the continuous legislative and administrative reforms in that sphere. A 
key element of the anti-corruption reform in privatization, which was not 
appreciated for quite a long time, is the understanding that corruption 
could be overcome and the privatization process could become efficient 
on the basis of partial changes rather than a system of interrelated 
rules:
• Many believed that the implementation of the mass (voucher) 
privatisation process would lead to fast and fair distribution of assets 
and the private interest of the numerous owners would subsequently 
inhibit possible abuse and corruption. The lack of corporate culture 
and functioning capital market enabled the transfer, often through 
corruption, of assets divested in the voucher privatisation to a handful 
of related parties. The employees-management buy-out schemes, 
which were applied as the preferred privatization model later on, 
brought about similar problems and outcomes;
• The most massive privatisation of assets from 1997 to 1999 was based 
on the presumption that the reduction of public ownership would 
automatically limit corruption opportunities. Market mechanisms were 
believed to be capable of automatically providing for the efficient 
functioning of privatised enterprises, regardless of who their new owners 
were. The emphasis on speed in the privatization process at that time 
led to the choice of “negotiations with potential buyers” as the most 
widely used privatisation technique. The lack of transparency in 
privatisation methods, coupled with the institutional fragmentation 
of responsibilities between the Privatisation Agency and line ministries, 
generated numerous opportunities for corruption. It was exactly the 
prevailing public opinion that the government’s privatization policy 
was corrupt that led to the change of government in the general 
elections held in the summer of 2001;
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• The presumption that the corruption problems in privatisation could 
be resolved exclusively through changes to the legal framework has 
caused the long stagnation in the large-scale privatisation from 2001 to 
2005. One of the major warnings of Coalition 2000 in that respect was 
that interests related to the criminal economy could continue for 
quite some time to control legitimate business and public policies 
due to the economic power and the corruption infrastructure 
that they had established before. The extensive and controversial 
interference of the judiciary in the privatisation of the Bulgarian 
Telecommunication Company and Bulgartabac Holding was among 
the most telling examples of the influence of political corruption in 
the country. The deals were blocked for more than two years and 
were ultimately discredited; it is hardly possible to gauge precisely 
the losses and missed opportunities for the economy. 
The lessons learned in the privatization process are still relevant with 
a view to the implementation of large infrastructure projects and the 
granting of concessions on infrastructure facilities in the near future. 
Against the background of the increasing transfer of public services 
to the private sector on an international scale, the establishment of 
working and transparent models of public-private partnerships in 
Bulgaria should turn into a key task in the modernisation of the 
public administration.
The Law on Privatisation and Post-privatisation Control adopted in early 2002 
reflected a number of recommendations of Coalition 2000 on reducing 
the corruption potential in the privatisation process. The negotiations 
with potential buyers were eliminated as a privatization technique and 
priority was given to public tenders and the stock exchange. The efforts 
made by the government to apply the law to the small and medium-
sized privatisation and the substantial improvement of the information 
activities of the Privatisation Agency in 2003 and 2004 led to tangible 
positive fiscal effects and greatly reduced the corruption pressure 
on the Agency. The small and medium-sized privatization process was 
almost completed at the central government level by the end of 2004.
Progress of the Privatisation Process in Bulgaria
At the end of August 2004, 54.37 % of the fixed assets of state-owned 
enterprises and 82.33 % of the assets subject to privatisation were 
privatised. With 2,878 enterprises already privatised there are only 
95 enterprises with majority state ownership left for privatization. 
Furthermore, 3,681 residual state minority shareholdings have been 
sold off by the end of 2004.
Source: Privatisation Agency
Unlike the case with small and medium-sized privatisation, the 
implementation of the Law on Privatisation and Post-privatisation Control 
in the large-scale privatisation deals was controversial and full of
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changes and delays. The re-
sults of the involvement of the 
administrative prosecution and 
the courts in the privatisation 
of the Bulgarian telecom op-
erator and Bulgartabac Holding 
generated reasonable doubts 
as to the independence of the 
judiciary and the existence of 
strong political corruption pres-
sure on the system. The at-
tempts of the executive power 
at amending the legislation in 
order to eliminate the judicial 
supervision of the privatisa-
tion process were blocked by 
the Constitutional Court in the 
beginning of 2003. The politi-
cal confrontation between the 
executive power and the ju-
diciary discredited the priva-
tization deals, generated legal 
uncertainty and delayed the 
large-scale privatisation by two 
to three years. The Draft Law 
on amending and supplementing 
the Law on Privatisation and Post-
privatisation Control submitted by 
the government to Parliament 
in June 2004 was the eleventh 
consecutive change to the law 
and provides for reduction of 
checks and balances in the pri-
vatisation process. The bill pro-
poses that most of the powers 
of the National Assembly with 
regards to privatization be trans-
ferred to the Council of Min-
isters, the Supervisory Boards 
of the Privatisation Agency 
and the Post-privatisation Con-
trol Agency be eliminated and 
some powers of the Privatisa-
tion Agency be handed over 
back to line ministries. The 
frequent attempts at using 
legislative and administrative 
mechanisms to resolve cur-
rent political problems and/or 
disagreements in the privatisa-
tion process enhance the legal 
uncertainty of the process and
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CHART 18. FINANCIAL RESULTS OF PRIVATIZATION DEALS (1997 - 2004) 
(THOUSANDS OF BGN IN ALL POSSIBLE MEANS OF PAYMENT*)
*According to Bulgarian privatization legislation payments can be made both in cash as well as in a number of other 
non-monetary instruments
Source: Privatization Agency
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Source: Privatization Agency
TАBLE 14. PRIVATIZATION METHODS (1993 - 2004) (NUMBER)
Tender Competition
Direct 
Negotiation
Stock 
Exchange
Central 
Tender
Deals for Stakes 
and Shares of 
Companies
320 1 093 1 075 64 330
Deals for Separate 
Company Assets
310 453 1 541 - -
Source: Privatization Agency
make its objective assessment much more difficult. The subsequent 
politicizing of the public debate conveniently conceals corrupt privatization 
and increases the public mistrust in the anti-corruption capability of 
government institutions. 
It is still difficult to assess objectively the effects from the establishment 
of the Post-privatization Control Agency (PCA). The main positive 
change is the reduction of institutional and responsibility mishmash in 
the post-privatization process, which should facilitate public oversight. 
Concerns that corruption in the privatization process would shift to 
the Agency proved wrong. However, this is most likely the result of 
the slow progress in the work of the Agency. It was not until the 
beginning of 2004 that the process of institutional establishment of the 
Post-privatization Agency was completed by pooling the majority of 
privatization dossiers into a single registry. Although the public registry 
is a step towards greater transparency in the post-privatization control 
at the level of individual transactions, the data is hard to process and 
prevents the establishment of aggregate indicators. This inhibits the 
assessment of the performance and efficiency of PCA. There also is no 
sufficient and accessible public information on the reports produced by 
the Agency. 
As Coalition 2000 has already suggested in earlier Corruption Assessment 
Reports one could hardly expect any substantial fiscal effect of the 
Agency’s activities:
• Voluntary payments of penalties levied by PCA on defaults on 
privatisation agreements are negligible and hardly cover the annual 
budget of the institution. The bulk of outstanding payment obligations 
under privatisation agreements are concentrated in few notorious 
deals with lots of legal complications and numerous shifts of title after 
the original privatisation contract;
• It is unlikely for the Agency to recover due receivables or penalties 
taking into consideration the overall bad shape of the judiciary, the 
expiration of statutes of limitation in most of the cases and the short 
notice for preparing cases before court. Experience has proven that 
most of the cases will take two to four years to complete and this 
time is sufficient to decapitalize the assets involved in the litigation.
At the same time, the fears of many investors that with the introduction 
of a unified PCA a number of privatisation deals would be cancelled, 
the investment climate would deteriorate and corruption payments 
would increase to avoid penalties proved unsubstantiated. By the end 
of 2004, the Post-privatisation Agency had exercised its right to demand 
cancellation of privatisation agreements only in five cases. Instead, the 
Agency opts for cash penalties and/or bankruptcy proceedings as the 
major sanctioning mechanisms. 
In the context of the limited executive powers of the Post-privatisation 
Agency, post-privatisation control remains an area which is relatively 
free of strong corruption pressure. As the latest government Draft 
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Law on amending and supplementing the Law on Privatisation and Post-
privatisation Control envisages greater powers of the Agency to supervise 
big privatisation deals and possible reinforcement of its sanctioning 
capability, the public, economic and political pressure on its operations 
is expected to grow. In this connection, adequate action is needed to 
prevent possible occurrence of corruption:
• the Agency has to receive adequate financing and staffing;
• the Agency has to improve 
its interaction with the pros-
ecutors’ offices, the MoI 
and the State Receivables 
Collection Agency to ensure 
maximum protection of the 
public interest in the numer-
ous court cases;
• the performance of the public 
registry for post-privatisation 
control has to be improved 
to allow for aggregation of 
data by various indicators. 
Performance of the Post-
privatisation Control 
Agency
As of 30 September 
2004, the Agency car-
ried out the post-priva-
tisation control on 7,006 
privatisation agreements. 
By 443 deals there were 
outstanding payments of 
the contracted price. By 
218 deals there were sys-
temic defaults on the re-
scheduled portion of the 
purchase price.
Over the period from 1 
January 2004 to 1 Sep-
tember 2004, the total 
amount of penalties lev-
ied by the APC for de-
faults on investment pro-
grams, employment plans 
and other contractual ob-
ligations equalled BGN 
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CHART 20. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE PRIVATIZATION AGENCY 
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CHART 21. DEGREE OF “ACCEPTANCE OF BRIBES BY OFFICIALS AND 
POLITICIANS DECIDING ON PRIVATIZATION TENDERS”*  
(BUSINESS SECTOR) (%)
* % of respondents saying that “all or almost all” in the Privatization Agency are involved in corruption
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
* % of companies indicating that the degree of bribe taking in decisions on privatization tenders is “high”
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
142,714,822. Of this only BGN 183,413 were paid out voluntarily 
within the prescribed time before the Agency undertook remedial 
court action. As of 30 September 2004, the Agency was a party to 
832 court cases. The financial obligations involved in these cases 
amounted to BGN 398,498,610.96, USD 107,245,538.60 and EUR 
1,941,186.64. 
Source: Post-privatisation Control Agency
Public procurement is a major channel for allocation of public resources 
to the private sector. Internationally and historically, it is one of the 
spheres that are most susceptible to corruption. From 1998 to 2005, 
corruption in the public procurement in Bulgaria retained its high 
levels with one out of two or three contracts being accompanied by 
graft payments. The corruption price for awarding public procurement 
typically ranges from 3 to 10 % of the contract price. In 2004, bribes 
tended to increase to 11-20 %. The Public Procurement Register shows 
that there has been a growing tendency for the last five years to opt 
for direct negotiations in awarding public procurement contracts. This 
form of contracting is the least transparent one and creates the biggest 
opportunities for violations and abuse, including corruption.  
The National Audit Office 
(NAO) reports that public 
procurement is particularly 
vulnerable to corruption:
• The number of reports on 
violations of the Law on 
Public Procurement sent 
by NAO to the Minister of 
Public Administration and 
the Minister of Finance in-
creased from 29 in 2003 to 
93 in 2004. That was the re-
sult of the improved exper-
tise and the more focused 
efforts of NAO in public 
procurement but also of the 
actual increase of incidents 
of violation of the Law on 
Public Procurement;
 
• The number of NAO state-
ments on violations in pub-
lic procurement contracting reveals a stable upward trend (2000 
– 33; 2001 – 235; 2002 – 509; June 2003 - 404). Over the period 
from 2000 to 2003, the typical violations were using the direct 
negotiations method of contracting without having valid legal grounds
4.4. Corruption and  
Public Procurement
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CHART 22. SHARE OF COMPANIES, WHICH MADE UNOFFICIAL PAYMENTS 
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OR LARGE 
COMPANY CONTRACT (%)
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
Base: December 2002: N=147 (Contract with Large Company); N=155 (Public Procurement); March 2003: N=98 
(Contract with Large Company); N=91 (Public Procurement); 
June 2003: N=136 (Contract with Large Company); N=133 (Public Procurement) 
November 2003: N=140 (Contract with large company); N=121 (Public procurement) 
February 2004: N=123 (Contract with large company); N=119 (Public procurement) 
April 2004: N=133 (Contract with large company); N=125 (Public procurement)
to do so, as well as awarding 
of contracts at prices lower 
than the bid; 914 contracts 
were awarded without any 
procedure at all.
Similar conclusions have been 
drawn by the other specialized 
controlling body under the 
Law on Public Procurement, i.e. 
the Public Internal Financial 
Control Agency (PIFCA). From 
2002 to 2004, the number 
of violations of the statutory 
procedures in awarding public 
procurement contracts and the 
number of failures to hold such 
procedures when the relevant 
legal grounds existed increased. 
PIFCA reports indicate that one 
in three public procurement 
contract was awarded in 
violation of the Law on Public 
Procurement, involving hundreds 
of millions of Bulgarian Leva.
The massive and widespread 
violation of the Law on Public 
Procurement and even the total 
neglect for its provisions has 
clearly shown that:
• the current legislation fails to 
provide adequate framework 
for transparent and efficient 
public procurement contrac–
ting and does not prevent 
effectively the use of corrupt 
practices for misappropriation 
of public resources;
• the control mechanisms of 
the NAO and PIFCA are 
inadequate and/or insufficient 
to ensure acceptable levels 
of compliance. 
The National Audit Office also 
shares the opinion that the 
penalty mechanism for public 
procurement contracting is not 
effective and efficient enough 
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Source: Public Procurement Register
TАBLE 15. RESULTS OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUDITS CARRIED 
OUT BY THE PUBLIC INTERNAL FINANCIAL CONTROL 
AGENCY IN BULGARIA (2002 – 2003)
2002 2003
Number of Audited Procurement Contracts 5 547 6 069
Number of Procedural Violations (% of Audited 
Contracts)
1 069
(19 %)
1 941
(32 %)
Number of Contracts Signed without Applying 
Public Procurement Rules though There Were 
Grounds for It
778 820
Source: Public Internal Financial Control Agency
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CHART 23. SIZE OF UNOFFICIAL PAYMENTS MADE BY COMPANIES IN 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT BIDS, AS A SHARE OF THE  
CONTRACT AMOUNT
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
Base: Companies, which paid in order to obtain public procurement contracts (November 2003: N=51; February 
2004: N=60; April 2004: N=36)
because the increased incidence 
of penalties does not lead to 
reduction of violations. 
It was not until 2003 and 2004 
that the government undertook 
legislative and administrative 
measures to reduce the cor-
ruption potential of the public 
procurement system:
• 2004 saw the adoption of 
a new Law on Public Pro-
curement harmonized with 
the acquis communautaire of 
the European Union in this 
field;
• A Draft Law on the Public Inter-
nal Financial Control has been 
submitted to Parliament in 
order to achieve improve-
ment of financial control 
and harmonization with EU 
requirements;
• Continuous training at the 
National Audit Office and 
PIFCA within the framework 
of international programs, 
has strengthened the con-
trolling capacity of the two 
institutions. 
The new Law on Public Pro-
curement which entered into 
force on 1 October 2004 is 
a precondition for enhancing 
the standards of transpar-
ency and accountability and 
for reducing the opportunities 
for abuse and corruption in 
public procurement. However, 
it cannot be expected to war-
rant automatic compliance and 
higher ethical standards on part 
of civil servants and business-
es. It is particularly important 
to establish good practice for 
transparent application of the 
new provisions of the law as 
early as 2005. There are many 
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TАBLE 16. THRESHOLDS FOR APPLYING SMALL SCALE PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT RULES* PRIOR TO AND POST THE 
NEW PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW OF 01.10.2004
After 01.10.2004 
Type of Procedure
Building/
Construction
Delivery 
of Goods
Services
Open Competition or 
Direct Negotiations after 
Invitation** (up to BGN)
1 800 000 150 000 90 000
Direct Negotiations after 
Obtaining at least 3 Price 
Offers (up to BGN)
100 000 30 000 20 000
Direct Negotiations (No 
Public Procurement 
Procedures Apply) (up to 
BGN)
45 000 15 000 10 000
Before 01.10.2004 
Open Competition (up to 
BGN)
600 000 50 000 30 000
Limited Competition (up to 
BGN)
100 000 20 000 15 000
Direct Negotiations (up to 
BGN)
30 000 10 000 10 000
Note: * Public procurement below certain thresholds, specified in the Public Procurement Law, 
is carried out under the Regulation on Awarding Small Scale Public Procurement, in which much 
lighter rules apply. 
** In terms of transparency and corruption potential between these two extremes lie two other 
options: public tenders and commodity exchange deals. 
Source: APIS
TАBLE 17. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS BY PRICE  
RANGE (2000 – 2004)
2004* 2003 2002 2001 2000
Price number number number number number
Up to 30 000 BGN 1 223 1 377 1 257 993 853
From 30 000  
to 50 000 BGN
438 512 505 379 286
From 50 000 
to 600 000 BGN
1 263 1 636 1 637 1 321 1 101
Above 600 000 BGN 231 382 257 285 198
Total 3 155 3 907 3 656 2 978 2 438
Note: For part of the public procurement contracts of 2004 the new rules of the Public 
Procurement Law might apply. 
Source: Public Procurement Register
risk factors, which should be closely monitored by the specialized 
controlling bodies, the civil society and the business community:
• Since the new law has introduced trebling of the minimal thresholds for 
obligatory application of public procurement procedures as required 
by the EU, about half of the contracts awarded on the average during 
the 2000 – 2004 period will be excluded from its scope. Moreover, 
the softer regime under the Regulation on Awarding Small Scale Public 
Procurement, which would allow direct awarding without any public 
tender procedure, would apply to about one-third of the contracts. 
Undoubtedly, the liberalization of the public procurement regime 
is a positive step towards reduction of the high transaction costs 
of negotiations and possible subsequent litigation but it calls for 
considerable enhancement of the public and specialized control 
on the process. An innovative tool for reduction of the corruption 
pressure resulting from the higher thresholds and the increased 
discretionary power of the public administration is the introduction of 
e-markets for small scale public procurement similar to the pilot project 
implemented at the Ministry of Finance. Adequate improvement is 
needed also in the quality of the information provided by the Public 
Procurement Register in order to guarantee higher level of public and 
media control;
• Some provisions of the new Law on Public Procurement and the 
Regulation on Awarding of Small Scale Public Procurement go 
beyond EU requirements and create opportunities for abuse. 
These are, for instance, the requirements of Art. 84, item 1 of the 
Law and the equivalent Art. 53, para 1, item 1 of the Regulation, 
which define the conditions for transition from public tendering 
to direct negotiations of public procurement contracts. “Upgrading” 
EU requirements in areas which do not require the introduction 
of any specific local features reasonable doubts emerge as to the
establishment of loopholes 
for circumvention of good 
practices. This reinforces the 
tendency observed for the 
last five years of an increase 
in the number of public pro-
curement contracts awarded 
on the basis of direct nego-
tiations and raises the risk of 
corruption;
• The texts regulating the Ar-
bitration court to the Agency 
for Public Procurement are 
unconstitutional in the opin-
ion of many jurists because 
they contradict the United 
Nations Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards ratified 
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CHART 25. NUMBER OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS BY MONTH 
(2001 – 2004)
Note: Data as of January 2005.
Source: Public Procurement Register
by Bulgaria in 1962 and the 
European Convention on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration 
ratified in 1964 and Art. 5, 
para. 4 of the Constitution of 
Republic of Bulgaria. If con-
tested at the Constitutional 
Court of Bulgaria these texts 
might be declared unconsti-
tutional thus creating legal 
uncertainty and opportuni-
ties for further changes in 
public procurement rules, 
which could lead to corpo-
rate pressure for exclusivity 
and corruption; 
• In the case of further 
amendments to the Law 
on Public Procurement the
government should adopt the principle not to add any provisions 
on top of what is mandatory under EU acquis. This is a way to 
avoid the lobbying for private vested interests, which usually lead to 
corruption;
• The rapid institutional establishment of the new Public Procurement 
Agency (PPA) is a key factor for the promotion of good practices 
under the new legislation. The six-month’ period allowed for the 
establishment of the Agency between the adoption and the effective 
entry into force of the Public Procurement Act was a good precondition 
for success. The one-off substantial increase of budget expenditures 
as a result of the spending of the considerable government fiscal 
surplus accumulated at the end of 2004 and the elections in 
the summer of 2005 would most likely increase the corruption 
pressure in public procurement. This will be the first practical test 
of the effectiveness of the procedures under the new Law on Public 
Procurement.
 
The more liberal nature of the new Law on Public Procurement implies an 
improved monitoring and control system of the specialized state bodies, 
i.e. the National Audit Office and PIFCA. While the institutional capacity 
of the National Audit Office has been considerably strengthened in recent 
years, PIFCA sill faces substantial changes in its legislative base, which 
is a potential risk for disturbing the normal operation of the institution. 
The government has already proposed a Draft Law on the Public Internal 
Financial Control, which aims to improve control on public expenditures, 
to protect public interests better and to align the national legislation with 
the EU acquis communautaire in this sphere. The draft law provides for 
much greater powers of PIFCA, which calls for thorough assessment of 
the risk of possible conflict of interests, abuse and corruption, as well as 
duplication of powers with other government institutions. 
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CHART 26. NUMBER OF SIGNED PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS AND 
RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF CORRUPTION PAYMENTS MADE BY 
COMPANIES IN ORDER TO WIN A PROCUREMENT CONTRACT
Source: Public Procurement Register, Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
Bribery is almost as widely spread in the private sector as it is in 
the public sector of Bulgaria. The abuse of economic or administrative 
power for personal benefit at the expense of the interests of business 
owners and customers distorts market forces and mitigates the positive 
effect of their functioning. These are the corrupt practices related to “kick-
back” payments, negative PR journalism, and the disregard for minority 
shareholders’ rights following the voucher privatization process, etc. The 
existence of corruption in the private sector worsens the consequences 
of potential external negative shocks to the economy. Corruption in the 
private sector is a sign of market immaturity, underdeveloped market 
infrastructure and passive businesses. If there is strong pressure for better 
products by well informed and organized customers and representative, 
independent and authoritative business associations which guarantee 
and maintain high standards of social corporate responsibility of their 
members, the room for corrupt transactions in the added value chain 
is much narrower.
The first half of Bulgaria’s tran-
sition (until 1997) was domi-
nated by bogus insurance 
companies and racketeering, 
financial fraud (financial “pyra-
mid” schemes and siphoning 
of banks) and various extortion 
practices (with regard to pric-
es and/or suppliers). All those 
parasite practices with consid-
erable negative social and eco-
nomic effect became possible 
due to the political instability 
and institutional weakness of 
the government and the law 
enforcement authorities in par-
ticular. That led to the emer-
gence of vicious business prac-
tices, which prevent the  ap-
pearance of modern corporate 
and institutional culture among 
the population.
During the second half of transition, businesses gradually came “out of 
the dark” and business relations in the private sector went to normal 
through the improvement of the overall institutional framework of the 
market. As the planning horizon of enterprises  extended mainly due to 
the efficient functioning of the currency board arrangement, businesses 
started recognizing their long-term private interest in the common 
observance of the rules of good and ethical conduct. Although very slowly 
and hesitantly, sectoral organizations and business associations began 
to change from sheer lobbyists insisting on privileges for individual 
members or the sector as a whole to self-regulators (improving the 
business environment through intolerance to unethical companies).
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CHART 27. SHARE OF COMPANIES WHICH ‘OFTEN’ LOST BUSINESS DEALS 
BECAUSE A COMPETITOR HAD PAID A BRIBE (%)
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
Generally, in 2004, some 60 % of the businesses assessed the spread 
of corruption as equal in the public and the private sector, although 
the problem in the private sector was perceived as much less urgent. 
This reflects the increased recognition of corruption in the private sector 
as a problem but also underlines the notion that there is no pressure 
from the business to undertake reforms. Businesses are aware that 
corruption is a serious problem also in the private sector but they 
prefer to see it resolved in the public sector first. 
Undoubtedly, the reduction of 
corruption in the private sec-
tor is largely dependent on 
the improvement of the per-
formance of many public in-
stitutions shaping the market. 
At the same time, businesses 
have to be more proactive and 
to find appropriate public-pri-
vate interaction mechanisms for 
sustainable reduction of nega-
tive business practices involv-
ing corruption. There are many 
ways in which business asso-
ciations can counteract corrup-
tion: advocacy for improved 
business environment through 
deregulation and simplification 
of administrative procedures; 
support for investigating jour-
nalism for unraveling cases of 
corruption; and carrying out of 
public awareness campaigns on 
the damage caused by corrup-
tion. But their most influential 
anti-corruption tool is reputa-
tion mechanisms (including the 
development of codes of ethics 
and standards of conduct).
Businesses in Bulgaria still fail to 
voice clearly their anti-corruption 
position. In 2003, only 17 to 
18 percent of companies were 
firm in their opinion that they 
would not pay a bribe under 
any circumstances. In 2004, 
their share went further down 
to 13.4 percent. 
In 2004, bribes offered by mem-
bers of business associations 
went down year-on-year and
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CHART 28. PRIVATE VS PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION: BUSINESS 
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CHART 29. PRIVATE VS PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION: WHICH IS MORE 
ACUTE ACCORDING ТО BUSINESS (%)*
* % of companies, which indicate corruption in the respective sector as a “problem“
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
* % of companies, which indicate corruption in the respective sector as a “very big  problem” 
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
more companies were prepared to respond and report cases of corruption 
pressure to the institutions. This was primarily due to the increased 
likelihood of media exposure of corruption cases - a major achievement 
of business associations, but also to the higher rates of detection of such 
cases by law enforcement agencies, however unsatisfactory those rates 
remain.
There already is a critical mass of companies which have adopted codes 
of ethics and standards for socially responsible conduct – Standard of 
Business Ethics, the Global Compact, etc. Many local business associations 
have also introduced codes of conduct. Sometimes industries that are 
not formally organized in a business association adopt codes of ethics 
(e.g. the media). The outstanding problem with these codes of ethics is 
compliance. In most cases, business associations are perceived by man-
agers as elitist clubs, which enhance the image of the company without 
requiring any strict commitments to standards for social responsibility.
 
The implementation of codes of ethics depends on the ability of 
business associations to impose reputation sanctions on their member-
companies (even expulsion) for non-compliance. There has been only 
one publicly known case for company exclusion on non-compliance so 
far in Bulgaria and this has happened in the Bulgarian Association of 
Information Technologies (BAIT). As a rule, this extreme measure strikes 
disciplining balance between long-term benefits from the membership in 
an association (effective information exchange, active advocacy, reduced 
training costs and other services, including reputation capital) and short-
term benefits of unethical or irresponsible behavior.
Another untapped opportunity to restrict corruption in the private sector 
is the public-private partnership between business associations and the 
government in the public procurement process. Associations could serve
as guarantors of transparency 
and integrity by participating in 
the whole process from pre-
paring the tender documenta-
tion, establishing criteria for 
assessment and monitoring to 
offering arbitration in cases of 
dispute.
 
The institutional weakness of 
business associations or em-
ployers’ unions (which are not 
narrowly specialized) can be 
seen in a number of facts: they 
are involved mainly in quasi-
political debates and general 
discussions on self-regulation; 
more often than not they are 
financed from activities typi-
cal for businesses, the civil 
society and think-tanks rather
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CHART 30. SELF-REGULATION AS AN ANTICORRUPTION MEASURE:  
DOES IT MATTER?*
* Will ethic codes  reduce corruption in the private sector? 
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
than from membership dues paid against the provision of services; 
their internal democratic deficit is as large as the one in the political 
life of the country, etc. Hence it is quite logical that businesses’ 
mistrust of codes of conduct as major tools of business associations in 
overcoming corruption and unfair competition has increased. It is very 
telling of the overall quality of codes of ethics in Bulgaria to see some 
of them state that companies undertake the commitment to abide by 
the laws of the country. This confirms the lack of knowledge among 
business associations of their role in society. 
104 ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN BULGARIA
Bulgarian NGOs have been at the forefront of anti-corruption reforms 
ever since the mid-1990s. One of the key contributions civil society 
has made in this area has been to place corruption high on the list 
of public concerns. NGOs have also been instrumental in prompting 
government action against corruption and exert a consistent pressure 
for key reforms. Above all, against the background of the volatile 
political establishment of the last eight years, NGOs have maintained the 
consistency and sustainability of the anti-corruption agenda in Bulgaria. 
The NGO sector owes much of its prominence in national anti-corruption 
efforts to its capacity to pull together substantial analytical resources and 
to communicate well with the media. It also has a good cooperation 
with international institutions and support from donor organizations and 
has enlisted them as key stakeholders. 
NGOs have made a difference in a number of areas, most significantly 
in:
• Analysis of corruption. NGOs have been providing government with 
expertise and analyses in the development and evaluation of anti-
corruption legislation and policies;
• Information and awareness. In the initial years of anti-corruption 
efforts, these were crucial to brining pubic around to support reformist 
policies and be less tolerant of corruption;
• Managing to engage government in a public-private partnership 
through institutional dialogue in counteracting corruption;
• Pilot initiatives to create lasting anti-corruption structures and 
instruments within the non-governmental sector;
• Facilitating a broader international cooperation in counteracting 
corruption going beyond the intergovernmental formats and involving 
various other public and private stakeholders.
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5.1. Non-Governmental 
Organizations and 
Anti-Corruption 
Reforms
Open Government Initiative Project
The Open Government Initiative (OGI) project is implemented in 
Bulgaria by DPK Consulting with funding from the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and covers activities 
related to institutional capacity building, prevention of corruption, 
enhancing the transparency and accountability, and reinforcing the 
rule of law, particularly in the areas of public sector auditing and 
public procurement. 
OGI supports the efforts of civil society to enlist broader public 
participation in the fight against corruption and encourages 
cooperation with state institutions, the media, and the private 
sector. Since the outset of the project, there have been three calls 
for proposals for anti-corruption projects with fourteen projects of 
civic organizations implemented in 2003 and 2004.
5.1.1. Public-Private Partnership
Public-private partnerships were not the most obvious choice of going 
about anti-corruption reforms in 1997, and not only in Bulgaria. Bulgarian 
non-governmental organizations could be credited for managing to engage 
government in an area that was not only sensitive but also required 
considerable commitment of will and resources. Eight years later it 
could be safely said that cooperation between the civil sector and 
government is as a major prerequisite for successful anti-corruption 
reforms. At the same time, the interaction between state and civic 
organizations involves a number of inherent strains. 
Anti-corruption initiatives and efforts launched by NGOs in Bulgaria 
continued to face an essentially ambivalent attitude on the part of the 
state. Since corruption came on the agenda, governments have wavered 
between the aspiration to identify with the values of transparency 
and integrity, on the one hand, and the reluctance to publicly 
acknowledge corruption, particularly at its higher ranks, on the other. 
The inconsistent anti-corruption efforts and the discrepancy between 
political rhetoric and actual policies contributed to the alienation between 
government and the public. Among other things, this has enhanced the 
need for greater role of NGOs in anti-corruption. 
Attitudes in parliament towards corruption were equally marked by 
ambivalence as the parliamentary bodies, trusted with tackling it, could 
not incorporate anti-corruption priorities in the agenda setting of the 
legislature. This adversely affected the anti-corruption cooperation 
between governing majorities and non-governmental organizations.
Another factor undermining public-private partnerships has been 
partisanship. Political parties and politicians frequently tried to present 
a better public image by associating with NGO anti-corruption efforts. 
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This has hampered both the effectiveness of NGOs and the credit they 
take for their effort. 
Public-private partnership at the local level also faced certain problems. 
Many pre-election commitments of the local authorities to participate in 
joint anti-corruption initiatives with the civic sector were not met at all 
or failed to lead to the creation of permanent mechanisms of public-
private partnership or to any tangible anti-corruption results.
Despite these challenges public-private partnerships have become 
the most effective mechanism through which anti-corruption reforms 
were implemented.
These partnerships have come in numerous forms. NGO experts have 
played important role in the discussion and assessment of draft anti-
corruption legislation. A case in point is the elaboration by Coalition 
2000 of the draft ombudsman law, its cooperation with the Customs 
Agency and the Ministry of Interior in identifying measures against 
smuggling and related corruption, as well as with the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Policy and the Ministry of the Economy in developing 
extensive measures to restrict unregistered employment and reduce the 
regulatory burden of the state.
Monitoring the integrity of public services of high corruption risk 
is another area where Coalition 2000 and a number of watchdog 
organizations have been active. NGOs have received and investigated 
reported cases of corruption and, in partnership with state institutions 
and the media, helped put in place the conditions for improved public 
accountability and transparency and for curbing corrupt practices at the 
various levels of government. A local level anti-corruption network was 
also established on the initiative of Coalition 2000 in partnership with 
non-governmental organizations to monitor corruption risk zones in the 
municipal administration. 
Civil society organizations outside the capital city Sofia are increasingly 
active. This is crucial as policies undertaken by the government need to 
be supplemented local level effort engaging citizens and thus ensuring 
that policies keep their relevance and government receives feedback. 
For example, since 1997 Coalition 2000 and other NGOs have initiated 
the establishment of local institutions of the ombudsman type (public 
mediators). Even before an adequate legal framework was put in place, 
similar institutions were set up in a number of municipalities (Sofia, 
Veliko Turnovo, Razgrad, Zavet, and others) and started operating upon 
the initiative of civil society in cooperation with the local authorities. 
It should also be noted that non-governmental organizations themselves 
continue to be vulnerable to corruption. Enhanced accountability is 
needed for two main reasons: the majority of NGO funding in Bulgaria 
comes from foreign public sources; there could be justified public 
mistrust of those non-governmental organizations which thrive on political 
protection and privileges.
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5.1.2. Coalition 2000
Coalition 2000 is an initiative of Bulgarian non-governmental organizations 
which brings together the efforts of civil society and state institutions. 
The efforts of Coalition 2000 and its partners have shaped the overall 
civil society involvement in combating corruption since 1997. Although 
initially seen as ambitious, all of Coalition 2000’s initial goals have been 
achieved: 
• A no-go area for public discussion some years ago, anti-corruption is 
now of mainstream concern in the policy agenda. As a result mostly 
of Coalition 2000’s monitoring system, corruption was acknowledged 
by political elites and recognized as a problem by the general public. 
The Coalition has shown not only that corruption can be measured 
but that measurement is crucial in its successful combat. The 
regular publication of data on the actual prevalence of corruption 
in society has given the public an instrument of advocacy and 
pressure, and has allowed government to better tailor its policies. 
Coalition 2000’s monitoring system has been included as part of the 
UN Anti-Corruption Tool Kit and is routinely referred to by various 
international institutions, including the European Commission, World 
Bank, IMF, UNDP and others. 
• By informing the policy process, Coalition 2000’s quarterly indexes on 
the spread of corruption have made a difference in a number of areas, 
lately on the hidden economy. Data on the gray economy prompted 
the government to introduce changes to employment legislation. The 
Coalition’s subsequent monitoring revealed a 25% drop in the share 
of the hidden economy in labor relations while highlighting remaining 
concerns in other areas. Thus, Coalition 2000’s watchdog mechanism 
has served both as an early warning and as a policy effectiveness 
feedback instrument. 
• Anti-corruption is now an avowedly strategic concern for government, 
and policy in this area is sought to be a comprehensive mix of 
prevention and enforcement. Bulgaria has aligned its laws with the 
best international standards and is actively contributing to their further 
development. The adoption of the Coalition 2000 Action Plan by a 
broad national consensus at the 1998 Policy Forum has helped structure 
the entire policy and institutional anti-corruption environment in 
the country by outlining the key challenges and solutions in the field 
of government, media and civil society, business and international 
cooperation. In an ultimate acknowledgment of the role of Coalition 
2000 in this process, the government based the better part of its 
2001 Anti-Corruption Strategy on the Action Plan of the Coalition. 
Coalition experts made valuable contributions to the drawing of the 
strategy. The document highlights the need to “build mechanisms 
and effective partnership practices between state institutions, non-
governmental organizations and privately-owned media in areas such 
as democratic control over the administration’s activities, civil rights 
protection, independent oversight and anti-corruption awareness and 
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advocacy campaigns”. The strategy acknowledges the important role 
of Coalition 2000 and Transparency International-Bulgaria.
• The anti-corruption experience of the Coalition has a growing 
international recognition. Regional anti-corruption projects such as 
Southeast European Legal Development Initiative (SELDI) have drawn 
on the public-private model of Coalition 2000 in bringing together 
NGOs from a number of countries in the region. 
The media play a very important role in shaping popular perceptions 
and attitudes to corruption. As shown by the Coalition 2000 Corruption 
Monitoring System, roughly half of the adult Bulgarian citizens get 
information about instances of corruption from broadcast and print 
media.
The regular media monitoring 
conducted by Coalition 2000 9 
indicates that both print and 
electronic media devote in-
creased attention to corrup-
tion. While with the emergence 
of anti-corruption initiatives in 
1998 the average monthly num-
ber of corruption-related items 
was about 150-200, in 2002 it 
reached 400 pieces, and by 
2004 it had risen to more than 
700 on average, regardless of 
whether the respective period 
was marked by a major cor-
ruption-related news story or 
public scandal. 
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5.2. The Role of Media 
in Anti-Corruption
9 The monitoring covered 32 national 
media, of which 10 dailies, 8 weeklies, 
7 internet media, all 3 national 
television stations, and 4 radio stations. 
Forty-eight weekly and 12 monthly 
reports have been prepared, as well 
as 7 topical analyses on some of the 
corruption-related stories that received 
most extensive media coverage (such 
as corruption in higher education, the 
Sofiyski Imoti affair, the selling of low-
price flats to government officials, the 
scandals at the National Protection 
Service, the grain siphoned off from 
the strategic grain reserve, etc.). 
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CHART 31. AVERAGE MONTHLY NUMBER OF CORRUPTION-RELATED ITEMS 
IN THE MEDIA 
Source: Media Monitoring by Coalition 2000
In the late 1990s, corruption was typically discussed by the media 
in general and non-personified terms. Now, increasingly corruption 
coverage deals with specific cases. Print media, which tended to resort 
to sensationalism, are gradually adopting a much more professional 
attitude in the investigation of this issue. Already there are reporters who 
write unbiased pieces on both concrete cases of corruption and on the 
underlying causes of corruption.
One notable development has 
been the shift of focus from 
petty to high-level corrup-
tion without this being used 
for party political confrontation 
(Table 18). If soon after 1997 
the topic of corruption was 
usually brought up in the con-
text of political antagonism, in 
recent years the public debate 
on corruption has shifted away 
from partisanship and more to-
wards a broader civic agenda. 
The subject of anti-corruption 
is increasingly treated in the 
context of the need to establish 
a political culture of transpar-
ency and accountability. The 
perfunctory partisan discourse 
is gradually being replaced by 
an understanding of the under-
lying causes of corruption. 
Further, there has been a relative increase in the number of success stories 
on anti-corruption measures and a considerable increase in the average 
number of items reporting successful punishment of corruption. 
Political corruption has increasingly been spotlighted by the media and 
journalistic interest in it has been sustained by disclosures of corrupt 
abuse of power, but also by the overall process of adoption of modern 
standards of transparency in the context of the country’s European 
integration.
Undoubtedly, the media rely on civic organizations and initiatives for 
assessments of the scope of corruption, as well as for information on 
the related perceptions and attitudes of Bulgarians. The level of trust 
achieved between the media and non-governmental organizations in the 
context of anti-corruption critique of governments is an important step 
toward reinforcing civil society.
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CHART 32. DEGREE OF CONCRETENESS OF CORRUPTION-RELATED ITEMS IN 
THE MEDIA (AUGUST 2004)
Source: Media Monitoring by Coalition 2000
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TАBLE 18. DISTRIBUTION OF CORRUPTION-RELATED ITEMS BY 
TOPIC (OCTOBER 2004)
Topics
Anti-
corruption 
Measures
Corrupt 
Practices
Investigations, 
arrests
Governance 15 157 -
Cabinet 22 38 8
Public administration 17 31 14
Customs administration 4 40 5
Army 1 6 -
Local government 2 26 5
Statements by ministers, deputy ministers, and other public figures 25 38 -
Political Parties 8 45 -
Legislature - - -
Laws and draft laws 11 9 -
Parliament - 2 -
Members of Parliament 1 2 -
Statements by MPs and other public figures 7 17 -
Judiciary and Police 1 8 1
Courts 1 43 -
Prosecution 2 3 1
Investigation 2 - 5
Police 25 20 34
Statements by representatives of the judiciary, the police and 
commentaries
4 10 -
Society - 1 -
Healthcare 4 30 19
Education 14 10 -
Other 1 6 -
Economy - 11 -
Public Procurement 1 4 -
EU Funds 1 3 -
Privatization - 3 -
Business 2 13 1
Non-governmental and international organizations 1 - 10
Bulgarian NGOs 7 2 -
International organizations 35 5 -
Media 7 21 1
Total 221 604 102
Source: Media Monitoring by Coalition 2000
Investigative journalism is 
the most high-risk professional 
commitment as well as the 
costliest investment and serious 
media cannot afford to ignore 
it. It is still underused, though, 
since shortage of financial 
resources and a heavy reliance 
on advertising, typical of a most 
Bulgarian media, drive them to 
focus on more conventional 
reporting genres and general 
information. Investigative 
journalism is still viewed as a 
luxury that is not necessarily 
warranted and one that may, 
in the event of a clash of 
interests, affect the survival of 
the respective media.
Journalistic disclosures still have a very low “life expectancy”. The blame 
is to be shared by the respective reporters/media and public authorities 
who for the most part still tend to ignore the investigative reports. On 
the other hand, there are also the stories aimed at discrediting particular 
public figures or organizations. Smear campaigns are part of the media 
landscape and tend to proliferate in periods of major political events, 
election times in particular. It is a professional test for journalism how 
susceptible the media are to this type of abuse of their public power, 
more often than not proving to be the turf of former and current 
officials in the security sector. One alarming tendency, however, is the 
tacit taboo in the professional community on publications concerning 
corruption in the media themselves.
The media have undeniably managed to demonstrate that a wide 
range of dubious practices in Bulgarian society are in fact corruption. 
They have raised public sensitivity and encouraged intolerance to a 
broad spectrum of corrupt actions. They have also coined a matching 
discourse for the public to use in the debate on corruption. 
The media are now not simply reporting law enforcement action against 
corruption but publish facts which need further investigation. In this, 
besides the usual methods reporters rely more on whistleblowers and 
on non-governmental organizations. There are already numerous good 
practices where the media, civic organizations, law-enforcement bodies, 
and the public administration form effective coalitions. They, however, 
rarely outlive the particular purpose of their formation.
In the last few years certain pieces of legislation related to judicial and 
economic reform were highlighted by some print and broadcast media 
because of the corruption risks involved. This was a good example how 
the media can do valuable preventive work as well. 
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CHART 33. DISTRIBUTION OF CORRUPTION-RELATED ITEMS BY GENRE
Source: Media Monitoring by Coalition 2000
Implementing professional and ethical journalistic codes is an important 
step towards enhancing media accountability. The fact that the code of 
ethics of journalists adopted in late 2004 was signed by major media 
provides some reason for hope. The code obliges the signatories to 
verify their sources and not to quote anonymous sources unless the 
information provided is of public importance; to differentiate information 
from commentary; to specially designate any paid advertisements and 
commercial messages, etc.
Education is arguably the most powerful instrument in shaping social 
attitudes. In acknowledging its role in anti-corruption, the National Strategy 
for Counteracting Corruption highlights the need to raise quality standards 
in secondary and higher education; to implement a policy aimed at 
restoring and reinforcing the authority and status of teachers; to develop 
and implement a national policy for monitoring and improving the 
quality of education through the system of staff recruitment in the 
various sectors, and to enhance the role of the national education 
system for the anti-corruption education and awareness of the nation. 
Aiming to leave a lasting impact in the field of anti-corruption, 
Coalition 2000 has also been successful in bringing Bulgaria’s young 
into the broader rule of law constituency. As a result of the Coalition 
work, there are now about 350 secondary schools in Bulgaria which 
have expressed interest in teaching anti-corruption as a part of the civic 
education program or as an optional subject.
A working group put together by the Coalition with Ministry of Education 
representatives, teachers and NGOs is in the process of laying the 
long term framework for anti-corruption education by elaborating a 
policy Concept Paper on the formal introduction of anti-corruption 
education for the school year 2005/06. The working group, recognizing 
the need of teaching materials for teachers and students, promoted 
the preparation of resources such as training manuals, readers, course 
curriculum, online learning course. Upon the request of the Ministry of 
Education Coalition 2000’ training resources were distributed to schools 
and educational district administrations with the recommendation to be 
used as teaching tools.
The Coalition has also prompted similar advancements in the universities 
where a number of optional anti-corruption courses were taught. For 
the first time anti-corruption was introduced in the curriculum of the 
Pedagogical Department at Sofia University as well as in the teaching 
program for 2004-2005 academic year at the Information and Qualification 
of Teachers Department, Sofia University.
The Small Grants Program of Coalition 2000 was another important 
instrument to encourage anti-corruption education and to establish a 
nation wide network of NGOs working in this area. In different Bulgarian 
towns anti-corruption instruction at the secondary schools and onsite 
classes were piloted. Within these projects support was received from 
local and district authorities in introducing the “Open Doors” initiative 
CIVIL SOCIETY AGAINST CORRUPTION 113
5.3. Anti-Corruption 
Education
(pupils’ visits to municipality offices, police, court, etc.) which was aimed 
at fostering a democratic culture, anticorruption values, etc. through 
enhancing the knowledge about the institutions, transparency and good 
governance, human and civil rights.
However, efforts to teach anti-corruption to students could be jeopardized 
by graft in the very schools and universities. The latter, if they are to 
be successful in teaching anti-corruption schools and universities, need 
to promote integrity in their administration as well. In 2003, the data 
from the Coalition 2000 Corruption Monitoring System and other studies 
in the area of higher education challenged the assumption that this 
public service tended to be less affected by corruption. University faculty 
and administrative staff were ranked at one of the leading positions by 
amount of corruption pressure exerted. The proportion of those who 
have experienced corruption pressure from university teachers ranges 
between 12 and 21%, and as regards administrative staff, between 3 
and 12% of all who have had contacts with these groups. Besides the 
regular monitoring of corruption conducted by Coalition 2000, which 
provides information about the scope of the problem in the area 
of higher and secondary education, there have been a number of 
specific disclosures regarding bribes solicited at universities. A number 
of mechanisms have also been identified for corrupt practices – making 
students purchase textbooks and other works authored by particular 
faculty members; undue payment for administrative services and undue 
examination fees; issuing of false diplomas, etc.
As in other areas of anti-corruption reforms, partnership between 
government and civil society would be crucial to tackle these 
challenges. These should involve both the Ministry of Education, the 
administration of state-run and private universities, parents’ associations, 
NGOs, regional educational inspectorates and other institutions. There 
have been already been some pilot efforts (eg electronic register of 
the regulatory framework of education and educational credits) which 
should be developed further. 
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CONCLUSION
There are several factors that determine Bulgaria’s entry into the crucial 
phase of its anti-corruption reforms. First, there is a positive trend, 
captured both by Coalition 2000’s Corruption Monitoring System and 
by international surveys after 1997, of a decrease of administrative 
corruption that should be developed further. There were some 
indications in late 2004 of a marginal increase in corruption prevalence 
compared to earlier that year. This implies that anti-corruption policies 
may be exhausting their effect and need to be consolidated and 
expanded. Second, political and large-scale corruption, which has 
been only slightly affected by reforms so far, impacts negatively on 
competitiveness and economic growth. This may lead to a vicious 
circle in which low economic efficiency bolsters corruption and vice 
versa. Third, the success of Bulgaria’s integration into the European 
Union depends on how it confronts corruption. Corruption hampers the 
country’s accession process in several ways: it weakens its institutions 
and impedes the implementation of common EU rules and policies; 
it heightens the risk of embezzlement and poor management of the 
EU pre-accession and structural funds; and it facilitates the “export” of 
crime to the Union. 
The challenges and opportunities of EU membership require that anti-
corruption reforms be an integral part of Bulgaria’s overall modernization 
strategy. In this context, the priority areas of anti-corruption policy in 
the next few years should be a fundamental reform of the judiciary 
and law-enforcement and the curbing of organized crime and the 
hidden economy. Anti-corruption policies should be more tailored 
to specific areas as well as targeted at the broader root causes of 
corruption:
• Continuing the development of democratic institutions. Constitutional 
changes should introduce improved checks and balances of the 
branches of government thus enhancing their anti-corruption potential. 
In order to meet the - as the USAID Anticorruption Strategy puts 
it - “dual challenges of grand and administrative corruption”10 
mechanisms of democratic control should be reinforced. Specialized 
anti-corruption units should receive more authority and higher profile. 
Legal provisions on political party financing, lobbying, campaigning 
and the restriction of political intervention in the judiciary, economy 
and media should be considered with priority. 
10 USAID Anticorruption Strategy, January 2005, p.2
• An effective and stable judiciary that is free from corruption is 
the most powerful agent of the rule of law and anti-corruption. 
Thus, anti-corruption reforms in the judiciary and law-enforcement 
should remain a priority area in Bulgaria’s progress towards EU 
accession. Several key challenges must be met: completing the 
reform in the pre-trial phase of the criminal process; transforming 
the role and functions of the investigation and prosecution bodies11, 
making judicial bodies and law enforcement improve their information 
exchange and cooperation.
• Market economy institutions should be strengthened to encourage 
legitimate business. Economic freedom and competition need to 
be bolstered, business should be burdened less by bureaucracy, and 
business ethics should be promoted. Bulgaria’s economic growth is 
held back by a lack of consistent policy to promote competition, 
as well as by monopolies established through political corruption. 
Bulgarian business is still debilitated by a heavily bureaucratized 
administrative control system which leads to excessive costs and 
corruption. Corruption schemes allowing a particular bidder to win 
in public tenders and concessions still exist. It is also important to 
set clear and transparent provisions on the use of EU pre-accession 
funds and to build a reliable system for internal and independent 
oversight of their programming and management.
• Reducing the influence of organized crime in government and the 
economy. Suppressing the economy of crime would be an important 
step towards reducing corruption practices which sustain it in the 
first place. The customs administration is still implicated in significant 
corruption and customs fraud in export/import deals and smuggling 
operations. Business and its associations are crucial stakeholders in 
ridding the economy of its gray sector and corruption and should 
be thus involved in anti-corruption policies. Bringing the hidden 
economy below 20% of GPD before the time of Bulgaria’s accession 
to the EU is a bold but realistic target.
• Civil society should maintain its active role in anti-corruption 
initiatives. NGO efforts should venture into areas where reform is 
underdeveloped or is yet to be launched, such as health care reform, 
education, and social security. Reducing corruption in these public 
services would indicate that the country is irreversibly on the road of 
successful and sustainable reforms. 
A strategy of social modernization has to rely on an effective anti-
corruption policy. Even a well-designed anti-corruption program would 
fail to bring about lasting impact if implemented outside the overall 
philosophy of legal, institutional, social and economic reforms. Anti-
corruption reforms should follow a holistic approach and when properly 
coordinated should manage to increase the risk, cost and insecurity for 
 
 
 
 
11 The case for these reforms has been extensively argued by Coalition 2000 and the Center 
for the Study of Democracy in the period 2002-2004. See Judicial Anti-Corruption Program, 
Sofia, 2003 and Corruption Assessment Report 2003.
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both parties to a corruption deal. As long as corruption is perceived as a 
low-risk, low-cost, high-profit endeavor, the efforts towards its reduction 
will be of small consequence. 
Effective coordination between all stakeholders - the legislature, the 
executive, and the judiciary with all their separate agencies; the central 
and local governments and institutions; NGOs and the media - is a 
must of the anti-corruption process. Civil society should keep the 
momentum of its anti-corruption initiatives and maintain its crucial 
watchdog function. The latter, together with the partnership of public 
and private institutions are the key factors for the success of anti-
corruption reforms. 
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